Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

2002

The impact of institutional stock ownership on a firm's earnings
management practice: an empirical investigation
Santanu Mitra
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the Accounting Commons

Recommended Citation
Mitra, Santanu, "The impact of institutional stock ownership on a firm's earnings management practice: an
empirical investigation" (2002). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 319.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/319

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu.

THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL STOCK OWNERSHIP ON A FIRM’S
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT PRACTICE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Accounting

By
Santanu Mitra
M.Com., University of Calcutta, India, 1983
C.A., The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, 1984
M.B.A., The University of New Hampshire, 1998
December 2002

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………………..iv
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………...vi
1. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………….1
2. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE VARIABLE AND INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS………………………………………………………………………….8
2.1. Theories of Governance Structure Variable……………………………………...8
2.2. Importance of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance…………………8
3. PRIOR RESEARCH…………………………………………………………………11
3.1. Prior Research on Corporate Governance Variables……………………………11
3.2. Prior Research on Influence of Institutional Investors………………………….14
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT………………18
4.1. Research Questions…………………………………………………………….. 18
4.2. Hypothesis Development………………………………………………………..18
4.2.1. Active Monitoring of Institutional Investors Hypothesis………………...18
4.2.2. Information Environment Hypothesis…………………………………….23
5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND MODEL………………………………………………27
5.1. Description of the Tests …………...……………………………………………27
5.2. Measure of Earnings Management……………………………………………...28
5.3. Estimation of Abnormal Current Accounting Accruals………………………...35
5.4. Cross-Sectional Multiple Regression Models…………………………………..39
5.4.1. Cross-Sectional Multiple Regression Model to Test Hypothesis 1………40
5.4.2. Cross-Sectional Multiple Regression Model to Test Hypothesis 2………47
5.4.3. Cross-Sectional Multiple Regression Model to Test Hypothesis 3………51
5.5. Clientele versus Monitoring Effects of Institutional Investors…………………53
6. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE DATA…………………………….. 57
6.1. Details of Sample Selection……………………………………………………..57
6.2. Industry Distribution of Sample Firms………………………………………….60
6.3. Descriptive Statistics…………………………………………………………….60
6.4. Distribution of Abnormal Accrual Variations…………………………………..64
6.5. Correlation Statistics…………………………………………………………….67
6.6. Estimated Coefficients and Descriptive Statistics for
Firm-Specific regressions……………………………………………………….77
7. RESULTS……………………………………………………………………………83

ii

8. ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION…………………………………………………...100
8.1. Test of Institutional Effects on Accrual Management in a
Dummy Variable Setting………………………………………………………100
8.2. Cross-Sectional Tests of Institutional Influence on Accrual
Management……………………………………………………………………107
8.3. Institutional Monitoring Effects on Generation of Positive
Abnormal Accruals…………………………………………………………….129
8.4. Regression Diagnostics………………………………………………………...138
9. CONCLUSIONS………………………………………………………………….. 140
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………147
VITA……………………………………………………………………………………154

iii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Sample Selection Procedure …………………………………………………...62
Table 2: Industry Distribution of Sample Firms Based on
Three-Digit SIC Codes…………………………………………………………63
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Employed in the Study………………...69
Table 4: Distribution Pattern of Abnormal Accrual Variations………………………….72
Table 5: Statistics for the S&P 500 and the Non S&P 500 Firms of the Final Sample….74
Table 6: Distribution of Abnormal Accrual Variations across Firms With and
Without Concentrated Institutional Stockholdings……………………………..76
Table 7: Correlation Matrix of Variables Used in Various Regressions………………...79
Table 8: Estimated Coefficients and Descriptive Statistics for
386 Firm-Specific Regressions…………………………………………………82
Table 9: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Abnormal Accrual Variation on
Institutional Stock Ownership and Other Control Variables…………………..94
Table 10: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Abnormal Accrual Variation on
Concentrated Institutional Stockholdings and Other Control Variables………95
Table 11: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Abnormal Accrual Variation on Various
Measures of Concentrated Institutional Shareholdings and Other
Control Variables……………………………………………………………...96
Table 12: Cross-Sectional Regressions Testing the Institutional Shareholding Effects
in the S&P 500 and the Non S&P 500 Firms of the Full Sample……………..97
Table 13: Cross-Sectional Regressions Testing the Institutional Shareholding Effects
Separately for the S&P 500 and the Non S&P 500 Firms ……………………98
Table 14: Test of Clientele versus Monitoring Effects of Institutional Investors in the
Context of Accrual Management Using Two-Stage Least Squares…………...99
Table 15: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Abnormal Accrual Variation on
Institutional Stock Ownership and Other Control Variables in Dummy
Variable Classification Setting on Median Institutional Percentage
Shareholdings………………………………………………………………...108

iv

Table 16: Cross-Sectional Regression in a Dummy Variable Setting of Mutually
Exclusive Institutional Ownership Constructs on Median Percentage
Shareholdings………………………………………………………………...109
Table 17: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Abnormal Accrual Variation on Institutional
Stock Ownership and Other Control Variables in Dummy Variable Setting
on Quintiles of Institutional Percentage Shareholdings……………………...110
Table 18: Cross-Sectional Regression in a Dummy Variable Setting of Mutually
Exclusive Institutional Ownership Constructs on Quintiles of Institutional
Percentage Shareholdings……………………………………………………111
Table 19: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regressions of Absolute Current Accruals on
Institutional Stockholdings and Other Control Variables……………………118
Table 20: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis of Concentrated Institutional
Shareholding Effects on Accrual Management……………………………...119
Table 21: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regressions Testing the Institutional Shareholding
Effects on Accrual Management in the S&P 500 and the Non S&P 500
Firms of the Full Sample…………………………………………...………...120
Table 22: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regressions Testing the Institutional Shareholding
Effects on Accrual Management Separately for the S&P 500 and the
Non S&P 500 Firms …………………………………………………………121
Table 23: Annual Cross-Sectional Regressions of Absolute Current Accruals on
Institutional Stockholdings and Other Control Variables……………………122
Table 24: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression of Positive Accounting Accruals on
Institutional Percentage Shareholdings and Other Control Variables……….134
Table 25: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis of Concentrated Institutional
Shareholding Effects on Management of Positive Accruals…………………135
Table 26: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regressions Testing the Institutional Shareholding
Effects on Positive Abnormal Accruals Separately for the S&P 500 and the
Non S&P 500 Firms …………………………………………………………136
Table 27: Pooled Cross-Sectional Tests of the Institutional Shareholding Effects on
Positive Abnormal Accruals in the S&P 500 and the Non S&P 500 Firms
of the Full Sample……………………………………………………………137

v

ABSTRACT
This study examines whether institutional investor shareholdings inhibit firm
managers from engaging in earnings management practice. It investigates the empirical
association between discretion/flexibility available to managers in managing abnormal
non-cash working capital accruals and institutional stock ownership for a sample of 386
New York Stock Exchange firms over a period of 8 years, from 1991 through 1998. The
differential institutional influence on the level of accrual management of firms having
different information environment, S&P 500 versus non S&P 500, is also examined to
see whether the difference in information environment of these two sets of firms has any
effect on this empirical relationship.
By performing various multivariate statistical analyses, I find significant evidence
that institutional stockholders reduce management flexibility in generating abnormal
accounting accruals. Further, concentrated institutional shareholdings in some cases are
found to diminish managerial propensity to manage abnormal accruals. A separate
analysis for the S&P 500 and the non S&P 500 firms reveals that institutional monitoring
effect on accrual management is different for these two sets of firms. I observe that
institutions do not have mitigating influence in the S&P 500 firms but have significant
mitigating effects on accrual management level in the non S&P 500 firms.
The study makes two-fold contributions to the existing earnings management
literature. First, it is generally assumed in prior studies that firms have uniform abilities to
generate abnormal accruals to manage earnings. This study provides evidence that
management’s ability to manage earnings is not constant across firms but varies
according to the level and concentration of institutional stock ownership. Institutional
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investors are found to improve the quality of corporate governance in financial reporting
in cases where other important governance factors exist. Consequently, this study also
extends prior research that examined the effects of other influential governance factors
such as external audit, independence of boards or audit committees on the level of accrual
management. Second, I develop a unique and powerful accrual model, which represents
an improvement over the traditional accrual models typically used in previous research
and provides more robustness to the tests of earnings management.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this study, I examine the effect of institutional stock ownership on a firm’s
earnings management activity by testing the empirical association between institutional
investor shareholdings and flexibility available for managers to make use of abnormal
accrual adjustments to manage earnings.1 This study is motivated by the fact that most
previous earnings management research generally ignores the influence of corporate
governance factors that might constrain managers’ ability to manage earnings, and a few
studies to date have directly examined the effects of such a limiting factor on earnings
management activity.
In recent years, regulators have expressed serious concern over earnings
management. In a 1998 speech, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman
Arthur Levitt identified several accounting practices that he claimed were eroding the
quality of reported earnings and he advocated a number of initiatives to improve the
quality of financial reporting. To address this concern, the SEC has started examining the
disclosure requirements and formed a task force to crack down on firms that
opportunistically manage earnings.2 This action continues under the current chairman,
Harvey Pitt. Furthermore, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National
Association of Security Dealers (NASD) have proposed a rule change regarding the
1

As defined by the SEC in Rule 13-f, institutional investors are entities such as bank trusts, insurance
companies, mutual funds, and pension funds that invest funds on behalf of others and manage at least $100
million in equity. Entities such as arbitrageurs, brokerage houses, and companies holding stock for their
own portfolio (as opposed to their pension funds) are not considered institutional investors by the SEC and
are not required to disclose their equity investments (Bushee 1998).
2

On the SEC’s recommendation, the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) was formed in 1999 (co-sponsored by
NYSE and NASD) to look into the area of improving auditor effectiveness. The goal of the BRC was to
find ways to improve the financial reporting process and enhance the role of the audit committee in
overseeing the process. The BRC has recommended that companies have audit committees comprised
entirely of independent outside directors. On December 14, 1999, the SEC approved changes to the audit
committee rules of the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ requiring the listed companies to comply with the
independence requirements before June 14, 2001.
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independence of audit committees for listed companies to increase the effectiveness of
monitoring the financial reporting process. Dechow and Skinner (2000) suggest that as
the stock market valuations (measured in terms of earnings and book values) increased in
the 1990s, managers have become increasingly sensitive to the level of their firms’ stock
prices and their relation to key accounting numbers such as earnings. Consequently, their
incentives to manage earnings to maintain and improve firm valuations have also
increased. These recent and ongoing events suggest that incentives and motivations
behind earnings management by firms and of factors that mitigate or encourage such
actions remain an important and useful area in accounting research.
Managers are posited to opportunistically manage earnings to maximize their
utility at the expense of other stakeholders. Growing evidence from prior research
supports the argument that earnings management is a common practice in firms (e.g., Dye
1988; Trueman and Titman 1988; Scott 1998).3 Given that managers have flexibility in
choosing accounting policies, they choose policies that maximize their own utility. Most
studies of earnings management take this opportunistic perspective (e.g., Watts and
Zimmerman 1986, 1990; Cahan 1992; Sweeney 1994; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). The
primary focus on earnings management research to date has been on detecting whether
3

According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence the contractual
outcomes that depend on the reported accounting numbers.
According to Parfet (2000), earnings management can be good or bad. A good earnings management is a
reasonable and proper practice that is a part of operating a well-managed business and delivering value to
shareholders. A bad earnings management involves intervention to hide real operating performance by
creating artificial accounting entries or making accounting estimates beyond a point of reasonableness.
But empirically, so far it has not been possible for researchers to separately identify cases of good and bad
earnings management. For example, use of accounting accruals is necessary to make financial statement
more informative about the economic performance of an entity in a given time-period. However, the same
accruals can be used by managers to manage earnings to accomplish their own economic objectives.

2

and when earnings management occurs. Researchers typically use broad measures of
earnings management (e.g., based on accounting accruals) and draw a sample of firms
where motivations to manage earnings are expected to be strong (Christie and
Zimmerman 1994; Healy and Wahlen 1999).
Prior accounting research on earnings management generally ignores the
influence of a firm’s governance structure as an intervening variable that limits the ability
of managers to manipulate earnings and assumes, instead, that the ability to manage
earnings is constant across firms (Jiambalvo 1996). It remains an essential facet of
earnings management research to look into the impact of various constraining factors on
a firm’s ability to manage earnings. Relatively few studies have specifically looked into
the influence of corporate governance on earnings management activity. Prominent
studies in this area, among others, are done by Becker et al. (1998), Francis et al. (1999),
Chung et al. (2002) and Klein (2002). Becker et al. (1998) have examined the relation
between audit quality and accrual management. They documented that Big-Six auditors
reduce management’s accounting flexibility to opportunistically engage in managing
earnings through discretionary accrual adjustments. Francis et al. (1999) also observe that
the Big-Six auditors constrain managers’ ability to opportunistically report accounting
accruals. Further, Chung et al. (2002) find evidence that institutional investors inhibit
management to opportunistically engage in accrual management to smooth the earnings
stream to achieve a desired level or range of profits. Klein (2002) observes that changes
in board or audit committee independence are accompanied by changes in the level of
abnormal accruals, a measure of earnings management. She concludes that an

3

independent board or audit committee is more effective in monitoring the corporate
financial reporting process by reducing the magnitude of abnormal accruals.
Dechow et al. (1996), in their study on firms subject to SEC enforcement actions,
have noted that firms manipulating earnings are less likely to have outside block-holders
and more likely to have boards of directors dominated by management. They suggest that
a firm’s governance structure plays an important role in management’s decision to
manipulate earnings, and sophisticated investors are more likely to expose the earnings
manipulation by firms. In their study on the reassessment of earnings quality, Balsam et
al. (2000) find evidence that, relative to individual investors, institutional investors are
more capable of quickly recognizing and decomposing the accrual components into
discretionary and non-discretionary parts to reassess the reported earnings integrity. They
assert that the sophisticated investors are more capable of recognizing earnings
management than unsophisticated investors because of their access to other timely and
valuable sources of firm-specific information.
Institutions have the resources, abilities and opportunities to monitor and
discipline managers to focus more on long-term appreciation of firm-values. Institutions
with substantial investment in a firm’s common stock have heightened incentives to
monitor firm-management. Whether they actually monitor and exert their influence is,
therefore, an empirical question (Chung et al. 2002). I examine the influence of
institutional investors, an influential corporate governance factor, on a firm’s accrual
management level in the presence of previously tested constraining factors such as audit
quality and independent audit committees, in a general setting where other traditional
underlying incentives and motivations behind earnings manipulations are expected to

4

exist. My primary objective is to see whether institutional stockholders have any
incremental mitigating influence on a firm’s accrual management activity. I also examine
this influence of institutional stockholders for firms with different information
environments. The basic difference between this study and most previous research on
earnings management is that in this study, I focus on the impact of an influential
constraining factor on earnings management activity rather than various economic factors
providing managerial incentives to engage in earnings manipulation.
As this study examines the aggregate influence of institutional investors4 in the
context of overall earnings management, it is also an extension of several previous
studies that examined the institutional influence on the level of specific expenditure items
of a firm such as research and development and property plant and equipment (Bushee
1998; Wahal and McConnell 2000; Eng and Shackell 2001). Chung et al. (2002) suggest
that although a number of studies were done in the past investigating the association
between institutional stock ownership and corporate performance, there are very few
studies that have examined how institutions monitor and influence certain management
actions. This study extends this stream of research by examining institutional influence
on the overall level of accrual management by firms.
Three hypotheses are developed. In the first hypothesis, I predict an inverse
relationship between a firm’s accrual management activity and its institutional stock
ownership. The second one extends the first hypothesis to the effect of concentrated
institutional stockholdings and predicts that increases in concentrated stock ownership
4

The use of institutional stock ownership as a sophistication variable is well established in accounting and
finance research. The studies using such variable look into the aggregate effects of institutional owners in
the context of a specific economic circumstance or a research situation. (e.g., Chung et al. 2002; Balsam et
al. 2000; Wahal and McConnell 2000; Bartov et al. 2000; Duggal and Millar 1999; El-Gazzar 1998; Utama
and Cready 1997; Kim et al. 1997).
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have mitigating influence on a firm’s accrual management activity. In the third
hypothesis, I predict differential institutional influence on accrual management in the two
sets of firms, the S&P 500 and the non S&P 500 as they have different information
environments.
The empirical tests in the study produce evidence consistent with institutional
investor activism in the earnings management context. Using a sample of 386 New York
stock exchange listed firms over a time-period of eight years from 1991 to 1998, I find
evidence that institutional investors have a strong mitigating influence on a firm’s accrual
management activity. The institutional stockholders are found to reduce management’s
flexibility in generating abnormal accruals to manage earnings during the sample timeperiod under study. Further, for certain measures of concentration, this monitoring
influence increases with the increase in concentration of institutional stockholdings in a
firm. Firms having concentrated institutional shareholdings experience greater
institutional monitoring and as a consequence, have lower flexibility to use accruals to
manage earnings. The results of this study are consistent with those of Chung et al.
(2002) who report that institutions deter management from opportunistically engaging in
accrual management to smooth earning streams. Additionally, I segregate the clientele
effects from the monitoring effects of institutional investors on accrual management
levels to eliminate an alternative interpretation of the empirical test results. By adopting
the two-stage least square approach, I have shown that institutions, in fact, provide
monitoring to constrain management flexibility to manipulate accounting accruals. I
observe, however, that the mitigating influence of institutions on accrual management is
largely moderated for the S&P 500 firms in the sample compared to the non S&P 500

6

firms. By partitioning the full sample between S&P 500 and non S&P 500 firms, I find
that there is a significant institutional influence for the non S&P 500 firms but not for the
S&P 500 firms. As a whole I find significant institutional effects on firms’ accrual
management activities in a general setting after accounting for the effects of firm-specific
variables controlling for firms’ abnormal accrual generation process. The study’s result
suggests that institutional investors improve the quality of corporate governance by
reducing the level of earnings manipulation.
The results of this study contribute to the existing literature of earnings
management by examining and demonstrating an empirical relationship between an
influential corporate governance factor, institutional stock ownership, and a measure of
earnings management, flexibility in generating abnormal accounting accruals. Previous
studies have examined the influence of two important governance variables, audit
committee and external audit, on overall earnings management efforts. By examining the
effects of a third influential governance factor, institutional stock ownership, on accrual
management levels, the study makes an important and incremental contribution to the
stream of earnings management research. The result of the study holds when two other
governance variables, independent audit committees, high quality external audit, are
included. My results suggest that it is essential to control for the effects of the corporate
governance factor, especially the impact of sophisticated group of stockowners in the
form of institutional investors, in an earnings management study because managers’
abilities to manage earnings are not constant but differ across firms depending on the
level and concentration of institutional stockholdings.

7

2. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE VARIABLE AND INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS
2.1. Theories of Governance Structure Variable
There are several theories concerning how governance structures affect the
practice of earnings manipulation. Dechow et al. (1996) suggest that outside blockholders
of common shares improve credibility of a firm’s financial statements by providing close
scrutiny over its earnings management activity.
Margiotta (1994) suggests that effective monitoring by large outside blockholders
of shares reduces the need to tie managerial compensation to earnings performance. If the
compensation is not linked to earnings performance, the incentive for managers to
manage earnings for personal gains is substantially diminished.
Core (1995) argues that the presence of large block-holders of shares reduces the
agency costs since managers would be more inclined to act in the interest of shareholders
and would reduce the extent of fraudulent reporting through accounting manipulation to
avoid litigation.
According to the Financial Economists Roundtable Statement on Institutional
Investors and Corporate Governance (1999), with an increase in institutional investment
in an entity, the institutional interest to monitor management actions increases because of
the increasingly large economic stakes. Substantial ownership provides strong incentives
to institutions to actively monitor and influence management actions and its various
policy decisions.
2.2. Importance of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance
The variable of interest in this study is the influence of institutional investor
shareholdings on a firm’s earnings management practice. Institutional investors have

8

become dominant equity holders in the U.S. during the past twenty years, and therefore,
have become an influential governance factor in U.S. corporations. According to one
estimate, institutional investors hold about one-half of the outstanding common stocks of
U.S. corporations (Duggal and Millar 1999). The Financial Economists Roundtable
(1999) estimated that institutional ownership of public corporations’ common stock grew
from 6% of the total outstanding stocks in 1950 to 47% by the end of 1996. Institutions
now hold nearly 60% of the common stock of the 1,000 largest US corporations. These
investors, therefore, hold large blocks of shares in firms and substantially influence
trading activities in the capital markets.
Institutional investors have two incentives for managing their portfolio of
investments: 1) fiduciary responsibilities and 2) higher investment performance. To
satisfy their fiduciary responsibilities, institutions develop a prudent/selective investment
policy and continuously monitor performance (Arbel et al. 1983). The efficient selection
and monitoring of investments involves large-scale development of private pre-disclosure
information (Brous and Kini 1994). Moreover, most institutional investors reward
portfolio managers on quarterly performance (Hessel and Norman 1992). This
compensation policy gives portfolio managers incentives to search for private
information to help them improve investment performance. The search for private
information by institutional investors is cost-effective because of the potential benefit
associated with their large stakes in a corporation.5 In addition, managers of firms with a

5

In an interview with investment managers of four different institutions, the managers emphasized that
they spend much time and effort on information collection and in-house analysis to improve portfolio
performance and to satisfy their fiduciary standards (El-Gazzar 1998).
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large institutional ownership may be induced to voluntarily release a high level of predisclosure information to gain confidence of institutional stockholders (El-Gazzar 1998).
The business community has expressed concern about the increasing power of
institutional investors in the market and their influence over corporate policies (El-Gazzar
1998). Nussbaum and Dobrzynski (1987) report that institutions hold blocks of securities
and continually monitor corporate performance. Institutions with a large stock ownership
within a firm are likely to trigger more voluntary disclosures by managers of that firm
and can impose their investment objectives on firms by introducing motions and
proposals at annual meetings, which counter management policies (Hessel and Norman
1992). Jones (1993) claims that institutional investors have contributed to the resignation
of CEOs of major corporations such as IBM, GM and Kodak, because institutions
believed that management did not serve owners’ interest.6

6

GM’s management made major policy changes less than three weeks after a threat was made by the
Council of Institutional Investors (Hessel and Norman 1992), a pension fund organization collectively
owning over $1 trillion of assets and taking active part in the corporate governance. The Co-chairman of
the Council has made it clear that such pressure would continue when he said: The Council members want
to meet with CFOs to make sure that their opinions are considered when policies are formulated and to
ensure that management feels accountable to someone outside the firm.
A study by Opler and Sokobin (1998) on the activism of the Council of Institutional investors provides
evidence that the firms on the Council’s focus lists subsequently experienced significant improvements in
operating profitability and share returns. Institutional investors attempt to improve firm-performance either
through non-confrontational, long-term negotiation strategies or through confrontational strategies
exemplified in shareholder motion or proposal.
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3. PRIOR RESEARCH
3.1. Prior Research on Corporate Governance Variables
Although a considerable body of research has examined managerial incentives to
opportunistically adjust earnings, relatively little research has examined factors that
constrain earnings management activity. Becker et al. (1998) have examined the
relationship between audit quality and earnings management by considering external
auditing as a part of corporate governance. They assume that Big-Six auditors are of
higher quality than non Big-Six auditors and find evidence that the clients of non Big-Six
auditors report discretionary accruals, a proxy for earnings management, that are, on
average, 1.5-2.1 percent of total assets higher than that reported by the clients of Big-Six
auditors. Consistent with earnings management, they find that the mean and median of
the absolute value of discretionary accruals are greater for firms audited by non Big-Six
auditors. Becker et al. (1998) also examine the variation in discretionary accruals, which
they suggest reflects the accounting flexibility that the auditor allows. They document
that the companies audited by non Big-Six auditors have significantly larger variation in
discretionary accruals compared to the companies audited by Big-Six auditors over the
sample period. They conclude that the test results are consistent with the external auditor
acting as a constraint on management’s opportunistic choice of accounting procedures,
with the effectiveness of such constraint depending on auditor quality. High quality
auditing acts as an effective deterrent to earnings management activity.7

7

This result is consistent with an earlier study done by Teoh and Wong (1993), which shows that earnings
response coefficients are higher for Big-8 auditees. They contend that this is the evidence of higher audit
quality for these firms, under the assumptions that a high quality audit ensures high earnings quality leading
to greater informativeness of earnings and higher association between reported earnings and market returns.
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Francis et al. (1999) have also examined whether the Big-Six auditors mitigate
firms’ earnings management behavior by constraining aggressive, potentially
opportunistic reporting of accruals. They find that even though firms with the Big-Six
auditors have relatively higher level of total accruals, they have smaller amount of
estimated discretionary accruals compared to firms audited by the non Big-Six auditors.
They extend this analysis to the three levels of audit quality. Firms audited by the first
tier Big-Six auditors have smaller discretionary accruals than firms audited by the second
tier national auditors, and firms audited by the second tier national auditors have smaller
discretionary accruals than firms audited by the third tire local auditors. They contend
that the Big-Six auditors have greater ability to constrain management’s aggressive and
questionable accounting practices. Francis et al. (1999) also find evidence that high
accrual firms hire Big-Six auditors to convey credibility of their reported earnings to
outside stakeholders of firms. High quality auditing is, therefore, regarded as an element
of effective corporate governance that reduces managerial opportunism in the area of
corporate financial reporting.
Warfield et al. (1995) observe that the increase in managerial ownership reduces
the magnitude of discretionary accrual adjustments especially for unregulated firms
because with an increase in managerial stock ownership, there is a greater alignment of
interests between managers and shareholders leading to more faithful determination of
accounting numbers and more informativeness of accounting earnings. However,
Warfield et al. (1995) also find evidence that the inverse relationship between managerial
ownership and absolute abnormal accruals becomes moderated in case of regulated firms.
They suggest that regulation provides monitoring on managers’ choice of making accrual

12

adjustment to manage earnings. Following this research, Gul et al. (2002) finds evidence
that the results of Warfield et al. (1995) are likely to depend on perceived auditor quality
in terms of Big-6 versus non Big-6 auditors. The result holds more strongly for non Big-6
auditees than for Big-6 auditees. Audit quality (proxied by Big-6 auditors) moderates or
weakens the negative association between the magnitude of discretionary accruals and
management ownership. Gul et al., therefore, suggest that the Big-6 audit mitigates
potential agency problems for firms with low managerial ownership.
Krishnan (2000) finds evidence that the market attaches higher value to the
discretionary accruals audited by Big-Six auditors relative to the discretionary accruals
audited by non Big-Six auditors. He shows that the association between stock returns and
discretionary accruals is greater for firms audited by Big-Six auditors than for firms
audited by non Big-Six auditors. Further, the discretionary accruals of clients of Big-Six
auditors have a greater association with future profitability than discretionary accruals of
clients of non Big-Six auditors. Krishnan (2000) argues that high-accrual firms face
greater agency costs compared to low-accrual firms and that auditing plays an important
role in mitigating those agency costs by constraining opportunistic management of
accruals.
In a study on institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management,
Chung et al. (2002) find evidence that the presence of large institutional shareholdings
inhibit managers from managing accruals to achieve desired level of earnings. Their
results show that when managers have incentives to increase or decrease reported profits
as revealed from the cash-flow performance for current versus future periods, they
accomplish the objective by using income-increasing or income-decreasing discretionary
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accruals to maintain a desired earnings stream. However, when investment institutions
collectively own a large percentage of outstanding common stock in firms, managers are
deterred from fully using discretionary accruals to opportunistically manage earnings.
Chung et al. (2002) suggest that with the increase in shareholdings in a particular firm,
institutional investors have strong incentives to monitor management to increase firmvalue by focusing more on long-term profitability instead of managing earnings on a
year-by-year basis. McConell and Servaes (1990) also report a statistically significant
relationship between the value of a firm (as measured by Tobin’s Q) and percentage
shareholdings of institutional investors.
In a recent study, Klein (2002) examines whether audit committee and board
characteristics are related to earnings management. Using a sample of 692 firm-years, she
finds evidence that the magnitude of abnormal accruals (a measure of earnings
management) is more pronounced for firms having audit committees comprised of less
than a majority of independent directors. Further, abnormal accruals are inversely related
to the percentage of outside directors on the audit committees. Klein (2002) concludes
that reductions in board or audit committee independence are accompanied by an increase
in abnormal accruals. Therefore, boards structured to be more independent of the chief
executive officer are more effective in monitoring the corporate financial reporting
process.
3.2. Prior Research on Influence of Institutional Investors
Previous studies on the influence of institutional investors over firm-specific
expenditures provide mixed evidence. Bushee (1998) examines whether institutional
investors reduce or create incentives for managers to cut research and development
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expenditure (R&D) to meet short-term earnings goals. He observes that firms with a high
percentage of institutional owners typically do not reduce a firm’s R&D spending.
However, a large percentage of ownership held by institutions engaged in momentum
trading increases the probability of firms managing their earnings upward through a
reduction in R&D spending. Bange and De Bondt (1998) also examined the management
of research and expenditures (R&D) and its association with institutional shareholders.
They conclude that there is less earnings management (related to R&D) when
institutional stockholdings are high.
Wahal and McConnell (2000) analyze corporate expenditures for property plant
and equipment (PP&E) and research and development (R&D) for more than 2,500 firms
and find no support for the contention that institutional investors discourage managers to
invest less in a project with a long-term pay-off. In fact, they document a positive
relationship between industry-adjusted expenditures for PP&E and R&D and the fraction
of shares owned by institutional investors. Similarly, Eng and Shackell (2001) find a
significantly positive relationship between firms’ R&D intensity and shareholdings of
institutional investors. As R&D investments have the immediate effects of reducing nearterm earnings (via FASB statement no.2),8 the result indicates that institutional investors
do not enforce managers to focus exclusively on short-term earnings performance.
Institutional investors are found to have a positive influence on the level of R&D
spending in firms implying that they encourage firms to invest in long-term value
enhancing projects.

8

All expenditures in conjunction with an R&D project, including personnel costs, materials, equipments,
facilities and intangibles, for which the company has no alternative future uses beyond the specific project
for which the items were purchased, are to be expensed (FAS-2, par.11).
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A number of previous studies have observed that institutional investors are, on
average, better informed than individual investors are because they spend substantial
resources on information search, which reduces information asymmetry between
management and outside stakeholders of firms making it difficult for managers to
manipulate earnings (e.g., Shiller and Pound 1989; Lev 1988). They encourage corporate
managers to focus on long-term value-maximizing projects. Other research findings,
however, suggest that institutional investors pressure managers to achieve short-term
profit goals at the expense of long-term value maximization (Greaves and Waddock
1990; Jacobs 1991; Potter 1992). Managers, for example, are discouraged from investing
in long-term projects and focus instead on projects with short-term pay offs especially
when the institutional investors themselves are judged by their own short-term portfolio
performance. Institutional trade is responsive to earnings and may provide management
with additional incentives to focus on earnings results (Lang and McNichols 1998) and
engage in short-term earnings manipulations. Historically, when a firm’s earnings
performance weakened, institutional investors divested stocks. Due to the high level of
shareholding by institutions, the sudden divestiture tends to drive the stock price down at
least temporarily.
Prior research also contends that institutions destabilize stock prices. This is based
on the premise that swings in institutional demand for a stock have a larger effect on its
price than swings in individual investors’ demands because institutions have much larger
holdings than most individuals and therefore have a larger influence in trading activity in
the market. More importantly, price destabilization may be aggravated by correlated
trading across institutional investors or by herding based on information about the quality
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of investments from each other’s trade (Shiller and Pound 1989), or on some exogenous
signals (Lakonishok et al. 1992). An opposing view is that institutional investors are
rational investors who counter the unpredictable changes in the sentiment of individual
investors. They are exposed to a variety of news reports and analyses, as well as to the
guidance of professional money managers, which puts them in a better position to
evaluate the fundamentals. Institutional investors, in fact, stabilize the stock prices.
Lakonishok et al. (1992), however, observe that neither the stabilizing nor the
destabilizing image of institutional investors is accurate.
There are arguments suggesting that the presence of substantial institutional
shareholdings is associated with superior corporate performance. Some studies document
a positive association between institutional stock ownership and corporate performance
(e.g., McConnell and Servaes 1990; Nesbitt 1994; Smith 1996; Guercio and Hawkins
1999) while others show that there is no such association between institutional stock
ownership and corporate performance in terms of accounting and stock return measures
(e.g., Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Wahal 1996; Duggal and Millar 1999; Facio and Lasfer
2000). Unfortunately, there is no strong consensus in the results from empirical research.
As a whole, institutions are found to have a profound influence on a firm’s
performance and its value in the equity market. Their investment objectives and horizons
may provide incentives or disincentives to firm management to focus either on
maximizing short-term earnings or on appreciating long-run value by improving firm
performance/profitability and/or focusing more on long-term value-enhancing projects.
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4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
4.1. Research Questions
In view of the mixed research evidence regarding the role of institutional
investors in corporate governance and their influence on managerial actions of a firm, I
pursue the following related research questions in the present study:
1) Is institutional stock ownership associated with earnings management practice
after controlling the proxies for traditional earnings management incentives such
as size, debt contract, compensation, financial risk etc?
2) Does such institutional influence on a firm’s earnings management activity vary
between the sets of firms differing in their information environment?
4.2. Hypotheses Development
4.2.1. Active Monitoring of Institutional Investors Hypothesis
The institutional investors are, on average, better informed than individual
investors due to their large-scale development and analysis of private pre-disclosure
information about firms. So, systematic differences exist in the amount and precision of
private information in the hands of institutional and individual investors. The higher level
of informedness of institutional investors also implies that with the increase in
institutional investor shareholdings in a firm, the information asymmetry between
shareholders and managers will decline thereby making it more difficult for managers to
manipulate earnings. In their study on whether the extent of reassessment of earnings
integrity varies with investor sophistication, Balsam et al. (2000) observe that because of
their access to other more timely sources of information, institutional investors recognize
earnings management more quickly and more easily than unsophisticated individual
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investors by decomposing the reported earnings into discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary earnings.
Duggal and Millar (1999) advance two arguments in favor of institutional
monitoring on firms. First, institutional investors perform quality research in order to
identify efficient firms to invest funds, thus directing scarce capital to its most efficient
use. Second, the large institutional stake in public corporations provides strong economic
incentives for institutional managers to monitor the firm performance to maximize their
investment value. This vigilant institutional monitoring enhances managerial efficiency
and the quality of corporate decision-making.9 These arguments are supported by the
recent finding of Chung et al. (2002) that institutions inhibit managers to
opportunistically engage in income smoothing efforts. They argue that substantial
investment in a firm make institutions more interested in monitoring managers’ choice of
accounting techniques.
Bushee (1998) finds evidence that managers are less likely to cut R&D expenses
to reverse an earnings decline when institutional ownership is high, implying that
institutional investors provide monitoring to encourage managers to concentrate more on
value-enhancing projects. Wahal and McConnell (2000) find a positive relation between
institutional investor shareholding and firms’ industry-adjusted expenditures on R&D and
PP&E. They conclude that they do not find any evidence that institutional owners
pressure corporate managers to concentrate more on managing short-term earnings and

9

1) Institutional monitoring may involve holding discussions with management on corporate plans and
performances, supporting or opposing the management’s wealth enhancing or reducing policies and
decisions, active participation in board elections and other voting issues (Duggal and Millar 1999).
2) The institutional owners of Honeywell and Lockheed Corporation used the proxy voting mechanism to
oppose management attempts to block a take-over (A.C. Wallace-The New York Times, Section D:1:3,
July 5, 1998).
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less on projects with a long-term pay-off. The similar positive association between
institutional investor shareholdings and a firm’s R&D intensity is found by Eng and
Shackell (2001), implying that institutional investors encourage managers to invest in
value-enhancing projects by spending more on research and development.
Although the effects of institutional monitoring should eventually be reflected in
operating and stock performance, some researchers (e.g., McConnell and Servaes 1990;
Chaganti and Damanpour 1991) have not been able to document a strong association
between institutional ownership and corporate performance. Further, Duggal and Millar
(1999) do not find any evidence that active institutional investors, as a group, enhance
efficiency in the market for corporate control. Several other research studies document
that institutional trade is responsive to earnings, which creates a pressure on managers to
focus more on achieving short-term profit targets (e.g., Lang and McNichols 1998;
Greaves and Waddock 1990; Jacobs 1991).
According to Potter (1992), institutional investors are overly focused on shortterm earnings, and as such, they are incapable of monitoring management. The
institutional owners are passive investors who are likely to sell their holdings in poorly
performing firms rather than expend their resources in monitoring firms to improve their
performance (Duggal and Millar 1999). Fearing that a decline in short-term profit will
lead to the liquidation of institutional ownership in the firm and at least a temporary
decline in equity value, managers are compelled to take actions that increase short-term
profit and resort to earnings manipulation in case the actual earnings are expected to fall
short of predictions. Moreover, several factors may make institutions disinterested in
overseeing firm management. Greaves (1988) argues that fund managers cannot afford to
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take a long-term view in their investment decisions since they are reviewed and rewarded
on the basis of quarterly, or at most, annual performance.
So, previous research provides competing evidence with respect to the active
monitoring influence of institutional owners on a firm’s operation. The primary objective
of this study is to examine this issue of institutional monitoring in the context of earnings
management and explore the relationship in a general setting where the traditional
incentives behind earnings management are expected to exist. Since the study is not
related to any particular economic event giving rise to specific earnings manipulation
incentives, I am interested in the magnitude, not the direction, of discretionary accounting
accruals, i.e., the combined effect of income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals.
I predict that the magnitude of accrual manipulation, an instrument of earnings
management, is considerably less in the case of firms with high levels of institutional
stock ownership because the accounting flexibility available to managers in managing
accounting accruals is expected to decrease with increase in institutional investor
shareholdings. In other words, my prediction is based on the active monitoring influence
of institutional investors on a firm’s earnings management activity.10
The first hypothesis, in its alternative form, is:
H1: The higher the level of institutional investor shareholdings, the lower the
level of accrual management by firms.11

10

According to the Financial Economists Roundtable Statement (1999), the larger the ownership position
held by an entity, the greater is its incentive to actively oversee the management. The large stockowners are
more likely to fully capture the economic benefits from their activism, and hence are more likely to
perceive their oversight activities as cost effective.

11

Accounting flexibility/discretion indicates the level of accrual management in a firm over the sample
period of eight years.

21

This hypothesis posits a negative relationship between the level of institutional
ownership and a firm’s earnings management practice. Since the flexibility of generating
discretionary accounting accruals (DACC) is positively related to the magnitude of
DACC (Barton 2001),12 the hypothesis implies a negative association between the
magnitude of DACC and the level of institutional ownership. The greater the institutional
ownership percentage, the lower is the accounting flexibility or discretion available to
managers to manage earnings through accruals and the lower is the magnitude of
abnormal accruals arising out of managerial discretion.
A natural follow up from the first hypothesis is that with an increase in
concentration of institutional stock ownership,13 the flexibility available to the firm
managers (or, the discretion exercised by firm managers) to manage earnings is deemed
to decline. The concentrated shareholding is expected to increase institutions’ incentives
to monitor managers, making them more focused on maximizing long-term profitability
instead of being overly pre-occupied with managing short-term earnings.14 Hence, my
second hypothesis in its alternative form is:
H2: When the institutional stock ownership is highly concentrated, the level of
accrual management is lower.

12

Barton (2001) finds a significant positive relationship between the magnitude of DACC and the
flexibility available to the management to generate discretionary accounting accruals. In this study, I find
that the Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the two variables is 0.527, which is highly significant with
p-value of 0.000 (Spearman Correlation Coefficient: 0.935; p-value: 0.000).

13

By concentration of shareholdings, I assume at least 5% shareholding in a firm by a single institutional
investor (termed as large blockholder). I predict that the persistent presence of large blockholders in a firm
makes it difficult for managers to engage in accrual manipulation activity in financial reporting process.
With increase in concentration, institutions may also find it difficult to liquidate their positions in a firm if
they feel that managers are not maximizing shareholder value (Financial Economists Roundtable Statement
1999).

14

Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that ownership concentration is an important determinant of corporate
governance.
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An increase in concentration of institutional shareholdings in a firm is expected to
increase the desire of institutions to exert more monitoring on management’s choice of
accruals to manage earnings, which leads to a reduction of flexibility available to
managers in the context of accrual management. This hypothesis is formulated on two
assumptions: 1) greater concentrations of institutional shareholdings lead to larger
economic interest and 2) greater institutional stakes in the long-term performance of
firms create disincentives for managers to focus excessively on short-term performance
that reduces their propensity to manage short-term earnings making them more inclined
toward enhancing long-term profitability. Rajgopal et al. (1998) find evidence that the
informativeness of earnings as measured by the earnings response coefficient (ERC),
increases with the increase in institutional ownership; in other words, the ERC is
positively impacted by institutional investor shareholdings after controlling for other
ERC determinants. They argue that institutional owners actively monitor management to
improve the credibility of financial statement information. Therefore, it is expected that
as the concentration of institutional stockholdings increase, the institutional monitoring of
a firm’s financial statement preparation will also increase.
4.2.2. Information Environment Hypothesis
Hessel and Norman (1992) find that institutional investors have a greater
preference for large firms than do individual investors. Empirical research by Aggarwal
and Rao (1990), Cready (1994) and Potter (1992) consistently find institutional
investment to be associated with information-rich environment. Cready (1994) observes
that relative to individual investors, institutional investors prefer the stocks of larger
firms, S&P 500 firms, and of firms with low dividend yields. Potter (1992) documents a
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positive relationship between size and institutional ownership. The positive relationship
between firm-size and institutional holdings is in many cases viewed to be due to legal
factors. Many institutional investors are held by the courts to a ‘prudent person standard’.
The courts have viewed firm size as evidence of prudence (Lang and McNichols 1998).
Guercio (1996) argues that the inclusion of S&P 500 firms in the portfolio of
institutional investors may not be a convincing support for the prudent-man hypothesis.
The inclusion of such stocks may be proxies for something other than quality. He
contends, for example, that banks overweight S&P 500 stocks because they tend to
passively index. Banks prefer large stocks for liquidity reasons or to avoid regulations on
the disclosure of beneficial ownership. So, laws and regulations also influence the
institutional investment behavior.
Therefore, the question remains whether institutional investors provide active
monitoring to enhance the long-term value of their investments in firms of their
preference in which they make large investments, or, they simply invest in large firms to
meet the prudent person standard. Institutional investors may engage in relationship
investing by concentrating their investments with the objective of achieving long-term
capital appreciation, or they may simply passively index by holding a diversified
portfolio. Moreover, larger firms, on average, release more public information and are
subject to more scrutiny by external agencies than small firms. Previous studies
document that more information is generated and analyzed for larger versus smaller firms
(e.g., Atiase 1985, Collins, Kothari and Rayburn 1987; Freeman 1987). Bhushan (1989)
finds that analysts’ following increases with firm size, and Utama and Cready (1997) find
evidence that sell-side analysts’ services reduce the information asymmetry between
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institutional and individual investors. So, greater information dissemination and analyses
occur for large firms leading to a reduction of uncertainty in the market about large firms.
Therefore, the difference in information environment between the S&P 500 and the
comparatively smaller non S&P 500 firms may cause institutions to exert different
degrees of monitoring over management decisions to use certain types of accounting
techniques to manage earnings.
Following the previous research evidence, I consider S&P 500 firms as the
benchmark for large capitalization firms attracting institutional investments15 and classify
those firms in the sample as S&P 500 that constantly appear on the S&P 500 list
throughout the sample period. The information environment of such S&P 500 firms is
expected to be superior to that of non-S&P 500 firms because the S&P 500 firms have
greater visibility, larger analysts’ following, and are subject to monitoring by various
external agencies compared to the non S&P 500 firms. It is, therefore, interesting to study
whether the difference in the information environment of these two sets of firms leads to
differential institutional monitoring on earnings management. I expect a significant
difference in information environment between the sample firms that appear constantly
on S&P 500 list during the sample time period and the firms that sometimes appear on
S&P 500 list during the same time period or do not appear at all. So, I specifically
examine whether the institutional influence on earnings management differs between the
two sets of firms with different information environments, e.g., S&P 500 and non S&P
500 firms. The third hypothesis, in its alternative form, is:
15

Standard and Poor’s considers, among other criteria, the market capitalization value of a firm to place it
in S&P 500 category. In general, the companies in S&P 500 index have capitalization value of over $4
billion though the agency adds companies with lower market values to the index (General Guide for S&P
U.S. index membership – September 2000). So, the S&P 500 firms, on average, have larger capitalization
values and are expected to have greater visibility in the market compared to the non S&P 500 firms.
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H3: The monitoring influence of institutional stock ownership on the level of
accrual management is different for the S&P 500 and the non S&P 500
firms.
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5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND MODEL
5.1. Description of the Tests
The following tests are conducted to examine the predicted relationship between
institutional stock ownership and earnings management practice as developed in the
hypotheses:
1) Test of empirical association between percentage of institutional stock
ownership and accrual management activity measured in terms of variations in
abnormal non-cash working capital accruals during the sample time-period.
2) Test of the above empirical association in the case where the institutional
stock ownership is concentrated in a firm to see whether the concentrated
stockholdings by institutions have any mitigating influence on accrual
management activities of the firms.
3) Test of the association between institutional stock ownership including
concentrated ownership, and accrual management activity for firms having
different information environment. For this, I use two categories of firms, e.g.,
firms that constantly appear in the S&P 500 list throughout the sample period
of eight years and firms that do not constantly appear in the S&P 500 list or do
not appear at all in the sample period of eight years.
In all the tests discussed above, I examine the effects of institutional stock
ownership at the aggregate level through association studies. I argue that though this
association study does not establish a direct causal link, a statistically significant
association certainly implies causality, which is consistent with the institutional investor
activism in the context of earnings management activity.
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5.2. Measure of Earnings Management
Each revenue and expense item in reported income has a discretionary and a nondiscretionary component. For many of these items, management can exercise discretion
through accounting method choice, through operating, investing and financing policies,
and through choice of estimates for a given accounting period (McNichols and Wilson
1988). Tests of earnings management generally assume that earnings are managed
through changes in accounting procedures, through specific transactions such as writedowns, and through discretion exercised over accounting accruals.
Sloan (1996) finds that stock prices behave as if investors fail to correctly
consider the valuation implications of the accrual component of earnings, which is found
to be less persistent compared to the cash component because of its reversal in
subsequent periods. He concludes that the result is consistent with earnings fixation by at
least some market participants. Investors adjust their trading decisions based on reported
total earnings rather than on the analysis of different components of earnings, accruals
and cash flow and their implications for future earnings. The evidence of accrual
mispricing by the market is also found by subsequent studies (e.g., Ali et al. 2000;
Chambers 1999; Xie 2001; DeFond and Park 2001 etc).16
Moreover, in a recent study, Bradshaw et al. (2001) find evidence that
professional intermediaries such as analysts and auditors do not provide investors with
information concerning the future earnings problems experienced by firms with high
accruals (having low quality of earnings). They find that sell-side analysts’ earnings
16

Xie (2001) finds evidence that the market overprices abnormal accruals while DeFond and Park (2001)
conclude that the market overprices abnormal accruals because investors underanticipated the future
reversal of these accruals. DeFond and Park (2001), however, document that market participants
understand the reversing implications of working capital accruals but do not fully impound its pricing
implications at the earnings announcement dates leading to subsequent stock price adjustments.
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forecasts do not incorporate predictable future earnings declines associated with high
accrual content in current earnings. Moreover, auditors do not signal future earnings
problem associated with high accruals through either their audit opinions or through
auditor changes. These findings favor the effectiveness of managing accruals by firms in
order to mislead certain sections of investors or to loosen contractual constraints imposed
on firms by outside stakeholders or to influence the contractual outcomes that depend on
the reported accounting numbers.
The accounting accruals reflect the summarized effects of managers’ selection
and application of accounting techniques. McNichols and Wilson (1988) argue that
accruals will reflect the effect of earnings management in many contexts on an ongoing
basis. The undoing of income differences caused by accruals can be difficult because the
information required to make these adjustments is not likely to be available (Schipper
1989). If managers manipulate accruals in ways that are hard to monitor, examination of
visible accounting choices to discover managerial opportunism in financial reporting
would underestimate the opportunistic behavior of managers (Christie and Zimmerman
1994). Hence, accrual management provides opportunity for managers to conveniently
adjust reported earnings to their economic advantage (sometimes by misleading the
outside stakeholders) without being easily detected.17

17

For example, a manager could produce lower income by increasing bad debt expenses, increasing
inventory write-offs, classifying more indirect manufacturing costs as period expenses rather than
inventoriable costs, accelerating purchases of inventory at year-end when LIFO is used, extending the use
of accelerated depreciation methods, or, by reducing the estimated lives of fixed assets (Cahan 1992).
Similarly, earnings may be increased by early recognition of sales, delayed recognition of expenses,
decreasing the bad debt provisions, delaying the purchase of inventories when LIFO is used, classifying
more indirect manufacturing costs as inventoriable costs rather than period expenses, or, by extending the
use of straight-line method of depreciation, or by increasing the estimated lives of fixed assets.
Subsequent detection of earnings management can be costly for managers. Dechow et al. (1996) find
evidence that the firms face significant increases in their costs of capital once earnings manipulations are
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In this study, I apply a modified version of the Jones (1991) model developed by
Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate abnormal accounting accruals that constitute a measure
of earnings management. The modified Jones model adopts an aggregate accrual
approach. The aggregate accounting accruals have two components, current and noncurrent. The current component of accruals relates to the changes in non-cash working
capital items such as accounts receivable or accounts payable, which can be caused by
changes in various revenue and expense items. The non-current accruals, on the other
hand, are depreciation and depletion expenses as well as deferred tax and amortization of
bond discounts/premium etc. These are associated with long-lived assets and long-term
liabilities. It is easier for managers to manipulate current accruals relative to non-current
accruals because they can exercise more discretion over the choice and application of
accounting techniques with regard to regular revenue and expense items. Sloan (1996)
also reports that most of the variation of total accruals is driven by current accruals.18
The objective here is to ascertain the variation of abnormal accruals caused by
managerial discretion during an estimation period of the study and to examine the
association between this variation and institutional percentage stock ownership. The
variability of abnormal accruals indicates the flexibility/discretion available to managers
in managing earnings and is used as the measure of the level of accrual management in a
firm during the sample time-period. Contrary to previous earnings management studies, I

made public. Moreover, the capital market imposes substantial costs on firms identified as earnings
manipulators. The average stock prices dropped by approximately 9% following the initial announcement
of the alleged earnings management. Dechow et al. (1996) also find that the identification of earnings
manipulator is associated with increase in bid-ask spread, a drop in analyst following, increase in short
interest rates and an increase in the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts.
18

Sloan (1996) documents that the most significant source of accrual variation is attributable to movements
in receivables and inventories that are not matched by movements in current liabilities. Sloan points out
that it is important to look at aggregate working capital accruals in order to identify such mismatches.
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focus on firm-specific abnormal accrual variability as the potential measure of earnings
management. For a number of reasons, this measure is more effective and efficient in
capturing accrual management level than abnormal accruals determined cross-sectionally
by previous studies (either by stacking data in a pooled accrual model or by applying the
time-series or cross-sectional version of the Jones or the modified Jones model to firmyear or firm-quarter data).
First, multi-year accrual management in a firm can effectively be captured by the
variability of abnormal accruals since prior studies show that the magnitude of abnormal
accruals are positively correlated with its variability (e.g., Barton 2001). The magnitude
indicates the extent to which accruals are managed by managers using certain accounting
techniques. Therefore, the variability measure also indicates the extent of discretion or
flexibility available to managers in managing accruals in the time-period under study.
Second, firm-specific determination of abnormal accrual variability eliminates
the possibility of serial dependence problem that may arise in case of stacking firm-year
or firm-quarter data in pooled time-series cross-sectional regression. The serial
dependence of regression residuals causes underestimation of residual variance or MSE
(root mean squared error) and overestimation of regression coefficients that inflate the
significance of test statistics, leading to distorted test results and erroneous inference.
This problem is avoided if the level of abnormal accruals is measured on a firm-by-firm
basis.
Third, managing accounting accruals is unlikely to be a single-year decision but
may be a part of multi-year management strategy of employing certain accounting
procedures to manipulate earnings in corporate financial reporting. Managers are more
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likely to have a long horizon while formulating a strategy for reporting accounting
numbers consistent with the production, investment, and financial plans of the firm for
the future. The year-to-year management of earnings, therefore, is a part of the broad
management strategy followed in corporate financial reporting over a specific timeperiod in compliance with overall operating decisions. As a result, the earnings
management in a particular year is not independent of prior or subsequent year. A multiyear measure of accrual manipulation such as this study’s residual variance directly
reflects this multi-year aspect of earnings management.
For example, based on long-term revenue forecasts dictated by the projected sales
demand, the management in a firm may develop some projected earnings numbers over
the next five years. They may have some desired level or range of profit in mind which
they want to report considering the firm’s equity market value, its past earnings trend, the
general profitability trend of the industry in which the firm belongs, and the competitors’
earnings position. In view of all these factors, a long horizon financial and operating
decision calls for a management strategy to report earnings at a certain level or within a
certain range over the years covered under the plan. The effects of other economic and
market-based factors on the firm’s operations are also considered. On the basis of all
available information, the management may formulate a policy of using certain
accounting techniques, including accruals, to manage and maintain earnings at the
desired level or range over the time-period under plan and use accounting accruals along
with other techniques such as managing derivatives to manage earnings. Examining
accrual management at an individual firm level over a time-period is, therefore, more
likely to reveal the level of such earnings management during this time-period.
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Researchers sometimes account for the possibility of correlated accrual management
actions over time-periods by employing the previous period’s discretionary accruals as a
separate explanatory variable in the regression model. This variable in particular is
expected to control for reversal effects based on the premise that abnormal accruals will
revert in the next period because they are considered to be an instrument for shifting
earnings between periods. This design, however, is deficient in two respects. First, it
imposes a distinct year-to-year linear structure on the manipulation that is essentially adhoc in nature because management may continue to manipulate accruals in some
unidentified fashion. Second, the magnitude of any serial correlation between abnormal
accruals in successive periods, particularly if it is negative, itself directly reflects the
degree of manipulation that is occurring. Such reversed manipulation is necessarily
excluded from the empirical measure of interest in this study.
Finally, many institutions (e.g., pension funds, etc) invest funds in a firm as a part
of their long-term investment policy and do not liquidate their positions based on shortterm firm performance. The large economic stakes of institutions provide them more
incentives to monitor management actions toward enhancing long-term profitability.
Moreover, Bushee (2000) finds evidence that the proportion of firm value captured in
long-term earnings is associated with the level of stock ownership held by institutions
having long investment horizons such as pension funds. Hence, the association between
accrual management and institutional stock ownership can be better established if I use
firm-specific abnormal accrual variability over a certain time-period as the dependent
variable when I examine the institutional effects on such variability during such period.
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In this study, I focus on current accruals (i.e., non-cash working capital items)
instead of total accruals because the scope for manipulating non-current accruals is
assumed to be relatively limited for management, and hence the magnitude of its
variability compared to that of current accruals is also expected to be less. Bradshaw et
al. (2001) suggest that there are two key differences between working capital and total
accruals. First, working capital accruals exclude a variety of long-term accruals, such as
depreciation of plant and equipment and amortization of the debt premium/discount.
These accruals tend to be fairly constant over time and account for little variation in total
accruals. Second, total accruals include a variety of ‘special’ accruals, such as gains and
losses on the sale of plant/other investments and accruals associated with asset writedowns. These accruals tend to mean revert very quickly, but they are usually flagged as
special, non-recurring items on the income statement. Bradshaw et al. (2001) argue that
investors are more likely to anticipate the non-recurring nature of these accrual items.
They find evidence that working capital accruals do a better job than total accruals in
capturing abnormal accruals that lead to earnings reversals not anticipated by investors.
Hence, it appears that managing current accruals as compared to total accruals is a more
effective instrument for managers to manipulate earnings without being easily detected.
I use a version of the modified Jones model (1995) to extract the abnormal
component of such current accruals arising out of managerial discretion and use it as a
proxy for earnings management.19 Like some previous studies such as Rangan (1998), the
dependent variable of the accrual model used to segregate the abnormal component is the

19

The abnormal accrual arising out of managerial discretion is termed as discretionary accrual, which is the
focus of this study as a measure of earnings management.
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aggregate current accruals instead of total accruals. The details of model development are
discussed in subsequent sections.
5.3. Estimation of Abnormal Current Accounting Accruals
In this study, an estimate of abnormal current accounting accruals (ACACC) is
used as the proxy for earnings management because it is expected that managers can
adjust current accruals relatively easily compared to non-current accruals in an attempt to
manage earnings. Consistent with the prior studies on earnings management that estimate
either total or current accruals as the case may be (e.g., Jones 1991; Cahan 1992; Perry
and Williams 1994; Dechow et al. 1995; Rangan 1998; Balsam et al. 2000; Pyne and
Robb 2000), I use the following firm-specific accrual equation to compute current
accruals from the changes in non-cash working capital items as reported in the balancesheet.
CACCit = [∆CAit - ∆Cashit] - [∆CLit - ∆CLDit] ……………………(1)
where, CACCit = Total current (working capital) accruals for firm i in year t;
∆CAit = Change in current assets for firm i in year t;
∆Cashit = Change in cash for firm i in year t;
∆CLit = Change in current liabilities for firm i in year t;
∆CLDit = Change in the current portion of long-term debt for firm i in
year t.
I use a version of the modified Jones accrual model as developed by Dechow et
al. (1995) to segregate the abnormal component of current accruals that arises out of
managerial discretion.
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The current accruals have both normal and abnormal components. In the original
Jones model (1991), two explanatory variables are considered to account for the nondiscretionary components of total accruals: the changes in revenues (∆REV) that account
for non-discretionary changes in working capital items and the level of gross property
plant and equipment (PPE) that account for non-discretionary depreciation expenses. The
Jones model is based on the assumption that revenue controls for the normal level of
accruals, while property plant and equipment controls for depreciation and depletion
expenses. Therefore, changes in current assets and current liabilities are driven by
changes in revenues. Kang (1999) argues that this restrictive assumption is questionable
since current liabilities such as accounts payable are more likely to be related to expenses
than to revenues. The omission of expenses potentially explains why the Jones model
produces upward bias in managed accruals in an economic upswing or downward bias in
an economic downswing. The modified Jones model, which uses changes in revenues,
adjusted by changes in accounts receivables, also suffers from the same limitation.
To address this concern, in addition to ∆REV, I include changes in cost of goods
(∆COGS) sold as an explanatory variable to control for changes in those working capital
items such as accounts payables that are expected to be more related to expenses rather
than revenues. Rangan (1998) has applied this approach in developing his current accrual
model to isolate the abnormal component of current accruals. However, I adjust changes
in cost of goods sold by changes in inventory based on the reasoning that inventory is a
potential source of managerial manipulation. A significant portion of abnormal current
accruals may be attributed to discretion exercised in recognizing and managing inventory
items.
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Operating cash flows (OCF) and accruals constitute total income. Firms facing
declines in OCF may engage in accrual manipulation to maintain smoothed earnings
streams as Sloan (1996) finds that at least some investors do not look beyond the reported
earnings number and analyze the earnings components. On the other hand, accruals are
also used partly to smooth the effects of cash flow variability on reported earnings to
produce a reliable and timely measure of economic performance of a firm during a
certain time period (as per performance measurement hypothesis advocated by Guy et al.
1996). The smoothing property of accounting accruals also implies that the nondiscretionary or normal accrual (NACC) is negatively correlated with OCF. In normal
business operations, the extreme positive (negative) cash flows in a particular period
result in negative (positive) NACC. So, failure to control for the association between
OCF and NDACC will cause a part of the NACC to be reflected in the residuals of the
accrual model and be erroneously termed as the abnormal accruals resulting from
managerial discretion. I include changes in OCF (∆OCF) as a variable to control for such
relationship in the model.
The abnormal current accruals resulting from managerial discretion (ACACC) are
the portion of total accruals that is not explained by the variables of the regression model,
i.e., the residual/error terms,∈it in equation (2).20 This portion of accounting accruals is
assumed to be the result of managerial manipulation. The standard deviation of residuals
computed from the following firm-specific regression forms the dependent variable of
interest in the main analysis of the study. The firm-specific current accrual model is (an
extended version of the modified Jones model) described as follows:
20

This is similar to the methods employed by previous studies, e.g., Cahan (1992), Hall and Stammerjohan
(1997), Ericson and Wang (1999), Barton (2001).
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CACCit /TAit-1 = β0i + β1i [(∆REVit -∆RECit) /TAit-1] + β2i [(∆COGSit + ∆INVit) / TAit-1]
+ β3i (∆OCFit / TAit-1) +∈it ………………………(2) 21
where,
CACCit = Total current accounting accruals for firm i in year t, as per equation (1).
∆REVit = Change in revenues of firm i in year t from year t-1;
∆RECit = Change in accounts receivables of firm i in year t from year t-1;
∆COGSit = Change in cost of goods sold of firm i in year t from year t-1;
∆INVit = Change in inventory in year t – change in inventory in year t-1;
∆OCFit = Change in operating cash flows of firm i in year t from year t-1.
TAit-1 = Total assets of firm i at the beginning of year t;
∈it = Error term for firm i in year t (proxy for discretionary accruals).
In the above equation (2), the variable, ∆REV-∆REC accounts for changes in
cash-basis revenue implying changes in the level of business activity and controls for the
related non-discretionary component of working capital accruals and the variable,
∆COGS + ∆INV accounts for changes in operating expenses that control for the related
portion of normal current accruals. The TA deflator controls for potential scale bias
(Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995). The variable ∆OCF accounts for the effect of change
in operating cash flow on the level of normal business accruals (non-discretionary
accounting accruals). The error term, ∈it, from equation (2) accounts for the portion of
total current accruals that remains unexplained by the variables in the regression and is
the proxy for abnormal current accruals arising out of managerial discretion.
21

The modified Jones model implicitly assumes that all changes in credit sales in a period result from
earnings management. This assumption is based on the reasoning that it is easier to manage earnings by
exercising discretion over the recognition of credit sales than on cash sales (Dechow et al. 1996). As a
specification check, I also estimate standard deviation of abnormal current accruals over the sample timeperiod by applying the original Jones’ model (1991) and use it as the dependent variable of interest in the
main analysis to provide comparability of the study’s results.
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The firm-specific variability of such abnormal current accruals over the eight-year
period is the dependent variable of interest and hence, the root-mean square errors of
such regression is used as a proxy for earnings management in this study. Over any given
time-period, the mean squared residuals or residual variance reflects the variability of
discretionary accounting accruals that indicates accounting flexibility available to
management and as a result, discretion exercised by it in manipulating accruals during the
same time period. Therefore, the root of mean squared residuals estimated from the firmspecific equation (2) is used as the dependent variable of interest in the main portion of
the analysis.22
5.4. Cross-Sectional Multiple Regression Models
I use cross-sectional regressions to examine the relationship between the
accounting flexibility available (and, hence, discretion exercised by a firm in generating
abnormal accounting accruals as estimated from the firm-specific regression in equation
2) and institutional stock ownership. An inverse relationship between flexibility in
generating abnormal accruals and institutional stock ownership is expected in accordance
with the predictions made in Hypotheses 1 and 2. The independent variable of interest in
cross-sectional regressions is institutional percentage stockholdings.
Institutional stock ownership, however, is not the sole determinant of the level of
accounting accruals. There are a number of factors, which may make a difference in the
accrual generation process across firms. These factors are also expected to influence
management’s decisions to manage earnings. With reference to previous research, I
22

Becker et al. (1998) suggest that the variation in discretionary accruals implies accounting flexibility.
The greater the variation in accounting accruals, the greater is the accounting flexibility available to
management. The flexibility proxy indicates the extent of discretion exercised by a firm in the accrual
adjustment process. So the greater the flexibility, the greater is the magnitude of accounting accruals arising
out of managerial discretion.
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identify several such factors as determinants of earnings management and include them in
the cross-sectional model as control variables: managerial ownership, size, leverage, and
liquidity. I also consider variables such as profitability, growth, and structural changes in
business that are found by previous studies to be correlated with the measurement error of
abnormal accruals estimated from the traditional accrual models. These variables are
used in the cross-sectional test to control for the differences in the variation of abnormal
current accruals across firms resulting from their effects to cleanly segregate the impacts
of institutional stock ownership on the discretion exercised by a firm in making accrual
adjustments.
5.4.1. Cross-Sectional Regression Model to Test Hypothesis 1
In order to test the hypothesis that there is an inverse relationship between
flexibility in generating abnormal accruals and institutional stock ownership, I employ
the following cross-sectional regression model:
FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σNETWORTHi +β5
σLIQUIDITYi + β6 ROSi + β7 MBi + β8 CAPi+ β9 INSTi + εi …………..(3)
where,
FLACACi = Accounting flexibility available in generating current (non-cash working
capital) abnormal accruals, computed as the root mean squared residuals estimated from
the firm-specific regression in equation (2).
INSTi = Average percentage of institutional ownership of common stock in firm i over
the sample period of 8 years.23

23

I select institutional percentage shareholdings at the end of third quarter of each year because managers
are presumed to have more accurate estimation of annual earnings at this stage and likely to consider its
effects on the investment decisions of large stockholders like institutional investors (Bushee 1998).
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PMGR2i = Squared average percentage of managerial ownership of common stock in firm
i in the sample period of 8 years.24
SIZEi = Log of average total assets of firm i for the sample period of 8 years.
LEVi = Average leverage ratio of firm i for the sample period of 8 years, computed as
long-term debt/total assets.
σNETWORTHi = Standard deviation in stockholders’ equity for firm i in the sample
period of 8 years scaled by the mean stockholders’ equity.
σLIQUIDITYi = Standard deviation in liquidity computed as the standard deviation of
working capital for firm i in the sample period of 8 years, scaled by the mean working
capital.
ROSi = Average return on sales for firm i in the sample period of 8 years; the measure of
average operating profitability.
MBi = Average beginning market to book ratio of firm i in the sample period of 8 years;
the measure of average growth prospect.
CAPi = Average capital expenditures of firm i during the sample period of 8 years, scaled
by average total assets.
According to the prediction made in the first hypothesis, I expect the coefficient
of INST to be negative, i.e., β9 < 0.
•

Control variables explained
Warfield et al. (1995) documents a negative association between managerial

ownership (PMGR) and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. They observe that
the magnitude of discretionary accrual adjustments is significantly low when managerial
24

I square the average managerial percentage shareholdings to improve the linear relationship in the
regression.
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ownership is high and vice-versa. Specifically, the absolute value of abnormal accruals
when managerial ownership is under 5 percent is more than twice that for corporations
with managerial ownership above 45 percent. This is because the greater the managerial
ownership, the greater is the alignment of interests between managers and stockholders
and the greater is the managerial wealth tied to the long-term value of firms. Warfield et
al. (1995) argue that when separation of ownership and control increases, managers are
expected to capitalize on the latitude in reporting numbers by resorting to greater accrual
adjustments with the objective of maximizing personal economic benefits. The evidence
of increased discretionary accrual adjustments is consistent with strategic accounting
choice behavior by managers to mitigate contractual restrictions imposed by firms to
control the value-reducing managerial activities.
In the cross-sectional regression model, I include the proportion of managerial
stock ownership as a control variable, computed as a ratio of the total number of equity
shares held by managers to the total number of equity shares outstanding to control for its
effect on the variability of abnormal current accruals. I predict that the greater the
managerial stock ownership, the lower is the variability in generating abnormal accruals
arising out of managerial discretion.
Size (SIZE) is a proxy for a variety of economic phenomena such as risk, earnings
persistence, growth, accounting practices, political and regulatory costs and information
environment. Positive accounting theory suggests that managers of large firms are more
likely to exploit latitude in accounting to reduce political costs since sheer size often
leads to political costs by attracting regulatory attention. Prior studies find that managers
of firms facing regulatory actions choose income reducing discretionary accruals in the
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period of regulatory process (e.g., Cahan 1992; Hall and Stammerjohan 1997; Cahan et
al. 1997). However, large firms also have a rich information environment and high
visibility and are subject to scrutiny by various external agencies that reduce information
asymmetry between managers and outside stakeholders, especially institutions making it
difficult for managers to manipulate earnings by making questionable accounting
choices. So, size is expected to have a negative effect on the earnings manipulation
process. I predict an inverse relationship between the variability of abnormal accruals and
firm size.
Press and Wintrop (1990) and Duke and Hunt (1990) provide support for the use
of the leverage ratio (LEV) as a proxy for closeness to violating debt covenants. The
higher the leverage ratio, the greater is the possibility of violating debt covenants and the
greater is the chance that managers would engage in manipulating income upwards to
loosen the effect of constraints imposed by debt contracts. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994)
document that firms approaching debt-covenant violations use more income-increasing
total accruals as well as working capital accruals in the year before and in the year of
violation. They suggest that this accrual management behavior is caused by the tendency
to avoid the violation, to delay the violation, or to increase the possibility of reducing the
renegotiation costs once the covenant violation occurs. Press and Wintrop (1990) observe
that for firms with accounting based constraints in their debt contracts, the measures of
proximity to leverage, net worth, and working capital constraints are significantly and
positively correlated to the leverage ratio. In their study, Duke and Hunt (1990) examine
the validity of debt-equity ratio as a measure of closeness to debt-covenant restrictions.
They report that several versions of the debt-equity ratio capture the existence and
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tightness of retained earnings restrictions and the existence of net tangible assets and
working capital restrictions. There is a positive relationship between the leverage ratio
and closeness to the violation of debt covenants. Therefore, in this study I predict a
positive relationship between the variability in generating abnormal accruals and the
leverage ratio used as a measure of proximity to debt-covenant violation.
Moreover, a high leverage ratio indicates a greater financial risk for firms. With
an

increase in the leverage ratio, a firm’s financial risk increases, which induces

managers to use more income-increasing accruals to manage earnings upward to counter
the negative impact of increasing financial risk and to avoid reduction in firm value.
However, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1994) suggest that financially distressed
companies generate large negative accruals to make contractual renegotiations favorable
for them. These possibilities still support the prediction that variations in abnormal
accruals over the sample period are positively associated with the leverage ratio.
Liquidity is one of the important factors behind managers' earnings management
behavior. The change in working capital or operating cash flows brings about the change
in the liquidity position of a company. Sweeney (1994) observes that the greater the
reduction in operating cash flows, the greater is the necessity of income-increasing
accounting changes to offset the effects of a decline in liquidity. Sweeney (1994) has also
observed that the change in operating cash flows and the change in working capital are
highly collinear variables. Since the change in operating cash flows is already considered
a part of the accrual determination process, the change in working capital is considered as
the proxy for change in liquidity. I predict that the standard deviation of liquidity
(σLIQUIDITY), as measured by working capital variability during the sample period,
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explains a part of the cross-sectional difference in variability of abnormal current
accruals. The variability of working capital over the sample period is expected to be
positively related to the standard deviation of abnormal current accruals in the crosssectional test.
Managers of firms that are closer to default on debt covenants are more likely to
be involved in accounting accrual manipulations to make income increasing accrual
choice in an attempt to avoid covenant violations (Duke and Hunt 1990; Press and
Wintrop 1990; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Sweeney 1994). Sweeney (1994) observes
that the majority of debt-covenant violating firms violate net worth covenants. The
greater the decline in net worth, the greater is the necessity of income increasing
accounting changes to offset the tightness of debt-covenant constraints. A decline in net
worth signifies a decline in firm performance. Managers may adopt income increasing
accounting procedures to loosen the debt covenant constraints and to offset poor financial
performance (Sweeney 1994). I measure net worth as total stockholders’ equity and
predict that the variability of total stockholders’ equity (σNETWORTH) is positively
related to the standard deviation of abnormal current accruals.
Hansen (1999) finds evidence that discretionary accruals computed in accordance
with the Jones, the modified Jones, and the DeAngelo models are positively correlated
with structural change variables such as capital expenditure, sales of PP & E, acquisitions
and divestitures. The result supports Healy’s (1996) contention that discretionary accruals
estimated by the currently used accrual models may be correlated with changes in
business fundamentals. I use average capital expenditure (CAP) of each firm over the
sample period as a proxy for structural changes in business in the cross-sectional model
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to account for the portion of variations in abnormal current accruals that is attributed to
such structural changes. I also predict that an increase in capital expenditure indicates
managerial tendency toward enhancing long-term profitability, which, in turn, reduces
their concern about short-term earnings performance of firms making them less inclined
toward managing year-to-year earnings by accrual adjustments.
•

Control for correlated variables affecting abnormal accruals
In any accrual management study, it is necessary to control for the effects of

factors measuring firm performance and growth on the generation of accruals to isolate
the portion of accruals arising out of managerial discretion. McNichols (2000) finds that
both growth and profitability of firms have incremental power in explaining discretionary
accruals (DAC) calculated from the Jones or the modified Jones model. Firms with high
growth and profitability exhibit high DAC adjustments that might be correlated with firm
performance rather than incentives to manipulate earnings. This finding indicates that
high-growth and high-profitable firms are likely to exhibit positive DAC and that a
comparison of such firms with low-growth and low-profitable firms can lead to a
conclusion of greater earnings management by high-growth and highly profitable firms.
In view of high growth and profitability, the DAC adjustment may be the result of
unusual business operations, not the result of managerial discretion. Unless these two
variables are controlled in a cross-sectional test, the result may lead to an erroneous
conclusion regarding earnings management.
Moreover, Healy (1996) argues that the effect of ex-post performance influences
the accrual generating process, which is not captured by the existing accrual models. If
the demand for a product is ex-post lower than management anticipated, accruals are
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likely to be affected by asset write-downs. On the other hand, due to ex-post abnormal
growth in demand for products, the effects of stock-piling inventory are more likely to be
captured in the discretionary accruals, even though they arise as a result of unusual
business operations and not as a result of managerial incentive to manipulate earnings. To
control for the effects of such correlated variables in the cross-sectional regression, I
include return on sales (ROS) as the proxy for operating profitability, and market to book
ratio (MB) as the proxy for growth.25
The two variables are measured as follows:
Return on sales (ROS): Income before interest and taxes divided by net sales
(EBIT/Net Sales).
Market to book ratio (MB): Year-end market value of outstanding shares divided
by total stockholders’ equity.
5.4.2. Cross-Sectional Regression Model to Test Hypothesis 2
In order to test the second hypothesis that with the increase in concentration of
institutional stockholdings, the flexibility in generating abnormal accruals decreases, I
use several models and measures of concentrated institutional shareholdings to study the
concentration effects. The related cross-sectional models are discussed below.
1) To examine the concentration effect by using a dummy variable to reflect the
concentration construct
In many previous studies, dummy variable classification is employed to capture
certain levels of institutional percentage shareholdings to examine their effects on the
dependent variable of interest in a relative setting to facilitate understanding the degree of
institutional influence (e.g., Chung et al. 2002; Balsam et al. 2000; Ali et al. 2000).
25

Collins and Kothari (1989) suggest that market to book ratio provides a proxy for growth and/or
persistence.
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Following these studies, I formulate a concentration construct (CONC)26 by assigning a
value of 1 to firms having concentrated institutional shareholdings and 0 to firms not
having concentrated institutional shareholdings. By employing this approach, I examine
the concentration effect on accrual management in a cross-sectional setting in presence of
other control variables. The related regression model is as follows:
FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σNETWORTHi + β5
σLIQUIDITYi + β6 ROSi + β7 MBi + β8 CAPi + β9 CONCi + εi …………(4)
The above model is based on the assumption that the coefficients of the control
variables for the firms with and for firms without concentrated institutional shareholdings
are statistically the same. For the model 4, the intercept for firms having concentrated
institutional shareholdings is β0 + β9 while that for firms not having concentrated
institutional shareholdings is β0. The difference in the intercept is caused by the dummy
variable CONC providing extra shift to the intercept. According to the second hypothesis,
the coefficient of CONC is negative (i.e., β9 < 0), so the CONC variable is predicted to
provide negative shift to the intercept. Thus, firms having concentrated institutional
shareholdings have lower accrual management level (i.e., lower flexibility/discretion)
relative to firms without concentrated institutional stockholdings. Therefore, β0 + β9 is
less than β0 since β9 < 0. This lower level of accrual management is deemed to be
attributed to the monitoring effects of institutions having concentrated shareholdings over
the sample time-period. This notion is supported by the arguments of previous studies
that substantial investment in a firm provides strong incentives to institutions to monitor
management

actions.

Moreover,

management

26

sometimes

voluntarily

discloses

CONC assigned to a firm having at least one institutional owner holding 5% or more outstanding
common stock for more than half of the sample period of eight years.
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information to institutional owners to earn their confidence (e.g., Chung et al. 2002; ElGazzar 1998).
2) To examine the incremental concentration effects over and above the general
institutional effects on accrual management
In addition to the above test, I also examine the incremental concentration effects
over and above the general institutional effects on accrual management. I include both the
CONC dummy and INST as separate independent variables in the model to study the
incremental negative concentration effects. The related regression model is as follows:
FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σNETWORTHi + β5
σLIQUIDITYi + β6 ROSi + β7 MBi + β8 CAPi+ β9 CONCi + β10 INSTi + εi
………………….(4A)
The model is structured to examine whether the CONC dummy variable provides
negative shift to the intercept in the presence of the INST variable in the model, i.e.,
whether the concentration effect on accrual management is observed even after
accounting for the general institutional effect. The prediction is that both β9 and β10 are
less than zero.
In the next model, I add another variable to the above equation (4A) to capture
the interaction effect between INST and CONC to test whether the CONC dummy
provides any extra negative shift to the slope coefficient of the INST variable. The related
regression model is as follows:
FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σNETWORTHi + β5
σLIQUIDITYi + β6 ROSi + β7 MBi + β8 CAPi + β9 INSTi + β10 CONCi +
β11 (INSTi*CONCi) + εi ………………………(4B)
For the model 4B, the slope coefficient of INST for firms having CONC=1 and
CONC=0 are β9 + β11 and β9 respectively while the intercepts for firms having CONC=1
and CONC=0 are β0 + β10 and β0 respectively. According to the prediction of the second
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hypothesis, the coefficients of CONC and the interaction variable, namely β10 and β11,
should both be less than 0 so that β0 + β10 < β0 and β9 + β11 < β9. The CONC variable is
expected to provide negative shifts both to the intercept and to the slope coefficient of the
INST variable. If firms with concentrated institutional shareholding have lower level of
flexibility in generating abnormal accrual relative to firms without concentrated
institutional shareholding, the coefficient of CONC should be negative. If the
concentrated institutional shareholdings provide additional mitigating influence on
accrual management over and above the general institutional effects, the coefficient of
the interactive variable should be negative. Therefore, β10 is predicted to be less than
zero, and β9 + β11 is predicted to be less than β9. Again, for the models 4A and 4B, the
underlying assumption is that the coefficients of the other control variables are the same
for the two categories of firms (firms with and without concentrated institutional
shareholdings).
3) To examine the concentration effects by using concentration measures in a
continuous variable setting as the independent variable
In this test, I use three separate measures of concentrated institutional
shareholdings as independent variables to study the concentration effects on accrual
management in the presence of the other control variables. The first measure is
CONPERC, which is computed as the average percentage shareholdings by institutional
shareholders owning at least 5% of the outstanding common stocks over the sample
period of eight years. The second measure is MULTCON, which is computed as the ratio
of the average percentage of outstanding common stock held by 5% institutional owners
to the average total percentage of institutional stockholdings during the sample timeperiod. The third measure is AVGHOLD, which is computed as the ratio of the total
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percentage of institutional stockholdings divided by the number of institutional
stockowners, i.e., the average stockholdings by a single institutional investor during the
sample time-period of eight years
The related cross-sectional regression model is as follows:
FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σNETWORTHi + β5
σLIQUIDITYi + β6 ROSi + β7 MBi + β8 CAPi + β9 Xi + εi ………….(4C)
where, X = CONPERC or MULTCON or AVGHOLD as the case may be. According to
the second hypothesis, the coefficient of X, β9, is predicted to be less than 0.
5.4.3. Cross-Sectional Regression Model to Test Hypothesis 3
I partition the full sample of NYSE firms into two sub-samples: one for the firms
that belong to S&P 500 group constantly over the eight-year sample period (S&P) and
the other for the firms that either belonged to the S&P 500 group in some but not all
sample years or did not enter into the S&P 500 category at all in any year (non S&P 500).
The purpose of the test is to examine the relative influence of institutional investors on
earnings manipulation practice in firms that are highly visible and are already subject to
various external monitoring compared to firms that are not so large and visible. I assume
that the firms that constantly appeared on S&P 500 list are comparatively more visible
and differ in their information environment (i.e., having greater dissemination and
analysis of information in the market) from the firms that appeared in S&P 500 in some
but not all years as well as the firms that did not appear at all. These two categories of
firms attract institutional investors with varying investment objectives and horizons.
Therefore, I expect varying degrees of influence exerted by institutional investors on
managerial incentives to engage in accrual manipulation in these two categories of firms,
S&P 500 and non S&P 500.
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I use the following two approaches to test the institutional influence on accrual
management in the two sets of firms, S&P 500 and non S&P 500.
1) To test the institutional effects by using a dummy variable, S&P, to examine
any differential institutional impact in the case of the S&P 500 firms in the
sample relative to the non S&P 500 firms.
The relevant cross-sectional regression model is described below:
FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σNETWORTHi + β5
σLIQUIDITYi + β6 ROSi + β7 MBi + β8 CAPi + β9 INSTi + β10 S&Pi + β11
(INSTi*S&Pi) + εi ………………….(5)
S&Pi = Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for S&P 500 firms and 0 otherwise.
Other variables are already defined in the previous section.
The equation 5 is formulated on the assumption that the coefficients of the control
variables are the same for the two sets of firms, the S&P 500 and the non S&P 500. The
interaction variable captures the differential institutional effects on accrual management
in the S&P 500 firms compared to the non S&P 500 firms. According to the prediction of
the third hypothesis, the coefficient of the S&P dummy provides extra shift to the slope
coefficients of the INST variable. The coefficient of INST for the S&P 500 firms is β9 +
β11 whereas the coefficient of INST for the non S&P 500 firms is β9. Therefore, β11
should be significantly different from zero and hence, β9 should be different from β9 +
β11. Moreover, the coefficient of the S&P dummy, β10 should be different from zero
providing shift to the intercept if there is a difference in flexibility in abnormal accrual
generation between the two sets of firms.
2) To test the institutional effects on accrual management for the two categories
of firms by estimating the equation (3) separately for the S&P 500 and the non
S&P 500 firms in the sample.
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In this case, I estimate the regression equation (3) separately for the two
categories of firms by partitioning the full sample into S&P 500 and non S&P 500 firms.
According to the prediction in the third hypothesis, the coefficient of INST is different
for these two categories of firms. This test is qualitatively superior to the previous one
because in this test, the differential institutional effect on accrual management is
precisely and separately estimated for the two categories of firms by partitioning the full
sample into S&P 500 and non S&P 500 firms. Moreover, there is no restrictive
assumption of uniform coefficients of the control variables for the two categories of
firms; the coefficients are allowed to be different.
5.5. Clientele Versus Monitoring Effects of Institutional Investors
It can be inferred from the association between institutional stock ownership and
the level of accrual management that the observed association might be a result of the
effects of some other exogenous factors attracting institutional investors to a firm. It is
also probable that institutional investors might be attracted to a firm having low-accrual
management instead of institutions providing active monitoring on the firm’s accrual
management process.
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that ownership concentration is determined by
several industry and firm-specific factors. Cready (1994) finds evidence that, relative to
individual investors, institutional investors prefer larger firms, firms in S&P 500 group,
and firms paying low dividends. He suggests that investors find a number of firm-specific
factors important in their investment decisions and that importance varies systematically
across investor types like individual versus institutional investors. Duggal and Millar
(1999) further observe that institutional investment is negatively correlated with insider
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stockholdings. Wahal and McConnell (2000) also address this clientele issue. They
suggest that the potential endogeneity between firm-level expenditures on R&D and
PP&E and institutional ownership creates a problem in distinguishing a causal
relationship from a clientele effect. Hence, if institutional ownership is determined by
firm-specific exogenous factors, or if institutions are attracted to firms having lowaccrual management activity, it will be difficult to interpret the results of the association
test in terms of implied causality attributed to institutional stock ownership. Therefore, it
is necessary to segregate the clientele effects from the causal effects implied by the
results of the test to eliminate the possibility of any alternative interpretation of the test
results.
To address the issue of the clientele effect, I adopt a two-stage least squares
regression approach like previous research (e.g., Duggal and Millar 1999; Wahal and
McConnell 2000). In the first stage cross-sectional regression, I regress institutional
percentage shareholdings on the determinants of institutional stock ownership as found in
previous research (Cready 1994; Duggal and Millar 1999; Wahal and McConnell 2000).
The coefficients estimated from the first stage regression are then used to ascertain the
predicted value of institutional stock ownership. In the second stage cross-sectional
regression, I regress the flexibility in generating abnormal accruals (FLACAC) estimated
from the firm-specific accrual model (as described in the equation 2) on the predicted
value of institutional stock ownership in the presence of other control variables.
The two cross-sectional regressions are described below:
First-stage regression:
INSTi = β0 + β1 MVi-1 + β2 DPi-1 + β3 S&Pi + β4 PMGRi-1 + εi ……………………(7)
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where, INSTi = Average institutional investor stockholdings in firm i in the
sample period of eight years;
MVi-1 = Average lagged market value of equity of firm i in the sample
period of eight years;
DPi-1 = Average lagged dividend pay-out ratio of firm i in the sample
period of eight years;
S&Pi = A dummy variable taking the value of 1 for firm in S&P 500
group, and 0 otherwise;
PMGRi-1 = Average lagged managerial stock ownership in firm i in the
sample period of eight years.
Second-stage regression:
FLACACi = β0 + β1 LEVi + β2 σLIQUIDITYi + β3 σNETWORTHi + β4 ROSi + β5 MBi +
β6 CAPi + β7 PINSTi + β8 UNEXPINSTi + εi ………………….(8)
The independent variables are PINST and UNEXPINST. PINST, the predicted
value of institutional stockholdings, is estimated from the coefficients of the first-stage
regression. UNEXPINST represents unexpected institutional stockholdings not accounted
for by the firm-specific factors attracting institutional investors, computed as the
difference

between

actual

percentage

shareholding

and

predicted

percentage

shareholding. The objective here is to examine the effects of these two variables
separately as well as simultaneously in the same model keeping all other control
variables. The tests show the institutional effects after controlling for the clientele factors
that are observed in previous research. Further, the effects of the portion of institutional
stockholdings not accounted for by those clientele factors (termed as unexpected), but
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that may be the result of some unknown factors, are also examined with regard to accrual
management activity.
Based on the monitoring of institutional investors hypothesis, it is predicted that
the coefficients of both PINST and UNEXPINST will be significantly negative. Here, it
is noteworthy that these two variables are not correlated, which implies that they
represent different constructs of institutional stockholdings.27 The tests more clearly help
separate the institutional monitoring effects by removing the alternative interpretation of
clientele effects. They also explain the association test in terms of implied causality
attributed to institutional investors.

27

The Pearson correlation statistic between the two variables is -0.001 (p-value: 0.984) and the
corresponding Spearman rank correlation coefficient (non-parametric) is -0.032 (p-value: 0.528).
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6. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE DATA
6.1. Details of Sample Selection
The sample for the study is comprised of unregulated industrial firms. I choose all
firms listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that are non-regulated, non-financial
and non-service in nature. In addition, the firms selected have fiscal year end of
December 31.28 The sample period is from 1991 through 1998. The following criteria are
applied in selecting firms for the sample:
1) Firms have a December 31 fiscal year-end.
2) The data on the variables used in the models are available on Compustat-Research
Insight database for each year in the sample period.
3) The institutional and insider ownership data are available on Compact Disclosure
database for each year in the sample.
4) Firms are unregulated, industrial firms; financial, regulated and service companies
are excluded.
My primary objective is to use a constant sample of firms for the entire period of
eight years. Out of the full sample, the firms that belong to S&P 500 group constantly
28

1) Firms with the same fiscal year are chosen to control for the effects of common market-based
economic factors. It will facilitate interpretation of results in the context of the economics of the
period.
2) I exclude financial companies due to unique rules and regulations with regard to their accounting
systems. Computing discretionary accounting accruals are problematic for financial firms (Becker et
al. 1998).
3) I do not consider regulated firms because regulation monitors managers’ accounting policy choices
(Warfield et al. 1995). Moreover, earnings have relatively less important role in firm valuation for
regulated firms compared to non-regulated firms where current earnings performance signals a
firm’s ability to generate future abnormal earnings. So, the incentive to manage earnings to maintain
and improve firm-valuation is expected to be greater, or, at least different in unregulated firms
compared to regulated firms.
5) I exclude service firms and concentrate on firms engaged in manufacturing or merchandising
operations because the accrual management process in such firms are expected to be different from
service firms especially with regard to managing inventory, which comprises a substantial proportion
of total current assets and working capital, and is, therefore, a potential source of manipulation in
manufacturing or merchandising firms.

57

over the entire period of eight years are classified as S&P 500 firms while the firms that
belong to S&P 500 group for some but not all years or do not belong to the S&P 500
group at all are classified as non S&P 500 firms for the purpose of this study.
Restricting the sample to the NYSE firms ensure a level of homogeneity in the
sample firms because all firms in the sample are subject to same kind of exchange-related
regulations and governance. All of them are expected to have the same degree of
visibility and external monitoring by various agencies. Baker, Powell and Weaver (1999)
find that the NYSE listing increases a firm’s visibility in terms of the number of analysts’
following and institutional stock ownership. They suggest that this visibility leads to
greater flow of information about a firm, reducing the uncertainty about the firm’s future
prospect and increasing the efficiency of trading its stocks in the market. Moreover, in the
sample period under the present study, firms listed in the NYSE are required to have an
independent audit committee, which is intended to increase audit effectiveness and
improve the credibility and integrity of financial reports by eliminating questionable
accounting policies and practices. Maintaining a wholly independent audit committee is
not a mandatory listing requirement in the sample period for firms listed in the American
Stock Exchange or OTC exchanges like NASDAQ.29 Therefore, this study examines
whether institutional investor shareholdings in NYSE-listed firms provide any additional
monitoring to constrain a firm’s accrual management ability by reducing the

29

The National Association of Security Dealers requires that companies listed on NASDAQ have audit
committees with at least a majority of members independent while the American Stock Exchange
recommends but does not require a wholly independent audit committee as a part of listing requirements.
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flexibility/discretion available to managers in generating abnormal accruals in presence
of several other governance mechanisms.30
The sample selection procedure is summarized in Table-1. I initially obtained data
for 2593 firms listed on the NYSE from the Compustat Research Insight database. Out of
those, I exclude the firms with the fiscal year-end other than December 31. I also exclude
firms engaged in financial, regulated and service industries. After these filters are
applied, there are 824 firms left.
I collected institutional and managerial ownership data from the Compact
Disclosure database. I did not find ownership data for the entire sample period with
respect to 108 firms nor data for the variables to be used in regression analyses for 330
firms. After eliminating those firms, the final sample has 386 firms that have complete
data for the entire sample period of eight years, 1991-1998.
Out of those 386 firms, the number of firms appearing constantly in the S&P 500
group over the entire sample period is 140; those firms are classified as S&P 500. The
remaining 246 firms are classified as non S&P 500 for the purpose of the study. Some of
the non S&P 500 firms appeared for not more than two years in the S&P 500 group, and
most of the 246 firms did not appear at all in the S&P 500 list.
It is also interesting to note that out of the final set of 386 firms, 380 firms were
audited by Big-5 auditors in the sample time-period. Some firms changed auditors during
this time-period but they switched from one Big-5 to another Big-5 auditor. Therefore, it
appears that an important form of corporate governance is already in place for almost all

30

El-Gazzar (1998) finds evidence that large institutional ownership induces a high level of voluntary
disclosure prior to earnings announcements even for large and widely followed firms. He shows that the
higher the institutional shareholdings, the lower is the market reaction to earnings releases after controlling
for security market capitalization and the number of analysts following a firm.
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of the sample firms in the period under study. Most firms are, therefore, subject to high
quality external audit, an influential constraining factor on management’s accrual
manipulation activities as observed by previous studies (e.g., Becker et al. 1998; Francis
et al. 1999; Gul et al. 2002).
6.2. Industry Distribution of Sample Firms
Table 2 exhibits the industry distribution of the sample firms based on the threedigit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code. The selected firms represent a wide
cross-sections of industries. Some industries are, however, more heavily represented in
sample than others. In my main analysis (which is discussed in subsequent sections of the
paper), I have also evaluated whether the basic findings of the study are driven by the
influence of industries that are heavily represented in the sample.
6.3. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical
tests. The mean and median of institutional percentage stockholdings in the sample firms
are 48.76 and 52.46 respectively. So, the data distribution of this variable is slightly leftskewed. This pattern of distribution of percentage institutional stockholdings is
comparable to that reported in previous research (e.g., Balsam et al. 2000; Bushee 2000).
For an average firm, institutional owners collectively own more than four times as much
common stock as managers (48.67% for institutions versus 10.48% for managers).
Hence, institutions are more likely to have greater influence on managerial decision to
engage in accrual management activity. The range of distribution of the INST% variable
is also wide with a minimum of 0.16% to a maximum of 86.12%. This wide distribution
of an independent variable in the sample increases the probability of increasing the power
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of the statistical tests. It is also interesting to note that the mean (median) number of
institutional owners in the sample firms is 165 (106) with a minimum of 3 and a
maximum of 799. This statistic indicates that an average sample firm has large
institutional following, and this institutional following substantially varies across firms in
the sample.
The distribution of managerial stock ownership (PMGR%) is also found to be
wide across firms with a minimum of 0.16% and a maximum of 86.12%. The mean and
median of the PMGR% variable in the sample firms is 10.48% and 6.35% respectively.
The wide variability of PMGR% helps improve the explanatory power of the variable in
the regression analysis.
The mean and median of abnormal accrual variations (FLACAC) are 4.71% and
3.71% respectively of total assets as estimated by the modified version of the Jones’
model used in this study. Under the original version of the Jones’ model, the
corresponding mean and median of FLACAC are 5.82% and 3.71% of total assets
respectively. The FLACAC variable has a quite large range in the data distribution with a
minimum of 0.32% and a maximum of 64.05% of total assets (min of 0.84% and max of
77.08% under the original Jones’ model). The pattern of FLACAC data distribution
across firms is identical under both the modified version of the Jones’ model employed in
the paper and under the original Jones’ model. It also appears that the distribution of
FLACAC is not unduly skewed under both versions of the Jones’ model.
The firms selected in the sample have varying sizes and equity market values. The
average (median) total assets is $5,708 million ($1,242 million). The sizes range widely
from minimum total assets of $42 million to maximum total assets of $233,310 million.
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Table 1: Sample Selection Procedure

A)
Total number of firms listed on NYSE
(as per Compustat Research Insight database)
Less: Firms with non Dec. 31 fiscal year end
Firms with Dec. 31 fiscal year end
Less: Number of firms in financial industry
(SIC 6000 to 6999)
Number of firms in regulated industry
(SIC 4000 to 4990)
Number of firms in service industry
(SIC 7000 to 8999)
Number of firms in manufacturing and merchandising
operations
Less: Firms with incomplete data for regression variables
for the sample time period
Firms with incomplete ownership data in
Compact Disclosure database
Number of firms finally selected for the study

2,593
788
1,805

B)
Out of 386 firms in the final sample:
Firms appearing constantly in S&P 500 list
in the sample years:
Non S&P 500 firms:

246
386

Firms audited by Big-5 auditors:
Firms audited by non Big-5 auditors:

380
6
386

(571)
(266)

140

(144)

824
(330)
(108)

386
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Table 2: Industry Distribution of Sample Firms Based on Three-Digit SIC Codes
SIC
104
131
140
160
173
201
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
221
225
227
230
240
251
260
271
281
283
286
287
291
301

Name of Industries

No. of
Firms
Metal mining
9
Crude petroleum and natural gas 35
Mining queries and non-metal
4
minerals
Heavy construction
2
Electrical works
1
Meat products
1
Grain mill products
2
Bakery products
2
Sugar and confectionary prods.
4
Fats and oils
1
Beverages
3
Misc. food preparations
1
Tobacco products
2
Broadwoven fabric mills, cotton
2
Knit and outwear mills
1
Carpets and rugs
2
Apparel and other finished
4
products
Lumber and wood products
6
Furniture and fixtures
4
Paper and allied products
21
Publishing and printing
19
Industrial inorganic chemicals
15
Pharmaceuticals
24
Industrial organic chemicals
6
Agricultural chemicals
6
Petroleum refining
15
Rubber and plastic products
7

SIC

Name of Industries

314
321
331
341
351
353
362

386
394

Leather and leather products
Glass products
Steel works, rolling and finishing mills
Metal cans and shipping containers
Engines and turbines
Construction machinery and equipment
Elect. transmission and distribution
equipment
Household appliances
Communication equipment
Motor vehicles and car bodies, parts
and accessories
Industrial measurement equipment
Surgical and medical instrument
and apparatus
Photographic equipment
Toys and sporting goods

495
500
511
517
519
520
531
531
571
590
999

Sanitory systems
Wholesale durable goods
Paper and paper products
Petroleum products-wholesale
Non-durable goods-wholesale
Building material, hardware-retail
Department stores
Grocery stores
Home furniture and office equipment
Misc. retail stores
Conglomerates

363
366
371
381
384
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No. of
Firms
3
8
23
18
3
32
2
7
16
23
7
7
1
4
4
9
3
2
1
1
1
3
2
3
4
386

The average (median) equity market values of the sample firms are $5,463 million
($1,315) ranging from a minimum of $42 million to a maximum of $146,518 million.
So, the sample firms represent a wide array of firms with varying sizes. It is noteworthy
from Table-3 that all variables used in the empirical tests have broad ranges of
distribution across firms and, therefore, have high variability in data distribution, which
increases the overall explanatory power of the regression model, providing more
robustness to various tests conducted in the study.
6.4. Distribution of Abnormal Accrual Variations
Table 4 presents various statistics of the distribution of abnormal accrual
variations. Panel A of Table 4 depicts FLACAC distribution in two sets of firms, one
having institutional stockholdings greater than the sample median and the other with
institutional stockholdings less than the sample median. Consistent with expectations, the
firms having greater than median institutional stockholdings have mean (median)
FLACAC of 3.98% (3.37%) of total assets with a mean institutional stockholding
percentage of 64.74% (median 64.67%) while the firms having less than median
institutional stockholdings have mean (median) FLACAC of 5.45% (3.98%) of total
assets with a mean institutional stockholding percentage of 32.61% (median 34.09%).
The univariate test of the mean difference between these two sets of firms shows that the
mean institutional stockholding in firms having less than the median stockholdings is
significantly less than that in the firms having greater than the median institutional
stockholding (t-statistic: -27.528; p-value: 0.000) while the mean abnormal accrual
variation for the firms with less than the median institutional shareholding is significantly
greater than that for the firms with greater than the median institutional shareholding (t-
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statistic: 3.039; p-value: 0.002). The inverse relationship between FLACAC and
institutional percentage stockholdings is quite evident from this statistical comparison.
Panel B of Table 4 presents an interesting pattern of FLACAC distribution across
different quintiles of institutional stock ownership. In the lowest quintile, the mean
institutional ownership percentage is 17.77 while in the highest quintile the mean
institutional ownership percentage is 72.33. The mean FLACAC in the lowest quintile is
6.80% while in the highest quintile it is 3.83% of total assets. The average abnormal
accrual variation monotonically decreases from the lowest to highest quintiles of
institutional stock ownership. The pattern indicates an inverse relationship between
abnormal accrual variations and institutional stock ownership and supports the notion that
institutional investors provide mitigating effects on a firm’s accrual management efforts.
The univariate t-tests for the difference in mean FLACAC between two quintiles are
reported at the bottom of the table. Only the difference of FLACAC between 1st and 2nd
quintiles is statistically significant. However, when I combine two quintiles together and
conduct a t-test for the difference in FLACAC between one pair of quintiles and the
other, I find significant t-statistics for the three out of four tests. The results further
support the notion of greater institutional monitoring for firms in the higher ownership
quintiles relative to lower ownership quintiles.
Panel A of Table 5 presents the distribution pattern of institutional stockholdings
and abnormal accrual variations across S&P 500 and non S&P 500 firms. The mean
institutional stockholdings in S&P 500 firms is about 60% (median 62.87%), while that
in non S&P 500 firms is 42.46% (median 43.47%). The average institutional
shareholding in S&P 500 firms is significantly greater than that of non S&P 500 firms. In
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the S&P 500 firms, the institutional ownership distribution across firms is left-skewed
(the mean is less than the median) which signifies the presence of firms with some low
institutional shareholdings. The distribution of institutional shareholdings is almost
normal in non S&P 500 firms with the mean being slightly less than the median. The
mean abnormal accrual variation in the S&P 500 firms is 0.0364 (median 0.0296), which
is significantly less than the mean of 0.0533 (median 0.0437) in non S&P 500 firms (pvalue: 0.0001).
Combining these results, it appears that on average, the S&P 500 firms have a
much larger institutional following relative to the non S&P 500 firms in the sample, and
the level of accrual management is also lower in the case of these S&P 500 firms. This
observation is consistent with previous research findings that institutions prefer to invest
in large firms and in firms having S&P 500 membership (e.g., Cready 1994). The average
low level of flexibility in generating abnormal accrual in the S&P 500 firms seems to be
due to greater monitoring by regulatory and other external agencies already in place for
such firms compared to their non S&P 500 counterpart. Institutions have little room for
monitoring the S&P 500 firms with respect to the quality of their accounting reports as
compared to their impact in the non S&P 500 firms. The large institutional investment in
the S&P 500 firms might be due to institutional policy for indexing or due to regulatory
and other legal reasons.
Panel B of Table 5 presents the size measurements of the S&P 500 and the non
S&P 500 firms in the sample along two size dimensions, total assets and equity market
values. In both dimensions, the S&P 500 firms are statistically significantly greater in
size than the non S&P 500 firms. The mean total assets and equity market values of the
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S&P 500 firms are $12,707 million and $12,565 million respectively, whereas the
corresponding numbers for the non S&P 500 firms are $1,725 million and $1,420 million.
Taking into account the observations depicted in Panel A and B, it is evident that on
average, the sample S&P 500 firms are very large and highly visible relative to the non
S&P 500 firms; they have also, on average, a larger institutional investor following and
lower level of accrual management compared to the non S&P 500 firms in the sample.
Table 6 presents information regarding the abnormal accrual variations between
firms having concentrated institutional shareholdings and firms not having concentrated
institutional shareholdings. Though the average institutional stockholdings in firms
having concentrated shareholding is statistically significantly greater than that in firms
not having concentrated institutional shareholdings (p-value: 0.000), the difference in the
average abnormal accrual variations between these two sets of firms is not statistically
significant. So, from the univariate t-tests, I do not find any additional monitoring effects
of concentrated institutional shareholdings over and above the general institutional
influence on the level of accrual management activity of the sample firms. It appears that
the concentrated institutional shareholdings do not capture more than the general
institutional effects.
6.5. Correlation Statistics
Table 7 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between each pair of
variables used in various regression analyses. Some correlation statistics are noteworthy.
The institutional percentage shareholdings (INST) is significantly negatively correlated
with the FLACAC variable estimated under both versions of the Jones’ accrual model
(coefficient: -0.207; p-value: 0.000). The predicted inverse relationship between these
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two variables is evident in this case. The INST variable is significantly negatively
correlated with the managerial ownership variable (PMGR2)

31

(coefficient: -0.303; p-

value: 0.000), which is consistent with the previous research observations that institutions
tend to invest less in firms dominated by insiders/managers (e.g., Duggal and Millar
1999). Further, firm size measured by the natural logarithm of average total assets is
highly and positively correlated with the INST variable, and the correlation coefficient is
0.271 (p-value: 0.000). This is also in line with previous research findings that
institutions prefer to invest in large firms. The size variable is, however, negatively
correlated with the FLACAC variable, and the coefficient is -0.211 (p-value: 0.000),
which indicates that in large firms the discretion/flexibility available to managers to
engage in accrual management is lower. These significant correlations with the SIZE
variable also underline the fact that it is necessary to control for the size effects in the
analyses; failure to do so will result in a potentially large omitted variable bias. The INST
is found to be negatively correlated with the LEV variable (coefficient: -0.066; p-value:
0.193), indicating that institutional investment decreases with increase in financial
leverage of a firm.
A significant correlation is found between the FLACAC variables computed as
per the modified version of the Jones’ accrual model developed in the paper and as per
the original Jones model. The two variables are highly positively correlated with a
correlation coefficient of 0.923 (p-value: 0.000). Hence, it is evident that these two
measures of flexibility potentially reflect the same degree of management flexibility in
managing current accruals during the sample time-period.

31

I square the PMGR variable in order to improve the linear relationship in regression analysis.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Employed in the Study
N = 386
Variables

Mean

Median

St. Dev

Min

Max

FLACAC
(as per paper model)

0.0471

0.0371

0.0480

0.0032

0.6405

FLACAC
(as per Jones' model)

0.0582

0.0442

0.0630

0.0084

0.7705

SIZE ($ mil)

5708

1242

20812

42

233310

MV ($ mil)

5463

1315

13879

12

146518

LEV

0.2042

0.1935

0.1268

0.0000

0.8108

σLIQUIDITY

0.6138

0.3839

6.7995

-27.3815

114.7253

σNETWORTH

0.4016

0.2900

0.8276

-2.4794

14.4963

ROS

0.0971

0.0904

0.0987

-0.7266

0.6519

MB

3.1946

2.4628

3.7132

-5.7800

42.3590

INST%

0.4867

0.5246

0.1974

0.0016

0.8612

PMGR%

0.1048

0.0635

0.1195

0.0000

0.6808

CAP

0.0781

0.0637

0.0599

0.0000

0.4832

NOOWNER

165

106

165

3

799

CONPERC

0.1157

0.1049

0.0860

0.0000

0.4329

MULTCON

0.2309

0.2073

0.1587

0.0000

0.6841

AVGHOLD

0.0060

0.0047

0.0048

0.0001

0.0318
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Table 3 (Continued)
Definition of variables
FLACAC:
(Paper)

Abnormal working capital accruals measured by the standard deviation of residuals from
the following firm-specific accrual model:
CACCit /TAit-1 = β0i + b1i [(∆REVit -DRECit) /TAit-1] + β2i [(∆COGSit + ∆INVit) / TAit-1]
β3i (∆OCFit / TAit-1) + εit
(Estimated over the sample time period of 8 years)
where, CACCit = [∆CAit - ∆Cashit] - [∆CLit - ∆CLDit]; CA = Current assets;
CLD = Current portion of long-yerm debt.
CL = Current liabilities;
∆REV = Change in revenue;
∆OCF = Change in operating cash flows;
∆REC = Change in accounts receivables;
∆INV = Change in inventory balance;
∆COGS = Change in cost of goods sold;
TA = Lagged total assets;

FLACAC
(Jones)

Abnormal working capital accruals measured by the standard deviation of residuals from
the following firm-specific accrual model:
CACCit /TAit-1 = β0i + β1i (∆REVit) /TAit-1 + εit
(Estimated over the sample time-period of 8 years)

SIZE

Log of average total assets of firm i for the sample period of 8 years.

MV

Average market value of equity of firm i over the sample period of 8 years.

LEV

Average leverage ratio of firm i for the sample period of 8 years, computed as
long-term debt/total assets.

σNETWORTH

Standard deviation in stockholders equity for firm i in the sample period of 8 years scaled by
the mean stockholders' equity.
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Table 3 (Continued)
σLIQUIDITY

Standard deviation in liquidity computed as the standard deviation of working capital for firm i
in the sample period of 8 years, scaled by the mean working capital.

ROS

Average return on sales for firm i in the sample period of 8 years; the measure of average
operating profitability

MB

Average beginning market to book ratio of firm i in the sample period of 8 years; the measure of
average growth prospect.

INST%

Average percentage of institutional ownership of common stock in firm i over the sample time
period of 8 years.

PMGR%

Average percentage of managerial ownership of common stock in firm i over the sample period
of 8 years.

CAP

Average capital expenditures scaled by total assets of firm i during the sample period of 8 years.

NOOWNER

Average number of institutional stockowners of firm i during the sample period of 8 years.

CONPERC

Average percentage of common stock held by 5% institutional owners in firm i during the sample
period of 8 years.

MULTCON

The ratio of average percentage of common stock held by 5% institutional owners to the average
total percentage of institutional stock ownership in firm i over the sample period of 8 years.

AVGHOLD

Average percentage stockholding by an institutional owner in firm i over the sample period of 8 years,
computed as the ratio of total percentage of institutional stockholdings divided by the number of
institutional stockowners.
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Table 4: Distribution Pattern of Abnormal Accrual Variations
Panel A: Distribution of Abnormal Accrual Variations across Median
Institutional Shareholdings
N = 386
Institutional
Stock
Ownership
(INST %)

Abnormal
Accrual
Variation
(FLACAC)

193
0.3261
0.3409
0.1425
0.0016
0.5240

193
0.0545
0.0398
0.0630
0.0084
0.6405

193
0.6474
0.6467
0.0774
0.5251
0.8612

193
0.0398
0.0337
0.0235
0.0032
0.1292

-27.528

3.039

0.000

0.002

Less than median stockholdings
No. of observations
Mean
Median
St. Dev
Minimum
Maximum

More than median stockholdings
No. of observations
Mean
Median
St. Dev
Minimum
Maximum
Univariate test of mean difference
t-statistic:
p-value (one-tailed):
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Table 4 (Continued)
Panel B: Distribution of Abnormal Accrual Variations across Quintiles of Institutional Shareholdings
N = 386
Institutional Stock Ownership

Variations of Abnormal Accruals
(FLACAC)
Mean
Median
St. Dev
Min

Mean

Median

St. Dev

Min

Max

Quintile 1

0.1777

0.1952

0.0909

0.0016

0.3041

0.0680

0.0462

0.0883

0.0088

0.6405

Quintile 2

0.3858

0.3858

0.0498

0.3046

0.4619

0.0465

0.0350

0.0411

0.0084

0.2745

Quintile 3

0.5206

0.5240

0.0299

0.4619

0.5688

0.0422

0.0372

0.0226

0.0119

0.1217

Quintile 4

0.6205

0.6203

0.2810

0.5718

0.6609

0.0410

0.0320

0.0266

0.0084

0.1292

Quintile 5

0.7233

0.7056

0.0491

0.6629

0.8612

0.0383

0.0328

0.0219

0.0032

0.1063

1) Univariate tests of difference in FLACAC of 1st and 2nd quintiles: t-statistic: 1.933; p-value (one-tailed): 0.028.
2) Univariate tests of difference in FLACAC of 2nd and 3rd quintiles: t-statistic: 0.800; p-value (one-tailed): 0.213.
3) Univariate tests of difference in FLACAC of 3rd and 4th quintiles: t-statistic: 0.306; p-value (one-tailed): 0.380.
4) Univariate tests of difference in FLACAC of 4th and 5th quintiles: t-statistic: 0.694; p-value (one-tailed): 0.244.
5) Univariate tests of difference in FLACAC of 1st and 2nd (combined) versus 4th and 5th (combined): t-statistic: 2.958; p-value (one-tailed): 0.002.
6) Univariate tests of difference in FLACAC of 1st and 2nd (combined) versus 3rd and 4th (combined): t-statistic: 2.618; p-value (one-tailed): 0.005.
7) Univariate tests of difference in FLACAC of 2nd and 3rd (combined) versus 4th and 5th (combined): t-statistic: 1.431; p-value (one-tailed): 0.077.

8) Univariate tests of difference in FLACAC of 3rd and 4th (combined) versus 4th and 5th (combined): t-statistic: 0.710;
p-value (one-tailed): 0.240.
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Table 5: Statistics for the S&P 500 and the Non S&P 500 Firms of the Final Sample
Panel A: Distribution of Abnormal Accrual Variations across the S&P 500 and the
Non S&P 500 firms of the sample
N = 386

Number of firms
Institutional stock ownership
Mean
Median
St. Dev
Minimum
Maximum
Abnormal accrual variations
Mean
Median
St. Dev
Minimum
Maximum

S &P 500

Non
S &P 500

140

246

0.5959
0.6287
0.1241
0.1735
0.8028

0.4246
0.4347
0.2045
0.0016
0.8612

Difference in means
Between S&P and non S&P firms
With respect to Institutional stock ownership
t-statistic:
p - value:
(two-tailed)

10.2372
0.0000

With respect to abnormal accrual variations
0.0364
0.0296
0.0257
0.0032
0.1588

0.0533
0.0437
0.0561
0.0088
0.6405
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t-statistic:
p - value:
(two-tailed)

-4.0345
0.0001

Table 5 (Continued)
Panel B: Size Measurements of the S&P 500 and the Non S&P 500 firms
N = 386
S&P 500

Non
S&P 500

Average total assets (in $ mil)
Mean
Median
St. Dev
Minimum
Maximum

12707.3
4196.92
32699.9
145.397
233310

1724.67
498.174
5483.78
41.8371
63818.7

Univariate
Tests:
t-statistic: 3.9425
p-value:
0.0000
(two-tailed)

Average equity market value (in $ mil)
Mean
Median
St. Dev
Minimum
Maximum

12565.1
4548.42
20775.4
269.692
146518

1420.45
528.328
3547.69
11.6234
45854.9
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t-statistic: 6.2952
p-value:
0.0000
(two-tailed)

Table 6: Distribution of Abnormal Accrual Variations across Firms With and
Without Concentrated Institutional Stockholdings
N = 386

Number of firms
S&P 500 firms
Non S&P 500 firms

Conc.
Holding

Non
Conc. Holding

276
102
174

110
38
72
With respect to institutional stock
ownership

Institutional stock ownership

Mean
Median
St. Dev
Minimum
Maximum

0.5438
0.5647
0.1586
0.1353
0.8612

0.3435
0.3247
0.2127
0.0016
0.8590

With respect to abnormal accrual variations

Abnormal accrual variations

Mean
Median
St. Dev
Minimum
Maximum

t-statistic:
8.9387
p – value:
0.0000
(two-tailed)

0.0452
0.0371
0.0469
0.0032
0.6405

0.0520
0.0362
0.0507
0.0106
0.3259
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t-statistic:
-1.2225
p - value:
0.2231
(two-tailed)

Both the PINST and UNEXPINST variables are found to be positively and
significantly correlated with INST (coefficients are 0.451 and 0.892 respectively with pvalues of 0.000), and PINST is positively correlated with SIZE (coefficient: 0.668 and pvalue: 0.000). Theses two variables are also negatively correlated with PMGR2
(coefficients are -0.550 and -0.061 respectively). Further, I do not find any significant
correlation between PINST and UNEXPINST (coefficient: -0.001; p-value: 0.984). This
insignificant correlation indicates that these two variables represent different unrelated
institutional ownership constructs. This provides credibility to the test (reported in latter
section) of separating monitoring from clientele effects of institutional stockholdings.
Moreover, PINST and UNEXPINST are significantly negatively correlated with the
FLACAC variable (coefficients -0.187 and -0.137 respectively with p-values of 0.000
and 0.007).32
6.6. Estimated Coefficients and Descriptive Statistics for Firm-Specific Regressions
Table 8 presents the results and descriptive statistics of the firm-specific accrual
regression model. The mean average absolute abnormal accruals computed from the
average absolute residual from the regression of 386 firms is 0.0303 (median 0.0219).
The average adjusted R2 of the 386 regressions is 0.3068 (median 0.3621). The mean
coefficient of adjusted REV is 0.0165 (median -0.0632), of adjusted COGS is 0.1578
(median 0.2663), and of ∆OCF is -0.0519 (median 2.625).33

32

Regarding FLACAC variable, I only discuss the correlations with FLACAC estimated by using the
extended version of the modified Jones’ model as developed in the paper.

33

This result is comparable with that reported by Jones (1991; pp.213) with regard to firm-specific total
accrual regression to estimate discretionary accruals. Jones reported average adjusted R2 of 0.232 (median
0.249). The average coefficient of ∆REV in the Jones’ model is 0.035 (median -0.008). The estimation
period in her study ranges between 14 and 32 years. In this study, the estimation period for each firm is 8
years.

77

Not surprisingly, there is a significant positive correlation between average
absolute residuals and root mean squared errors from firm-specific regressions (Pearson
correlation coefficient: 0.527, p-value: 0.000; spearman correlation coefficient: 0.935; pvalue: 0.000) as reported in Panel A of the table. This is consistent with the observations
made in previous studies (e.g., Barton 2001). The greater the variability, the greater is the
magnitude, and therefore, the greater is the level of accrual management. This variability,
therefore, effectively indicates management flexibility in generating abnormal accruals.
The average absolute residual from firm-specific regressions (i.e., the magnitude of
abnormal accruals) and standard deviation of residuals (i.e., root mean squared error)
both reflect managerial flexibility in generating abnormal accruals during the estimation
period of eight years. This finding also provides credibility for employing the FLACAC
as the measure of earnings management in this study.
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix of Variables Used in Various Regressions
N = 386

FLACAC (Paper)
FLACAC (Jones)
SIZE
LEV
σNETWORTH
σLIQUIDITY
ROS
MB
CAP
INST
PMGR2
PINST
UNEXPINST

FLACAC FLACAC SIZE
(Paper) (Jones)
1.000
0.923
1.000
0.000
-0.211
-0.196
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.113
0.122
0.066
0.026
0.017
0.196
0.196
0.134
-0.133
0.000
0.008
0.009
0.130
0.128
-0.003
0.011
0.012
0.947
-0.035
0.010
0.141
0.499
0.841
0.005
0.177
0.218
0.128
0.000
0.000
0.012
-0.107
-0.091
-0.167
0.035
0.074
0.001
-0.207
-0.180
0.271
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.098
0.055
-0.187
0.000
-0.137
0.007

-0.088
0.085
-0.184
0.000
-0.108
0.033

-0.242
0.000
0.668
0.000
-0.035
0.497

LEV

σNET- σLIQUIWORTH DITY ROS

MB

CAP

INST

UNEXPMGR2 PINST PINST

1.000
0.172
0.001
0.140
0.006
-0.122
0.017
0.013
0.793
0.191
0.000
-0.066
0.193

1.000
0.056
0.272
-0.047
0.355
-0.101
0.046
0.014
0.785
-0.099
0.052

0.214
0.000
0.014
0.782
-0.028
0.579
-0.084
0.101

0.217
0.000
-0.035
0.497
0.128
0.012

-0.026
0.607
0.042
0.415

-0.089
0.080

1.000

0.104
0.041
-0.155
0.002
0.004
0.937

0.277
0.000
-0.195
0.000
-0.012
0.810

0.098
0.054
-0.087
0.088
-0.050
0.330

-0.030
0.552
0.192
0.000
0.047
0.359

-0.017
0.733
0.107
0.035
-0.008
0.882

-0.053
0.303
-0.095
0.062
-0.052
0.310

-0.303
0.000
0.451
0.000
0.892
0.000

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

1.000
-0.550
0.000
-0.061
0.229

1.000
-0.001
0.984

1.000

Note: For each variable, the numbers in the first row are Pearson correlation coefficients and the bold numbers in the second row are p-values (two-tailed).
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Table 7 (Continued)
Definition of variables
FLACAC:
(Paper)

Abnormal working capital accruals measured by the standard deviation of residuals from
the following firm-specific accrual model:
CACCit /TAit-1 = β0i + β1i [(∆REVit -∆RECit) /TAit-1] + β2i [(∆COGSit + ∆INVit) / TAit-1]
β3i (∆OCFit / TAit-1) + εit
(Estimated over the sample time period of 8 years)
where, CACCit = [∆CAit - ∆Cashit] - [∆CLit - ∆CLDit]; CA = Current assets;
CL = Current liabilities; CLD = Current portion of long-term debt.
∆REV = Change in revenue;
∆OCF = Change in operating cash flows
∆REC = Change in accounts receivables;
∆INV = Change in inventory balance;
∆COGS = Change in cost of goods sold;
TA = Lagged total assets;

FLACAC
(Jones)

Abnormal working capital accruals measured by the standard deviation of residuals from
the following firm-specific accrual model:
CACCit /TAit-1 = β0i + β1i (∆REVit) /TAit-1 + εit
(Estimated over the sample time-period of 8 years)

SIZE

Log of average total assets of firm i for the sample period of 8 years.

LEV

Average leverage ratio of firm i for the sample period of 8 years, computed as
long-term debt/total assets.

σNETWORTH

Standard deviation in stockholders equity for firm i in the sample period of 8 years scaled by
the mean stockholders' equity.

σLIQUIDITY

Standard deviation in liquidity computed as the standard deviation of working capital for firm i
in the sample period of 8 years, scaled by the mean working capital.
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Table 7 (Continued)
ROS

Average return on sales for firm i in the sample period of 8 years; the measure of average
operating profitability

MB

Average beginning market to book ratio of firm i in the sample period of 8 years; the measure of
average growth prospect.

INST

Average percentage of institutional ownership of common stock in firm i over the sample time
period of 8 years.

PMGR2

Squared average percentage of managerial ownership of common stock in firm i over
the sample period of 8 years.

CAP

Average capital expenditures scaled by total assets of firm i during the sample period of 8 years.

PINST

Predicted average institutional percentage stockholdings in firm i in sample period of 8 years,
estimated from the following regression:

UNEXPINST

INSTi = β0 + β1 MVi-1 + β2 DPi-1 + β3 S&Pi + β4 PMGRi-1 + εi
where, MV = Lagged average market capitalization value of equity of firm i
in the sample time period of 8 years.
DP = Average lagged dividend pay-out ratio of firm i
in the sample time period of 8 years.
S&P = A dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the firm belongs
to S&P 500 group in the eight year period; 0 otherwise.
PMGR = Average lagged percentage of managerial ownership in
firm i over the sample period of 8 years.
Average unexpected percentage of institutional stockholdings in firm i over the sample time-period,
computed as:

average actual percentage stockholdings minus predicted percentage stockholdings estimated from
the above regression.
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Table 8: Estimated Coefficients and Descriptive Statistics for 386 Firm-Specific Regressions
N = 386
Panel A
Correlation statistics with regard to average absolute residuals and root mean squared errors from firm-specific regressions:
Pearson's correlation coefficient:
p-value (two-tailed):

0.527
0.000

(Significant at 0.01 level)

Spearman's correlation coefficient:
p-value (two-tailed):

0.935
0.000

(Significant at 0.01 level)

Panel B
Descriptive statistics for firm-specific accrual regressions:
Coefficient statistics

Avg. absolute

Adj. REV
(β1i)

Adj. COGS
(β2i)

∆OCF
(β3i)

0.0165
-0.0632
0.9195

0.1578
0.2663
1.2452

-0.0519
-0.2090
2.6250

residuals

Adjusted R2

0.0303
0.0219
0.0477

0.3068
0.3621
0.4321

Coefficients:
Mean
Median
St Dev

Mean
Median
St Dev
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7. RESULTS
•

General institutional effects on the level of accrual management to test
hypothesis 1
Table 9 reports the test results by estimating the regression model in equation 3

with respect to institutional effects on accrual management as embodied in the first
hypothesis. By using the reduced model 1 in which β9 is set to zero, I estimate the
regression of FLACAC on the control variables. Many control variables are found to be
significant in the predicted directions. The SIZE variable is significantly negative, which
is consistent with the political cost hypothesis as documented by Cahan (1992) and Hall
and Stammerjohan (1997), and the information environment hypothesis that large firms
have greater visibility and a large following by external agencies (e.g., Bhushan 1989)
that make it difficult for managers to manipulate earnings. LEV is significantly positive,
providing evidence that an increase in leverage induces managers to use more accruals to
manage earnings to loosen the contractual debt-constraints, consistent with the
observations made by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). The variables, σ LIQUIDITY and
σ NETWORTH, are positive and significant, which is consistent with the observations of
Sweeney (1994) that the greater the decline in networth and liquidity, the greater is the
necessity to offset their negative effects by using income-increasing accounting changes.
MB is positive and significant, indicating that some portion of abnormal accrual variation
results from growth and not from managerial discretion. CAP is significantly negative,
indicating that with an increase in capital expenditures, a proxy for structural changes in
business, managerial propensity to manage accruals declines. The structural changes may
be geared toward enhancing long-term firm profitability that make managers more farsighted instead of being overly concerned about short-term earnings performance.
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PMGR2 is negative, which is consistent with the observations of Warfield et al. (1995)
that with an increase in managerial ownership, the level of accrual management declines.
But the PMGR2 is not statistically significant. I find that ROS variable, a proxy for
profitability, is also not significant in the regression.
I report the regression results of FLACAC on the INST variable by applying the
reduced model 2 in which β1 through β8 are set to zero. The INST is found to be negative
and statistically significant at any level (coefficient: -0.207; t-statistic: -4.137; p-value:
0.000), which strongly supports the prediction made in the first hypothesis that
institutional investors mitigate a firm’s accrual management. By using the full model, I
have examined the institutional investor influence on flexibility in generating abnormal
accruals (FLACAC) in the presence of other control variables. I find that the INST
variable remains negative and statistically significant even after including all control
variables in the regression model (coefficient: -0.158; t-statistic: -3.130; p-value 0.001).
The control variables are all significant as predicted except ROS. PMGR2 is also found to
be negative and statistically significant at the 10% level in this regression. As a whole, I
find strong evidence in support of the first hypothesis.34
•

Effect of concentrated institutional shareholdings on accrual management to test
hypothesis 2
In Table 10, I report various test results with respect to the concentrated

institutional shareholdings using the regression models formulated in the equations 4, 4A
and 4B. I present the test results regarding the effects of CONC, a dummy variable
assigned to firms having 5% institutional stockowners, on FLACAC in the presence of
34

As an alternative measure, I use square root of the number of institutional owners as the independent
variable in regression equation to test the institutional effect and find significant result. The related test
statistics for this variable are: coefficient: - 0.158; t-statistic: -1.881 and p-value: 0.031.
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other control variables by estimating the regression equation 4 in the reduced model 1.
The CONC variable is found to be negative and statistically significant at the 5% level
(coefficient: -0.094; t-statistic: -1.910; p-value: 0.029). Most control variables are
significant in the predicted direction. The result shows that firms with concentrated
institutional shareholdings have a lower level of accrual management relative to firms
without such concentrated shareholdings. Therefore, with an increase in concentration
institutions are found to become more inclined to monitor management choice of using
certain accounting techniques to manage accruals, a finding consistent with the
observations made in prior studies that substantial investment in a firm provides strong
incentives to institutions to monitor managers (e.g., Chung 2002; Wahal and McConnell
2000). The result supports the predictions made in the second hypothesis that with an
increase in concentrated institutional shareholdings, the level of accrual management
becomes lower.
By applying the reduced model 2, I estimate the regression equation 4A. Here, I
examine the effect of CONC once INST is included in the model to see whether
concentrated shareholding has any incremental effect on accrual management. I have
found that INST is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (p-value: 0.007).
But CONC variable is not significant even though the sign of its coefficient is negative
(coefficient: -0.023; t-statistic: -0.399; p-value: 0.345). It seems that the strong
institutional influence as captured by INST makes the concentration effect insignificant.
By applying the full model, I estimate the regression equation 4B to test the incremental
effects of concentrated institutional shareholdings by including an interaction variable
(INST*CONC) in the presence of other variables. INST is again negative and highly
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significant (p-value: 0.015). But the coefficients of both the CONC and the interaction
variable are found to be not significant (with p-values of 0.229 and 0.265 respectively). It
is therefore evident that the presence of INST and CONC at the same time in the model
does not provide any additional information about the effects of concentration over and
above the general institutional effects on accrual management. In presence of the strong
influence of INST in the model, the concentration effects have become insignificant. But
when the effect of concentrated shareholding is examined on a stand-alone basis, I find
that its effect is statistically significant in the presence of other control variables.35 The
overall test results as reported by using the three models suggest that the concentrated
institutional shareholding may have some additional effects on accrual management but
the effect is not very clear from the reported test results. CONC seems to capture not
more than the general institutional effects. CONC might have captured some
concentration effects when considered on a stand-alone basis in the regression, but this
effect disappears when INST is included in the model. Therefore, from the test results I
find only limited evidence in support of the second hypothesis regarding the effect of
concentrated institutional stock ownership on the variability of abnormal accruals.
35

I also estimate the regression model by including only the interaction of INST and CONC, as the
independent variable and other control variables. I find that the coefficient of INST*CONC is negative and
statistically significant (coefficient: -0.113; t-statistic: -2.323; p-value: 0.010). The result indicates that in
firms with concentrated institutional shareholdings, the institutional investors provide significant
monitoring to reduce management flexibility to make abnormal accrual adjustments. However, it is not
clear whether the result indicates the general institutional investor effects in firms having concentrated
institutional shareholdings or the effects of concentrated shareholdings exerted by the institutional owners.
The result may be due to the combined effects of the two factors, the general and the concentrated
shareholdings by institutions. It is not evident which factor dominates over the other in its effects on the
level of accrual management.
I also estimate the regression equation 3 separately for firms having concentrated institutional
shareholdings and for firms not having such concentrated shareholdings. I find that the coefficient of INST
is negative and significant for both types of firms. The result apparently suggests the general institutional
monitoring effect on flexibility in abnormal accrual generation for both categories of firms, firms with and
without concentration. No additional concentration effect is evident from such separate analysis.
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Table 11 reports the regression results by estimating the effects of various
concentration measures in the presence of other control variables in the equation 4C.
Three measures of concentration, CONPERC, AVGHOLD and MULTCON, are used
separately to test the effects of concentrated institutional shareholdings in the presence of
other control variables. By using the model 1, I test the effects of CONPERC. I find that
CONPERC is negative and significant at the 10% level (coefficient: -0.069; t-statistic: 1.412; p-value: 0.080), which indicates that with the increase in aggregate shareholdings
of 5% institutional stockowners in a firm, management flexibility to manage accruals
declines, a result that supports the second hypothesis. Most control variables are
significant as per predicted directions. However, by using the models 2 and 3, I find that
the other two measures of concentrated institutional shareholdings, AVGHOLD and
MULTCON, are not statistically significant (p-values are 0.355 and 0.456 respectively).
Therefore, by applying various concentration measures I find limited support for the
predictions made in the second hypothesis.36 The test results are also consistent with the
one obtained from the univariate test and reported in Table 6 that firms with concentrated
institutional stockholdings have greater institutional percentage shareholdings but do not
experience significantly greater abnormal accrual variations compared to firms without
concentrated institutional shareholdings.
•

Institutional effects on accrual management in the S&P 500 and the non S&P 500
firms to test hypothesis 3
Table 12 reports the test results of institutional effects in the two categories of

firms, the S&P 500 and the non S&P 500 by estimating the regression equation 5. By
36

I find significant positive effects of AVGHOLD and MULTCON in univariate tests regressing FLACAC
on AVGHOLD and MULTCON respectively. The coefficients and p-values are: 0.169 and 0.001 for
AVGHOLD, and 0.015 and 0.10 for MULTCON. However, these effects disappear when the control
variables are included in the regression model.
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using the reduced model 1, I find that in the presence of other control variables, the S&P
dummy is not significant. Perhaps the difference of flexibility in generating abnormal
accruals between the two categories of firms are accounted by the control variables as
well as by the factors not included in the model as indicated by the highly significant
intercept (with t-statistic: 6.828; p-value: 0.000).
By using the reduced model 2, I examine the differential effects of institutional
monitoring on accrual management in the S&P 500 and the non S&P 500 firms in the
sample. I find that the INST variable is negative and significant at the 1% level (tstatistic: -3.161; p-value: 0.002). But the S&P dummy variable is not significant though
the sign of its coefficient is negative (t-statistic: -1.478; p-value: 0.140). Further, I do not
observe any significant differential effect of institutions in the S&P 500 firms compared
to the non S&P 500 firms, as revealed by the insignificant interaction variable (t-statistic:
1.030; p-value: 0.304) though its coefficient is positive. The positive coefficient of the
interaction variable indicates that the institutional effect on flexibility in the generation of
abnormal accruals is somewhat moderated in the S&P 500 firms compared to the non
S&P 500 firms.
By using the full model, I estimate the full regression equation 5. I find that the
INST is significantly negative at the 1% level in the presence of all other control
variables (t-statistic: -3.265; p-value: 0.002). Most control variables are significant in the
predicted directions. However, both the S&P dummy (though it has a negative
coefficient) and the interaction between INST and S&P are found to be insignificant
(with p-values of 0.628 and 0.428 respectively). The result, therefore, does not indicate
any differential institutional impact on accrual management for these two sets of firms, a
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result that does not support the prediction of the third hypothesis. However, to better
comprehend the differential institutional impact, it is necessary to estimate general crosssectional regressions as formulated in the equation 3 separately for the S&P 500 and the
non S&P 500 firms to more clearly examine the differential institutional effects.
Table 13 reports the test results on institutional effects separately for the S&P 500
and the non S&P 500 firms by estimating the equation 3. I find that in the presence of all
control variables, INST is not significant (t-statistic: 0.065; p-value: 0.474) for the S&P
500 firms. Many of the control variables are also not significant. It is worth mentioning
that among the control variables, SIZE, LEV, σLIQUIDITY, ROS and CAP are found to
be statistically insignificant. Another remarkable thing is that the intercept is not
significant (p-value: 0.116). The traditional accrual determinant variables, therefore,
appear to be mostly redundant in explaining the cross-sectional differences in FLACAC
among the sample S&P 500 firms. Moreover, the coefficient of PMGR2 is positive and
significant, a result that is contrary to the previous research findings that an increase in
managerial ownership is accompanied by a decrease in the level of accrual management.
For the non S&P 500 firms, I find evidence of significant institutional effects on
accrual management in the presence of other control variables. INST is significantly
negative (coefficient: -0.163; t-statistic: -2.681; p-value: 0.004). Most control variables
are significant in the predicted directions. Therefore, by separately estimating the general
regression equation 3, I find evidence of differential institutional impact on the level of
accrual management in these two different categories of sample firms, S&P 500 and non
S&P 500. Hence, the test results support the third hypothesis that the monitoring
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influence of institutional investors on accrual management are different for these two
categories of firms.
The S&P 500 firms are very large and highly visible, having substantially higher
institutional investment compared to the non S&P 500 firms in the sample as seen from
Panels A and B of the Table 5. Institutions are found not to exert any significant
influence on the accrual management level of such firms while they have significant
influence in the non S&P 500 firms. Institutions seem to find greater scope to provide
monitoring in the non S&P 500 firms in their accrual management effort relative to the
S&P 500 firms. This result is also consistent with the observations made in previous
studies that institutions prefer to invest in the firms having S&P 500 membership to meet
the “prudent-person” standard either because these firms have information-rich
environments (Lang and McNichols 1998), or for other regulatory or liquidity reasons
(Guercio 1996). Institutions may simply passively index in the S&P 500 firms for such
various reasons. It also seems that the pattern of accrual generation is somewhat different
in nature in those large highly visible S&P 500 firms having greater transparency and
external monitoring by various regulatory and professional bodies compared to the non
S&P 500 firms. Most of the traditional variables that are expected to explain the crosssectional differences of accrual management are not significant for the S&P 500 firms.
Moreover, some variable, i.e., managerial ownership has significantly positive effects on
flexibility in abnormal accrual generation, which is contrary to the predictions based on
prior studies. This result provides an interesting avenue for future research with respect to
the accrual generation process of the S&P 500 firms. It will be an interesting endeavor to
explore the factors at an individual firm level influencing management choice of the
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selection and application of accounting techniques in financial reporting of such highly
visible, large capitalization firms.37
•

Test of clientele versus monitoring effects of institutional investors
Table 14 reports the results of two-stage least square regressions to segregate and

examine the institutional monitoring effects from clientele effects in the context of
accrual management. In the first stage cross-sectional model, institutional percentage
shareholdings are regressed on the determinant variables. The coefficients and related test
statistics are reported in the first stage. The adjusted R2 of the regression is 0.195, which
appears to be healthy.38 The signs of the coefficients are consistent with the previous
research findings that institutions invest more in large firms and firms having S&P 500
37

The industry distribution of sample firms is not even. As revealed from Table-2, there are some
industries which have greater representation in the final sample relative to others, e.g., oil and gas, paper
and allied products, publishing and printing, steel works, communication equipment, motor vehicles,
organic/inorganic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, engines/turbines, metal cans and shipping containers.
Altogether 10 industries out of 51 are heavily represented by firms in the sample. In order to check whether
the basic results of the study are driven by any industry-related factors, I estimate the original crosssectional regression by including 10 industry dummy variables to capture any industry-related effects for
those heavily represented industries. The use of such industry dummy variables also controls for any crosssectional correlations among residuals that may be caused by the common industry-related factors. I find
the dummy variable for oil and gas industry as positive and significant at 5% level and that of publishing
and printing as negative and significant at 10% level in all regressions. All other industry dummy variables
are found to be insignificant. But the original results reported in the main analysis remain qualitatively
identical.

The adjusted R2 of the cross-sectional accrual regressions reported by previous research on earnings
management varies widely from study to study. Normally, on average, it ranges between 1% and 25%,
depending on the specific circumstances of a test. The accrual management studies of similar nature as the
present one report adjusted R2 varying between 8% and 13%, on average. Therefore, the model employed
in this study appears to be more powerful than the ones used in prior studies. As a whole, the adjusted R2 as
reported in various tests in the Tables 9 to 13 ranges between 16% and 17% that are comparable to those
reported in previous studies of accrual management (e.g, Hall and Stammerjohan 1997; Warfield et al.
1995; Rajgopal et al. 1998; Gul et al. 2002; Becker et al. 1998; Chung et al. 2002).
With respect to different tests reported in the Tables 9 to 13, I employ the dependent variable, FLACAC as
estimated from the alternative version of the modified Jones’ model (1995) developed in this paper.
Alternatively, as a specification check I also use FLACAC estimated as per the original Jones’ model. The
results in both cases are qualitatively identical.
38

I am not able to compare the power of the first stage regression in terms of adjusted R2 with that of the
similar test done by Wahal and McConnell (2000) because they did not report this statistic relating to the
first stage regression.
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membership, and less in firms having high dividend payout and having high insider
ownership. The intercept and coefficients of S&P and PMGR appear to be extremely
significant. However, the coefficients of MV and DP remain statistically insignificant.
The predicted value of institutional percentage shareholdings (PINST) in each sample
firm is obtained from the intercept and coefficients estimated from the first-stage
regression. The unexpected institutional shareholding (UNEXPINST) in each firm is
obtained by subtracting the predicted shareholding from the actual institutional
shareholding.
The second stage presents the results of the cross-sectional regression of
FLACAC on the predicted institutional stock ownership and unexpected institutional
stockholdings in the presence of the other control variables. The regression results of
FLACAC on PINST in the presence of other control variables are estimated by using the
reduced model 1. I find the coefficient of PINST to be negative and statistically
significant at the 1% level (coefficient: -0.159; t-statistic: -3.153; p-value: 0.001). By
using the reduced model 2, I examine the association with respect to UNEXPINST. I find
that the coefficient of UNEXPINST is also negative and statistically significant at the 1%
level (coefficient: -0.130; t-statistic: -2.707; p-value: 0.004). By estimating the full
model, I report the regression results by simultaneously testing the effects of PINST and
UNEXPINST. Both the variables are found to be negative and statistically significant at
the 1% level (with p-values of 0.001 and 0.003 respectively) in the presence of other
control variables. Therefore, these test results clearly suggest that institutions did exert
monitoring over a firm’s accrual management activity during the sample time-period.39

39

I also test the interaction effects of PINST and UNEXPINST with CONC variable in the regression in
presence of PINST and UNEXPINST. The interaction variables are not found to be statistically significant.

92

The significantly inverse relationship between flexibility in generating abnormal accruals
and institutional percentage shareholdings is not due to the institutional preference to
invest in a firm having low accrual management (i.e., high-quality earnings) or for some
omitted underlying factors driving the relationship. Therefore, the relationship can be
attributed

to

institutional

investors

constraining

management’s

flexibility

to

opportunistically use abnormal accruals to manage earnings. Substantial institutional
presence acts as a deterrent to a firm’s accrual management activity. Institutional
investors are, therefore, found to improve corporate governance by providing monitoring
on the corporate financial reporting process.

I also test the relationship as reported in the Table 14 by employing FLACAC estimated from the original
Jones’ model (1991) as the dependent variable. The results appear to be similar.

93

Table 9: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Abnormal Accrual Variation on
Institutional Stock Ownership and Other Control Variables
N = 386
Full model: FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σNETWORTHi + β5 σLIQUIDITYi +
β6 ROSi + β7 MBi + β8 CAPi+ β9 INSTi + εi
Reduced

Reduced

Full

Model 1

Model 2

Model

Variable

Coeff.

t-statistic p-value Coeff. t-statistic p-value Coeff. t-statistic p-value

Intercept

0.092

7.655

0.000

PMGR2

-0.040

-0.797

SIZE

-0.254

LEV

0.109

8.348

0.000

0.426

-0.080

-1.548

0.061

-5.025

0.000

-0.225

-4.420

0.000

0.111

2.209

0.014

0.109

2.184

0.015

σNETWORTH

0.171

3.427

0.001

0.172

3.492

0.001

σLIQUIDITY

0.112

2.280

0.012

0.099

2.032

0.022

ROS

-0.058

-1.158

0.124

-0.041

-0.816

0.210

MB

0.232

4.772

0.000

0.230

4.793

0.000

CAP

-0.168

-3.429

0.001

-0.179

-3.677

0.000

0.000 -0.158

-3.130

0.001

INST
Adjusted R2
F -statistic

0.067

-0.207
0.154
9.738

0.040
17.117

11.222

-4.137

0.000

0.173
9.947

Note: All variables are defined in previous sections. The p-values reported are one-tailed.
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Table 10: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Abnormal Accrual Variation on
Concentrated Institutional Stockholdings and Other Control Variables
N = 386
Full model : FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σNETWORTHi + β5 σLIQUIDITYi
+ β6 ROSi + β7 MBi + β8 CAPi+ β9 INSTi + β10 CONCi + β11 (INSTi*CONCi) + εi
Reduced

Reduced

Full

Model 1

Model 2

Model

Variable

Coeff.

Intercept

0.101

7.770

0.000

0.105

8.094

0.000

0.107

7.627

0.000

PMGR2

-0.061

-1.179

0.120

-0.082

-1.577

0.058

-0.083

-1.592

0.056

SIZE

-0.271

-5.291

0.000

-0.231

-4.343

0.000

-0.234

-4.377

0.000

LEV

0.127

2.500

0.007

0.113

2.218

0.014

0.114

2.234

0.013

σNETWORTH

0.176

3.536

0.000

0.173

3.505

0.001

0.176

3.548

0.000

σLIQUIDITY

0.099

1.999

0.046

0.097

1.972

0.025

0.095

1.927

0.028

ROS

-0.058

-1.163

0.246

-0.042

-0.840

0.202

-0.041

-0.817

0.207

MB

0.223

4.592

0.000

0.228

4.724

0.000

0.228

4.716

0.000

CAP

-0.177

-3.599

0.000

-0.180

-3.691

0.000

-0.181

-3.708

0.000

CONC

-0.094

-1.910

0.029

-0.023

-0.399

0.345

-0.090

-0.743

0.229

-0.146

-2.497

0.007

-0.184

-2.184

0.015

0.096

0.630

0.265

INST

t-statistic p-value Coeff. t-statistic p-value Coeff. t-statistic

INST*CONC
Adjusted R2
F -statistic

0.160
9.122

0.171
8.948

0.170
8.158

Note: All variables are defined in previous sections. The p-values reported are one-tailed.
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p-value

Table 11: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Abnormal Accrual Variation on Various
Measures of Concentrated Institutional Shareholdings and Other
Control Variables
N = 386
Model: FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σNETWORTHi + β5 σLIQUIDITYi +
β6 ROSi + β7 MBi + β8 CAPi + β9 Xi + εi
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Variable

Coeff. t-statistic p-value Coeff. t-statistic p-value Coeff. t-statistic p-value

Intercept

0.099

7.646

0.000

0.084

4.423

0.000

0.094

6.706

0.000

PMGR2

-0.051

-0.998

0.160

-0.041

-0.812

0.209

-0.040

-0.792

0.214

SIZE

-0.265

-5.188

0.000

-0.235

-3.282

0.001

-0.253

-4.770

0.000

LEV

0.124

2.424

0.008

0.110

2.183

0.015

0.110

2.097

0.019

σNETWORTH

0.167

3.364

0.001

0.170

3.408

0.001

0.171

3.424

0.001

σLIQUIDITY

0.105

2.141

0.017

0.112

2.286

0.012

0.112

2.277

0.012

ROS

-0.060

-1.185

0.119

-0.056

-1.115

0.132

-0.058

-1.148

0.126

MB

0.226

4.636

0.000

0.234

4.778

0.000

0.232

4.754

0.000

CAP

-0.173

-3.515

0.000

-0.166

-3.369

0.001

-0.168

-3.413

0.001

CONPERCa

-0.069

-1.412

0.080
0.026

0.373

0.355
0.006

0.110

0.456

AVGHOLDa
MULTCONa
Adjusted R2
F-statistic

0.156
8.901

0.154
8.652

a

0.151
8.635

The independent variable of the model is denoted by X, which represents CONPERC, AVGHOLD and
MULTCON respectively.
All variables are defined in previous sections. The p-values reported are one-tailed.
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Table 12: Cross-Sectional Regressions Testing the Institutional Shareholding Effects
in the S&P 500 and the Non S&P 500 Firms of the Full Sample
N = 386
Full model: FLACACi = β0 + β1PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σNETWORTHi + β5 σLIQUIDITYi +
β6 ROSi + β7 MBi + β8 CAPi + β9 INSTi + β10 S&Pi + β11 (INSTi* S&Pi) + εi
Reduced
Model 1

Reduced
Model 2

t-statistic p-value Coeff

t-statistic p-value Coeff t-statistic

Variable

Coeff

Intercept

0.089

6.828

0.000

PMGR2

-0.041

-0.807

SIZE

-0.247

LEV

7.664

0.000

0.210

-0.080

-1.553

0.060

-3.798

0.000

-0.252

-3.911

0.000

0.110

2.130

0.017

0.113

2.219

0.014

σNETWORTH 0.171

3.425

0.001

0.172

3.484

0.001

σLIQUIDITY

0.111

2.259

0.012

0.100

2.050

0.021

ROS

-0.057

-1.120

0.132

-0.046

-0.907

0.182

MB

0.232

4.769

0.000

0.232

4.816

0.000

CAP

-0.168

-3.422

0.001

-0.177

-3.619

0.000

S&P
INST*S&P

-0.012

-0.179

10.562

0.000

p-value

0.115

INST

0.074

Full
Model

-0.190

-3.161

0.002* -0.189

-3.265

0.002*

0.858* -0.307

-1.478

0.140* -0.099

-0.487

0.628*

0.224

1.030

0.304* 0.163

0.792

0.428*

Adjusted R2
0.151
0.046
F-statistic
8.638
7.217
*The reported p-values are two-tailed. All other p-values are one-tailed.
All variables are defined in previous sections.
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0.171
8.237

Table 13: Cross-Sectional Regressions Testing the Institutional Shareholding
Effects Separately for the S&P 500 and the Non S&P 500 Firms
Full model: FLACACi = β0 + β1PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σNETWORTHi + β5
σLIQUIDITYi + β6 ROSi + β7 MBi + β8 CAPi+ β9 INSTi + εi
N = 140
S&P 500

N = 246
Non S&P 500

Variable

Coeff.

t-statistic

p-value

Coeff.

t-statistic

p-value

Intercept

0.025

1.202

0.116

0.130

6.484

0.000

PMGR2

0.198

2.352

0.010

-0.121

-1.909

0.029

SIZE

-0.044

-0.543

0.294

-0.220

-3.491

0.001

LEV

0.079

0.955

0.170

0.130

1.970

0.025

σNETWORTH

0.198

2.299

0.012

0.180

2.888

0.002

σLIQUIDITY

-0.100

-1.237

0.110

0.120

1.910

0.029

ROS

0.023

0.238

0.406

-0.061

-0.979

0.164

MB

0.255

2.417

0.008

0.214

3.584

0.000

CAP

-0.075

-0.924

0.177

-0.212

-3.432

0.001

INST

0.005

0.065

0.474

-0.163

-2.681

0.004

Adjusted R2
F-statistic

0.177
4.311

0.159
6.163

Note: All variables are defined in previous sections. The p-values reported are one-tailed.
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Table 14: Test of Clientele versus Monitoring Effects of Institutional Investors in the
Context of Accrual Management Using Two-Stage Least Squares
N = 386
Two-stage least squares regressions
First stage
Estimation of the coefficients of the determinant variables of institutional stockholdings
by using the following cross-sectional regression:
Model:

INSTi = β0 + β1 MVi-1 + β2 DPi-1 + β3 S&Pi + β4 PMGRi-1 + εi
β0

Estimated coefficients:
Adjusted R2
0.195
F-statistic
24.270

0.463

β1

β2

0.00026 -0.00073

β3

β4

0.147

-0.295

Second stage
Cross-sectional regression on abnormal accrual variations on predicted value of institutional stock
ownership computed from the first-stage stage estimated from the first stage
Full model: FLACACi = β0 + β1 LEVi + β2 σLIQUIDITYi + β3 σNETWORTHi + β4 ROSi + β5 MBi +
β6 CAPi + β7 PINSTi + β8 UNEXINSTi + εi
Reduced
Reduced
Full
Model 1
Model 2
Model
Variable
Coeff. t-statistic p-value Coeff. t-statistic p-value Coeff. t-statistic p-value
Intercept

0.083

5.582

0.000

0.040

6.630

0.000

0.085

5.680

0.000

LEV

0.059

1.164

0.123

0.076

1.493

0.078

0.064

1.266

0.103

σLIQUIDITY

0.105

2.091

0.019

0.113

2.257

0.012

0.095

1.909

0.028

σNETWORTH

0.170

3.431

0.001

0.194

3.954

0.000

0.167

3.416

0.000

ROS

-0.063

-1.223

0.110

-0.084

-1.640

0.051

-0.054

-1.045

0.198

MB

0.220

4.450

0.000

0.208

4.210

0.000

0.216

4.425

0.000

CAP

-0.129

-2.646

0.004

-0.125

-2.558

0.060

-0.137

-2.831

0.003

PINST

-0.159

-3.153

0.001

-0.162

-3.242

0.001

-0.134

-2.810

0.003

UNEXINST

-0.130

-2.707

0.004

0.122
0.116
0.138
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
8.647
8.225
8.691
Note: p-values reported are one-tailed. All variables are defined in previous sections.
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8. ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION
8.1. Test of Institutional Effects on Accrual Management in a Dummy Variable
Setting
In this section, I describe tests of institutional influence on a firm’s accrual
management activity in a dummy variable setting. Instead of applying continuous
variables like the ones in the main analysis as reported in previous sections, I use dummy
variables to capture different institutional ownership levels and examine their relative
impacts on a firm’s accrual management activity.
I predict that different proportions of institutional ownership in a firm’s
shareholder mix have differential influence on the abnormal accrual generation activities.
Institutions with a large ownership in a firm are likely to trigger more voluntary
disclosures by firm managers (Hessel and Norman 1992) and large-scale development of
sophisticated, private information from many different sources. Moreover, the larger the
ownership position in an entity, the greater is the economic stake involved providing
greater incentives to oversee management’s choice of using certain accounting techniques
in financial statement preparation.
In order to examine the differential impact of institutional shareholding, I conduct
two types of dummy variable tests. The first test involves the formation of two levels of
institutional ownership based on median shareholdings. I assign a dummy variable with a
value of 1 to firms having more than the median institutional shareholdings (MEDIH)
when firms are arranged in a lowest to highest order of institutional stock ownership, and
0 to firms having less than the median institutional shareholdings. An interaction variable
with a concentration dummy is also used to capture the additional effect of concentrated
institutional stockholdings.
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The relevant regression model is described below:
FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σLIQUIDITYi + β5
σNETWORTHi + β6 ROSi + β7 MBi + β8 CAPi + β9 MEDIHi + β10
[MEDIHi*CONCi] + β11 [MEDPIHi * S&Pi] + εi ………………..(9)
For the second test, I form quintiles of firms based on institutional stock
ownership when firms are arranged in a lowest to highest order. For each fiscal year, the
lowest 20% of the observations is assigned to the first quintile (Q1), the next 20% to the
second quintile (Q2) and so on. In the process, the highest 20% of the observations is
placed in the fifth quintile (Q5). A score is assigned to a firm based on the institutional
quintile ranking in each year: 1 for Q1, 2 for Q2, 3 for Q3, 4 for Q4 and 5 for Q5. Then, I
compute the mean eight-year score (from 1991 to 1998) for each firm. I reassign the
firms to quintiles on the basis of the mean eight-year scores, the lowest 20% to the first
quintile, the second lowest to the second quintile and so forth.40
Using these quintiles I examine the impact of institutional holdings in conjunction
with ownership concentration by using dummy variable classifications as follows:
1) CONPIH takes the value of 1 for firms with high institutional ownership
levels (i.e., firms in quintiles 4 and 5), where at least one of the institutions
owns 5% or more of the outstanding shares and 0 otherwise.41
2) HPIH takes the value of 1 for all firms (i.e., quintiles 4 and 5) with a high
level of institutional ownership and 0 otherwise.42
40

Different forms of institutional shareholdings constructed on the basis of ownership levels are expected
to provide better understanding of the tests of institutional influence on a firm’s accrual management
activity. This relative setting is applied based on the assumption that influence may not be linearly
correlated with the percentage shareholdings. Therefore, the tests using different institutional ownership
constructs are expected to exhibit more precisely the differing institutional influence on firms’ accrual
management activity.

41

CONPIH is assigned to firms having concentrated institutional shareholdings (i.e., with 5% or more than
5% stockowners) for more than half of the sample period of 8 years.
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3) MPIH takes the value of 1 for firms with a medium level of institutional
ownership (i.e., quintile 3) and 0 otherwise.
A negative relation between HPIH and the level of discretionary accrual activity
is expected if institutional oversight dampens managerial enthusiasm for employing
discretionary accruals. If CONPIH is also negative then this dampening effect is
heightened when individual institution holdings are sizable (i.e., 5% or more). A negative
MPIH effect, if it occurs, implies that institutional stock ownership is influential even
when it is not particularly large.
FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σLIQUIDITYi + β5
σNETWORTHi + β6 ROSi + β7 MBi + β8 CAPi + β9 CONPIHi + β10 HPIHi +
β11 MPIHi + β12 [CONPIHi* S&Pi] + β13 [HPIHi* S&Pi] + β14 [MPIHi*S&Pi]
+ εi ………………………………….(10)
All variables are defined in previous sections and paragraphs.
Table 15 reports the results of cross-sectional tests in a dummy variable setting
based on median institutional percentage shareholdings, the relative degree of
institutional influence in firms having greater than median stockholdings compared to
firms having less than median stockholdings. By using the reduced model 1, I find
evidence that in the presence of other variables, the coefficient of MEDIH is negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level (coefficient: -0.099; t-statistic: -1.943; p-value:
0.026). By using the reduced model 2, I separately estimate the effects of MEDIH having
concentrated institutional shareholdings. The coefficient is again found to be negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level (coefficient: -0.092; t-statistic: -1.887; p-value:
0.030). Therefore, I find that both the MEDIH dummy (in the reduced model 1) and the
MEDPIH dummy with concentrated institutional shareholdings (in the reduced model 2)
42

CONPIH is designed to capture the incremental effect over and above HPIH.
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provide significantly negative shifts to the intercept when considered on a stand-alone
basis in the presence of other control variables. Most control variables are significant as
per predicted directions. The results support the predictions made in the first and second
hypotheses. Firms having greater than the median institutional shareholdings experience
more institutional monitoring and as a result, have less flexibility in generating abnormal
accruals compared to firms having less than the median institutional shareholdings.
Further, firms having greater than the median institutional stockholdings with
concentration experience more institutional monitoring and as a result, have less
flexibility in generating abnormal accrual than firms having greater than the median
institutional shareholdings without any concentration and firms having less than the
median institutional shareholdings. The test results are consistent with the findings of
Chung et al. (2002) that substantial investment in a firm makes the institutions more
inclined to monitor managers and deter them from opportunistically manipulating
accruals. Consistent with the test results in the continuous variable setting (as reported in
Table 8), I find significant concentrated institutional effects when the concentration
construct is separately considered in the regression analysis.
However, when I include both dummy variables, MEDIH and MEDIH*CONC, in
the same model they become insignificant as found by applying the reduced model 3. It
seems that since both the variables have almost the same coefficients when considered
separately, they are almost equally powerful in providing shift to the intercept. As a
result, when they are jointly considered in a model, they neutralize each other’s effect.
By using the reduced model 4, I estimate the additional effects of the S&P
dummy in the presence of MEDIH and other control variables. It is observed that the
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coefficient of MEDIH is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level (coefficient:
-0.114; t-statistic: -1.894; p-value of 0.029). But the interaction variable with S&P is not
significant even though the coefficient is positive. This finding is consistent with the
results of the main analyses that the S&P dummy fails to capture any differential
institutional effects between the two categories of firms once the main effect of
institutional stockholdings is considered in the same model. Most of the control variables
are significant in the predicted directions.
In Table 16, I report the test result separately for the institutional effects with
concentrated shareholdings on accrual management level in a mutually exclusive dummy
variable setting. I include two mutually exclusive constructs of institutional ownerships,
one dummy variable for firms having greater than the median institutional ownership
with concentrated stockholdings (CONMEDIH) and the other for firms having greater
than

the

median

institutional

ownership

without

concentrated

stockholdings

(NCONMEDIH) for better comprehension of the relative impacts of concentrated
stockholdings. The CONMEDIH is found to have greater and significantly negative
effects on managerial flexibility in generating accruals relative to NCONMEDIH in the
presence of other control variables. The coefficient of CONMEDIH is -0.103 (t-statistic: 1.997; p-value: 0.024), while that of NCONMEDIH is -0.031 (t-statistic: -0.606; p-value:
0.273). Firms having greater than the median institutional stockholdings with
concentration experience significantly greater institutional influence on their accrual
management activities relative to firms having greater than the median institutional
stockholdings without concentration. This test result, therefore, suggests that
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concentrated institutional stockholdings have greater mitigating effects on accrual
management levels providing support to the prediction made in the second hypothesis.
Table-17 presents the test results in the case of dummy variable classifications
based on quintiles of institutional stock ownership. By using the reduced model 1, I
report the regression results when CONPIH and MPIH dummy variables are used as
independent variables. It is observed that in the presence of other control variables,
CONPIH is negatively significant at the 5% level (coefficient: -0.101; t-statistic: -1.883;
p-value: 0.031) but MPIH is not statistically significant (coefficient: -0.057). Most
control variables are significant in the predicted directions. The result suggests that
CONPIH provides significantly negative shift to the intercept, which means that firms in
the top two quintiles of institutional ownership having concentrated holdings experience
more mitigating effects on accrual management relative to firms in the top two quintiles
without having concentrated institutional shareholdings and to firms in the middle and
lower two quintiles. This result supports the prediction of a concentration effect made in
the second hypothesis. However, I do not find any additional institutional effect for firms
in middle quintile relative to firms in the lower two quintiles.
By using the reduced model 2, I estimate the effects of HPIH and MPIH as
independent variables. The coefficient of HPIH is found to be negative and statistically
significant at the 5% level (coefficient: -0.109; -1.892; p-value: 0.030) but the coefficient
MPIH is not significant (coefficient: -0.067; t-statistic: -1.224; p-value: 0.111). This
result suggests that firms in the top two quintiles of institutional stock ownership
experience greater institutional monitoring over accrual management relative to firms in
the middle and lowest two quintiles of institutional stock ownership. The finding supports
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the prediction of the first hypothesis. Most control variables are significant in the
predicted directions.
By using the reduced model 3, I estimate the regression equation when CONPIH,
HPIH and MPIH are considered together in the model. None of the independent variables
are found to be significant. This is mainly due to the fact that these variables are
collinear. Especially, the correlation coefficient between CONPIH and HPIH is extremely
high and significantly positive (coefficient: 0.895 and p-value: 0.000), which is the
reason that these variables become insignificant when simultaneously considered in the
same regression analysis. Therefore, no additional information regarding the incremental
effects of institutional shareholdings is observed at different ownership levels when these
three ownership constructs are included together in the same model.
By using the full model, I estimate the effects of the interaction variables of the
S&P dummy with CONPIH, HPIH and MPIH. None of the interaction variables is found
to be significant, which is consistent with the previous test results that there is no
additional institutional monitoring effect evident for the S&P 500 firms once the main
effects of institutional stockholdings are accounted for in the model. Again, most control
variables are significant in predicted directions.43
In Table 18, I present the test results when two mutually exclusive constructs of
institutional ownership are considered for firms in the top two quintiles of institutional
stock

ownership:

with

concentrated

shareholdings

and

without

concentrated

shareholdings This test is designed to specifically examine the concentration effects. I
develop three institutional ownership constructs that are mutually exclusive to one

43

With regard to all cross-sectional regressions reported in Table 15 to 18, the power of the models remains
quite reasonable as the adjusted R2 ranges between 15% and 16%.
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another; first one, CONHPIH, denotes firms in the top two quintiles of institutional stock
ownership having concentrated shareholdings, the second one, HPIH, denotes firms in the
top two quintiles without having concentrated institutional shareholdings, and the third
one, MPIH, denotes firms in the middle quintile of institutional ownership. The results
shows that firms in the top two quintiles having concentrated stockholdings (CONHPIH)
experience significantly greater institutional monitoring on accrual management than
firms in the top two quintiles not having concentrated institutional stockholdings (HPIH)
and firms in the middle quintile of institutional stockholdings (MPIH). The coefficient of
CONHPIH is -0.111 (t-statistic: 1.956; p-value: 0.025), while the coefficient of HPIH is 0.026 and that of MPIH is -0.065. Both the coefficients are statistically insignificant. It is
also interesting to note that firms in the middle quintile experience less institutional
monitoring effects compared to firms in the top two quintiles having concentration and
have relatively greater institutional influence relative to firms in the top two quintiles
without having concentration. On an overall basis, I find support for the prediction that
concentrated institutional ownership has greater mitigating effects on management’s
flexibility in generating abnormal accruals.
8.2. Cross-Sectional Tests of Institutional Influence on Accrual Management
The primary test in this study relates to the firm-specific variability in generating
abnormal accruals during the sample period of eight years. I use average values of
explanatory variables in the cross-sectional regressions in equations (3) through (5). In
the main analysis, I examine the institutional influence on the overall accrual
management levels indicated by management flexibility during the sample time-period.
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Table 15: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Abnormal Accrual Variation on Institutional Stock Ownership
and Other Control Variables in Dummy Variable Classification Setting on Median Institutional
Percentage Shareholdings
N = 386
Full model: FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σLIQUIDITYi + β5 σNETWORTHi + β6 ROSi +
β7 MBi + β8 CAPi + β9 MEDIHi + β10 [MEDIHi*CONCi] + β11 [MEDIHi * S&Pi] + εi
Reduced
Reduced
Reduced
Reduced
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Variable
Coeff.
t-stat.
p-value Coeff.
t-stat.
p-value Coeff.
t-stat.
p-value Coeff. t-stat. p-value
Intercept
PMGR2
SIZE
LEV
σLIQUIDITY
σNETWORTH
ROS
MB
CAP
MEDIH
MEDIH*CONC
MEDIH*S&P

0.092
-0.064
-0.234
0.116
0.104
0.170
-0.045
0.232
-0.174
-0.099

Adjusted R2
F-statistic

0.160
9.140

7.718
-1.228
-4.538
2.304
2.126
3.434
-0.899
4.798
-3.547
-1.943

0.000
0.110
0.000
0.011
0.017
0.001
0.184
0.000
0.000
0.026

0.094
-0.060
-0.246
0.119
0.106
0.168
-0.051
0.230
-0.173

7.823
-1.170
-4.854
2.355
2.153
3.395
-1.023
4.741
-3.536

0.000
0.122
0.000
0.010
0.016
0.001
0.154
0.000
0.000

-0.092

-1.887

0.030

0.159
9.111

0.092
-0.064
-0.238
0.117
0.104
0.169
-0.047
0.231
-0.174
-0.062
-0.041

0.158
8.226

7.686
-1.231
-4.539
2.327
2.124
3.411
-0.929
4.763
-3.546
-0.628
-0.427

0.000
0.109
0.000
0.011
0.017
0.001
0.177
0.000
0.000
0.265
0.335

0.097
-0.064
-0.245
0.119
0.105
0.170
-0.047
0.233
-0.173
-0.114

7.463
-1.238
-4.343
2.343
2.131
3.424
-0.934
4.809
-3.537
-1.894

0.000
0.119
0.000
0.010
0.017
0.001
0.175
0.000
0.000
0.029

0.031

0.477

0.317

0.158
8.232

Note: Dummy variable 1 assigned to firms having institutional stockholdings greater than sample median (MEDIH); 0 otherwise.
All other variables are defined in previous sections. The reported p-values are one-tailed.
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Table 16: Cross-Sectional Regression in a Dummy Variable Setting of Mutually Exclusive Institutional
Ownership Constructs on Median Percentage Shareholdings
N = 386
Full model: FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σLIQUIDITYi + β5 σNETWORTHi + β6 ROSi + β7 MBi +
β8 CAPi + β9 CONMEDIHi + β10 NCONMEDIHi + εi

β0

β1

β2

β3

β4

β5

β6

Coefficient
t-statistics
p-value

0.092
7.688
0.000

-0.064
-1.232
0.110

-0.238
-4.543
0.000

0.117
2.328
0.010

0.104
2.124
0.017

0.169
3.409
0.001

-0.047
-0.930
0.177

Adjusted R2
F-statistic

0.158
8.231

β7

β8

0.231 -0.174
4.764 -3.544
0.000 0.000

β9

β10

-0.103
-1.997
0.024

-0.031
-0.606
0.273

Note: One dummy variable 1 is assigned to firms having greater than median institutional stockholdings and also having concentrated
institutional shareholdings (CONMEDIH) and another dummy variable 1 is assigned to firms having greater than median
institutional stockholdings without concentrated shareholdings (NCONMEDIH); 0 otherwise.
CONMEDIH = MEDIH*CONC
NCONMEDIH = MEDIH - CONMEDIH
All variables are defined in previous sections. The p-values reported are one-tailed.
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Table 17: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Abnormal Accrual Variation on Institutional Stock Ownership and Other
Control Variables in Dummy Variable Setting on Quintiles of Institutional Percentage Shareholdings
N = 386
Full model: FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 σLIQUIDITYi + β5 σNETWORTHi + β6 ROSi + β7 MBi + β8 CAPi
β9 CONPIHi + β10 HPIHi + β11 MPIHi + β12 [CONPIHi* S&Pi] + β13 [HPIHi* S&Pi] + β14 [MPIHi*S&Pi] + εi
Reduced
Reduced
Reduced
Full
Variable
Intercept
PMGR2
SIZE
LEV
σLIQUIDITY
σNETWORTH
ROS
MB
CAP
CONPIH
HPIH
MPIH
CONPIH*S&P
HPIH*S&P
MPIH*S&P

Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model
Coeff.
t-stat
p-value Coeff.
t-stat
p-value Coeff.
t-stat
p-value Coeff. t-stat p-value
0.093
-0.062
-0.235
0.115
0.103
0.169
-0.052
0.231
-0.173
-0.101
-0.057

7.766
-1.197
-4.567
2.278
2.103
3.397
-1.036
4.762
-3.521
-1.883
-1.097

0.000
0.161
0.000
0.011
0.018
0.001
0.151
0.000
0.001
0.031
0.136

0.092
-0.066
-0.226
0.110
0.103
0.171
-0.046
0.234
-0.173

7.696
-1.267
-4.300
2.191
2.096
3.442
-0.909
4.825
-3.526

0.000
0.103
0.000
0.015
0.018
0.001
0.182
0.000
0.000

-0.109
0.067

-1.892
-1.224

0.030
0.111

Adjusted R2
0.157
0.157
F -statistic
8.191
8.195
All variables are already defined in previous sections.

0.092
-0.066
-0.229
0.112
0.103
0.170
-0.048
0.232
-0.173
-0.053
-0.060
-0.065

0.156
7.456
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7.702
-1.257
-4.323
2.224
2.085
3.412
-0.950
4.781
-3.526
-0.489
-0.522
-1.199

0.000
0.105
0.000
0.013
0.019
0.001
0.172
0.000
0.000
0.313
0.301
0.116

0.095
-0.066
-0.251
0.117
0.105
0.170
-0.051
0.234
-0.172
-0.198
0.068
-0.084
0.157
-0.121
0.040
0.151
5.905

7.304
-1.252
-4.100
2.283
2.116
3.401
-0.990
4.784
-3.501
-0.873
0.296
-1.293
0.747
-0.555
0.603

0.000
0.106
0.000
0.012
0.018
0.001
0.162
0.000
0.001
0.192
0.383
0.094
0.228
0.290
0.273

Table 18: Cross-Sectional Regression in a Dummy Variable Setting of Mutually Exclusive Institutional
Ownership Constructs on Quintiles of Institutional Percentage Shareholdings
N = 386
Full model: FLACACi = β0 + β1 PMGR2i + β2 SIZEi + β3 LEVi + β4 sLIQUIDITYi + β5 sNETWORTHi + β6 ROSi + β7 MBi

+ β8 CAPi + β9 CONHPIHi + β10 HPIHi + β11 MPIHi + εi
β0

β1

β2

β3

β4

β5

β6

β7

β8

β9

β10

β11

Coefficient
t-statistics
p-value

0.093
7.705
0.000

-0.066
-1.257
0.105

-0.230
-4.239
0.000

0.112
2.226
0.014

0.103
2.084
0.019

0.170
3.410
0.001

-0.048
-0.952
0.171

0.232
4.784
0.000

-0.173
-3.523
0.000

-0.111
-1.956
0.025

-0.026
-0.505
0.307

-0.065
-1.196
0.116

Adjusted R2
F-Statistic

0.156
7.461

Note: Mutually exclusive dummy variables; the first dummy variable assigned to firms in the top two quintiles of institutional
ownership having concentrated shareholdings, the second dummy variable assigned to firms in the top two quintiles
of institutional stock ownership, and the third one assigned to firms in the middle quintile of institutional stock ownership;
0 otherwise.
CONHPIH refers to firms in the top two quintiles of institutional stock ownership having institutions with concentrated
shareholdings.
HPIH refers to firms in the top two quintiles of institutional stock ownership not having institutions with concentrated
shareholdings.
MPIH refers to firms in the middle quintile of institutional stock ownership.
All other control variables are already defined in previous sections.
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The tests are based on the premise that multi-year accrual management levels (as
measured by variability in abnormal accrual generation) during a specific time-period can
better be ascertained on a firm by firm basis, and the association tests between such a
measure of accrual management and institutional stockholdings in a cross-sectional
setting will better reflect the institutional influence on the level of accrual management.
However, previous studies of accrual management have used either year-wise
cross-sectional data or pooled time-series cross-sectional data in regression analyses to
perform test of accrual management in a specific economic context or to examine the
effects of any governance factors.44 To provide comparability to previous studies, it is
necessary to complement the aggregate approach of the main analysis with year-wise
cross-sectional tests as well as with tests using pooled cross-sectional data over the years.
Moreover, during the sample period of eight years, the operating and economic
circumstances of some firms might change leading to a change in the nature of their
accrual management activities. Further, the institutional stockholdings and their influence
on firms’ financial and operating decisions have grown over the years. Therefore, the
institutional influence on firms’ accrual management activities may not be uniform and of
the same magnitude throughout the sample period. Since the relationship between
institutional stock ownership and earnings management activity may vary over the years
in the sample time-period, it is interesting to examine the stability of this relationship
during the sample time-period. A year-wise cross-sectional test is expected to capture the
time-series change in the relationship between institutional stock ownership and a firm’s
accrual management level.

44

For example: Cahan 1992; Warfield et al. 1995; Hall and Stammerjohan 1997; Han and Wang 1998;
Becker et al. 1998; Rajgopal et al. 1998; Ericson and Wang 1999; Gul et al. 2002; Klein 2002.
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In this section, I conduct two kinds of regression tests: the first test is done by
using a pooled cross-sectional regression model by stacking the annual data across firms
over the sample time-period, and the second test is performed annually by using the yearwise cross-sectional data.
•

Pooled cross-sectional regression analysis
With the pooled cross-sectional data, I replicate the analyses in the same way as I

perform in the main analysis to test the predictions regarding institutional effects made in
various hypotheses. To test the first hypothesis of general institutional monitoring effects
on the accrual management level, I employ the following cross-sectional model:
CACCit /TAit-1 = β0 + β1(∆REVit -∆RECit)/ TAit-1 + β2 (∆COGSit + ∆INVit)/
TAit-1 + β3 ∆OCFit / TAit-1 + β4 PMGR2it + β5 SIZEit + β6
LEVit + β7 ∆LIQUIDITYit + β8 ∆NETWORTHit + β9 ROSit + β10
MBit-1 + β11 CAPit + β12 INSTit + εit …………………………….(11)
where, CACCit= Absolute non-cash working capital accruals computed as per
equation (1) for firm i in year t.45
The other variables are already defined in previous sections. The explanatory
variables in the regression represent the independent variable, INST, and the other control
variables. The control variables account for the normal level of the magnitude of accruals
so that the relationship between the absolute abnormal component accruals and

45

I use the absolute current accruals as dependent variable because in a general setting, I am interested in
examining the extent of managerial discretion in generating abnormal accruals. The absolute abnormal
accruals reflect the level of discretion/flexibility available to manage earnings and serves to measure the
extent to which earnings are managed by pursuing certain accounting techniques. In the regression model, I
include various control variables to account for the normal level of accruals so that the relationship between
the magnitude of abnormal accruals and institutional stock ownership can be examined. The test is
performed to examine how the magnitude of abnormal accruals is impacted by the institutional percentage
stockholdings.
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institutional investor stockholdings can be examined. The prediction in this case is that
β12 is significantly less than zero.
In order to test the second hypothesis, I use the following regression models to
examine the effects of various concentration measures.
1) To examine the concentration effect by using a dummy variable to reflect the
concentration construct.
The relevant regression model is described below:
CACCit /TAit-1 = β0 + β1(∆REVit -∆RECit)/ TAit-1 + β2 (∆COGSit +
∆INVit)/ TAit-1 + β3 ∆OCFit / TAit-1 + β4 PMGR2it + β5
SIZEit + β6 LEVit + β7 ∆LIQUIDITYit + β8 ∆NETWORTHit +
β9 ROSit + β10 MBit-1 + β11CAPit+ β12 CONCit + εit………(12)
CONC is a dummy variable 1 assigned to firm-years with at least one institutional
investor owning 5% or more of outstanding common stock and 0 otherwise. The
prediction in this case is that β12 is significantly less than zero. CONC is expected to
provide a negative shift to the intercept. The intercept of firms having concentrated
institutional shareholdings is β0 + β12 while that of firms not having concentrated
institutional shareholdings is β0. All other variables are already defined in previous
sections.
2) To examine the incremental effects of concentrated institutional shareholding
over and above the general institutional effects on accrual management.
The relevant cross-sectional regression models is as follows:
First model:
CACCit /TAit-1 = β0 + β1(∆REVit -∆RECit)/ TAit-1 + β2 (∆COGSit +
∆INVit)/ TAit-1 + β3 ∆OCFit / TAit-1+ β4 PMGR2it + β5
SIZEit + β6 LEVit + β7 ∆LIQUIDITYit + β8 ∆NETWORTHit +
β9 ROSit + β10 MBit-1 + β11 CAPit+ β12 INSTit + β13 CONCit +
εit ……………………..(12A)
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The prediction is that β13 is significantly less than zero.
Second model:
CACCit /TAit-1 = β0 + β1(∆REVit -∆RECit)/ TAit-1 + β2 (∆COGSit +
∆INVit)/ TAit-1 + β3 ∆OCFit / TAit-1+ β4 PMGR2it + β5
SIZEit + β6 LEVit + β7 ∆LIQUIDITYit + β8 ∆NETWORTHit +
β9 ROSit + β10 MBit-1 + β11 CAPit+ β12 INSTit + β13 CONCit +
β14 (INSTit*CONCit) + εit………………(12B)
The variables are defined in previous sections. The prediction here is that β13 and
β14 are significantly less than zero. CONC variable is expected to provide a negative shift
to the slope coefficient of INST.
3) To examine the concentration effects by using various concentration measures.
The relevant cross-sectional regression model is as follows:
CACCit/TAit-1 = β0 + β1(∆REVit -∆RECit)/ TAit-1 + β2 (∆COGSit +
∆INVit)/ TAit-1 + β3 ∆OCFit / TAit-1+ β4 PMGR2it + β5
SIZEit + β6 LEVit + β7 ∆LIQUIDITYit + β8 ∆NETWORTHit +
β9 ROSit + β10 MBit-1 + β11 CAPit + β12 Xit + εit…………(12C)
where, X = CONPERC or MULTCON or AVGHOLD as the case may be. The
other variables are already defined in previous sections. The prediction here is that the
coefficient of X, β12 , is significantly less than zero.
In order to test the third hypothesis regarding differential institutional effects on
accrual management of the two different categories of firms, the S&P 500 and the non
S&P 500, I employ the following two approaches as done in the main analysis.
1) To test the differential institutional effects by using a dummy variable, S&P, to
examine difference in institutional influence on accrual management in the two
sets of firms.
The relevant cross-sectional regression model is described below:
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CACCit/TAit-1 = β0 +(∆REVit -∆RECit)/ TAit-1 + β2 (∆COGSit +
∆INVit)/ TAit-1 + β3 ∆OCFit / TAit-1+ β4 PMGR2it + β5
SIZEit + β6 LEVit + β7 ∆LIQUIDITYit + β8 ∆NETWORTHit +
β9 ROSit + β10 MBit-1 + β11 CAPit+ β12 INSTit + β13 S&Pit + β14
(INSTit* S&Pit)………….(13)
The prediction is that β14 is significantly different from zero. The S&P dummy is
expected to provide a significant shift to the slope coefficient of the INST variable.
Therefore, β12 + β14 is statistically different from β12.
2) To test the difference in institutional effects in the S&P 500 and the non S&P
500 firms by separately estimating equation (11) for these two sets of firms.
The prediction in this case is that the coefficient of INST is different for the two
categories of firms, S&P 500 and non S&P 500.
Table 19 reports the cross-sectional regression results by estimating the equation
11. The number of firm-year observations is 3088 (for 386 firms over an eight-year
period). By using the reduced model 1, I examine the relationship between absolute
accruals and various control variables by regressing ABSCACC on all control variables.
Most control variables are significant in the predicted directions. The adjusted R2 is
0.157, which is comparable to that reported in earlier studies of earnings management
(Warfield et al. 1995; Becker et al. 1998; Gul et al. 2002). By using the reduced model 2,
I conduct a univariate test by regressing absolute accruals on the institutional percentage
stockholdings. The coefficient of INST is found to be negative and significant at the 1%
level (t-statistic: -3.053; p-value: 0.001). By using the full model, I examine the
association between absolute abnormal accruals and institutional ownership in the
presence of other control variables. The coefficient of INST still remains significantly
negative when the control variables are also included in the model (t-statistic: -1.803; pvalue: 0.035). The result supports the prediction of the first hypothesis that institutions
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actively monitor to reduce the level of abnormal accruals and is consistent with the result
reported in the main analysis.
Table 20 reports various test results with respect to the effects of concentrated
institutional shareholdings. Panel A presents the test results by estimating the equations
12, 12A and 12B. By using the reduced model 1, I examine the effects of CONC, a
dummy variable formed as a construct of concentrated stockholdings by institutions
similar to the main analysis. I find that the coefficient of CONC is negative and
significant at the 5% level (t-statistic: -2.246; p-value: 0.013); the result indicates that
firms with concentrated institutional stockholdings experience more mitigating
institutional influence in accrual management, a finding consistent with that of the main
analysis and supports the prediction of the second hypothesis. Most control variables are
significant in the predicted directions. By using the reduced model 2, I examine the effect
of CONC in presence of INST and other control variables. It is observed that when INST
is included in the regression, CONC still remains significantly negative at the 10% level
(t-statistic: -1.609; p-value: 0.054). However, INST is found to be insignificant though
the sign of its coefficient is negative (p-value: 0.185). The result is different from that
reported in the main analysis that the presence of the influential INST variable makes the
CONC variable insignificant. The difference may be due to the artifacts of the regression
model used in the main analysis and the one used in the pooled cross-sectional timeseries design. In this cross-sectional test, I find evidence of an additional concentration
effect on accrual management in the presence of INST, which supports the prediction of
the second hypothesis.
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Table 19: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regressions of Absolute Current Accruals on
Institutional Stockholdings and Other Control Variables
N = 3088
Full model: | CACCit| /TAit-1 = β0 + β1 |(∆REVit -∆RECit)| /TAit-1 + β2 |(∆COGSit + ∆INVit)| / TAit-1 + β3
|∆OCFit | / TAit-1 + β4 PMGR2it + β5 SIZEit + β6 LEVit + β7 ∆LIQUIDITYit+ β8 ∆NETWORTHit + β9
ROSit + β10 MBit-1 + β11 CAPit + β12 INSTit + εit

Coefficient

Value

β0
β1
β2
β3
β4
β5
β6
β7
β8
β9
β10
β11
β12

0.064
-0.267
0.546
0.110
-0.021
-0.107
0.078
0.051
0.004
0.070
0.003
-0.085

Adjusted R2
F-statistic

0.157
53.331

Reduced
Model 1
t-stat.
p-value
9.131
-6.152
12.667
6.048
-1.251
-5.964
4.581
2.997
0.222
4.069
0.160
-4.992

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.105
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.413
0.000
0.437
0.000

Reduced
Model 2
Value
t-stat. p-value
0.071

0.003
9.320

p-value

17.757

0.000

0.065
-0.267
0.546
0.110
-0.028
-0.100
0.078
0.051
0.004
0.072
0.003
-0.086

9.288
-6.146
12.688
6.060
-1.628
-5.483
4.549
2.998
0.246
4.183
0.208
-5.043

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.133
0.052
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.403
0.000
0.418
0.000

-3.053

0.001

-0.032

-1.803

0.035

Reduced

-0.055

Value

Full
Model
t-stat.

0.158
49.194

Note: All variables are defined in previous sections. The reported p-values are one-tailed.
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Table 20: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis of Concentrated Institutional
Shareholding Effects on Accrual Management
N = 3088
Panel A: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression of Absolute Abnormal Accrual on
Concentrated Institutional Shareholdings and Other Control Variables
Full model: | CACCit| /TAit-1 = β0 + β1 |(∆REVit -∆RECit)| /TAit-1 + β2 |(∆COGSit + ∆INVit)| / TAit-1 + β3
|∆OCFit| / TAit-1 + β4 ΡMGR2it + β5 SIZEit + β6 LEVit + β7 ∆LIQUIDITYit + β8 ∆NETWORTHit + β9 ROSit
+ β10 MBit-1 + β11CAPit + β12 CONCit + β13 INSTit + β14 (INSTit* CONCit) + εit
Reduced
Reduced
Full
Model 1
Model 2
Model
Coefficient
Value
t-stat. p-value Value
t-stat. p-value Value
t-stat.
p-value
0.075
9.380
0.000 0.075
9.416
0.000 0.077
9.692
0.000
β0
-0.270
-6.212
0.000 -0.269 -6.195
0.000 -0.270 -6.231
0.000
β1
0.549
12.745
0.000 0.549 12.739
0.000 0.550
12.773
0.000
β2
0.109
5.992
0.000 0.109
6.008
0.000 0.107
5.898
0.139
β3
-0.026
-1.510
0.066 -0.029 -1.655
0.049 -0.028 -1.606
0.054
β4
-0.110
-6.131
0.000 -0.106 -5.689
0.000 -0.110 -5.877
0.000
β5
0.082
4.792
0.000 0.081
4.715
0.000 0.082
4.772
0.000
β6
0.050
2.928
0.002 0.050
2.941
0.001 0.051
3.033
0.001
β7
0.004
0.255
0.400 0.004
0.262
0.496 0.004
0.252
0.400
β8
0.069
4.021
0.000 0.070
4.083
0.000 0.071
4.113
0.000
β9
0.002
0.143
0.443 0.003
0.172
0.431 0.004
0.246
0.403
β10
-0.087
-5.055
0.000 -0.087 -5.069
0.000 -0.088 -5.143
0.000
β11
β12
β13
β14
Adjusted R2
F-statistic

-0.038

-2.246

0.158
49.372

0.013

-0.030
-0.018

0.158
45.632

-1.609
-0.893

0.054
0.186

-0.121
-0.068
0.129

-2.998
-2.435
2.541

0.002
0.008
0.006

0.160
42.909

Panel B: Reported Coefficients of Various Measures of Concentrated Institutional
Stockholdings from Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression

Coefficient
t-statistics
p-value

Concentration of institutional stockholding measures
CONPERC
MULTCON
AVGHOLD
-0.019
-0.017
0.002
-1.148
-0.984
0.101
0.126
0.163
0.460

Note: The pooled model in equation 12C is estimated by including all control variables as described above
and treating each measure of concentration as the independent variable to examine their effects separately
on the magnitude of abnormal accruals.
All variables are defined in previous sections. The reported p-values are one-tailed.
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Table 21: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regressions Testing the Institutional Shareholding
Effects on Accrual Management in the S&P 500 and the Non S&P 500
Firms of the Full Sample
N = 3088
Full model: | CACCit| /TAit-1 = β0 + β1 |(∆REVit -∆RECit)| /TAit-1 + β2 |(∆COGSit + ∆INVit)| / TAit-1 +
β3 |∆OCFit | / TAit-1 + β4 ΡMGR2it + β5 SIZEit + β6 LEVit + β7 ∆ LIQUIDITYit + β8 ∆ NETWORTHit
+ β9 ROSit + β10 MBit-1 + β11 CAPit + β12 S&Pit + β13 INSTit + β14 (INSTit* S&Pit) + εit
Reduced
Reduced
Full
Model 1
Model 2
Model
Coefficient Value
t-stat.
p-value Value
t-stat. p-value Value
t-stat. p-value
β0
0.068
8.536
0.000
0.069
17.139 0.000
0.070
8.790 0.000
β1
-0.267
-6.148
0.000
-0.266
-6.118 0.000
β2
0.546
12.666
0.000
0.078
4.482 0.000
β3
0.110
6.044
0.000
0.110
6.042 0.133
β4
-0.021
-1.237
0.108
-0.029
-1.652 0.049
β5
-0.109
-4.893
0.000
-0.107
-4.783 0.000
β6
0.079
4.525
0.000
0.078
4.482 0.000
β7
0.051
2.995
0.001
0.051
2.990 0.001
β8
0.004
0.223
0.412
0.005
0.274 0.392
β9
0.070
4.044
0.000
0.071
4.130 0.000
β10
0.003
0.152
0.439
0.003
0.197 0.422
β11
-0.085
-4.989
0.000
-0.085
-4.944 0.000
β12
0.004
0.171
0.864* -0.215 -3.452 0.000* -0.064
-1.064 0.288*
-0.031 -1.459 0.146* -0.047
β13
-2.332 0.020*
1.412 0.158*
β14
0.117
1.775 0.076* 0.086
Adjusted R2 0.157
F-statistic
48.874

0.014
15.130

Note: All variables are defined in previous sections.
*The reported p-values are two-tailed. All other p-values are one-tailed.
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0.158
42.345

Table 22: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regressions to Test the Institutional Shareholding
Effects on Accrual Management Separately for the S&P 500 and the
Non S&P 500 Firms
Full model: |CACCit| /TAit-1 = β0 + β1 |(∆REVit -∆RECit)| /TAit-1 + β2 |(∆COGSit + ∆INVit) |/ TAit-1
+ β3 |∆OCFit |/ TAit-1 + β4 PMGR2it + β5 SIZEit+ β6 LEVit + β7 ∆LIQUIDITYit + β8 ∆NETWORTHit+
β9 ROSit + β10 MBit-1 + β11CAPit + β12 INSTit + εit

Coefficient Value
-0.004
β0
0.092
β1
0.276
β2
0.016
β3
0.035
β4
0.005
β5
0.083
β6
0.105
β7
-0.043
β8
0.118
β9
0.082
β10
-0.009
β11
β12

0.049

Adjusted R2 0.154
F-statistic
18.039

N = 1120
S&P 500
t-stat.
-0.369
1.642
4.964
0.552
1.199
0.156
2.877
3.737
-1.508
3.878
2.722
-0.314

p-value
0.356
0.050
0.000
0.290
0.116
0.438
0.002
0.000
0.066
0.000
0.004
0.377

1.700

0.045

N = 1968
Non S&P 500
Value
t-stat.
0.085
7.748
-0.343
-6.177
0.604
11.020
0.129
5.675
-0.041
-1.906
-0.103
-4.614
0.086
3.944
0.092
3.945
0.011
0.462
0.061
2.848
-0.006
-0.275
-0.100
-4.657
-0.045

-2.101

p-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.033
0.028
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.322
0.002
0.392
0.000
0.018

0.167
33.758

Note: All variables are defined in previous sections. The reported p-values are one-tailed.
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Table 23: Annual Cross-Sectional Regressions of Absolute Abnormal Accruals on Institutional
Stockholdings and Other Control Variables
N = 386
Full model:
|CACCit| / TAit-1 = β0 + β 1 |(∆REVit -∆RECit)| /TAit-1 + β 2 |(∆COGSit + ∆INVit)| /TAit-1 + β 3 |∆OCFit| / TAit-1 + β 4 PMGR2it +
β5 SIZEit + β6 LEVit + β 7 ∆LIQUIDITYit + β8 ∆NETWORTHit + β 9 ROSit + β 10 MBit-1 + β11 CAPit + β12 INSTit + εit

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

β0

Coeff.
t-statistic
p-value

0.056
3.287
0.000

0.105
5.273
0.000

0.077
3.075
0.001

0.085
4.484
0.000

0.080
3.795
0.000

0.118
3.803
0.000

0.063
3.500
0.000

0.019
0.920
0.179

β1

Coeff.
t-statistic
p-value

-0.159
-1.256
0.105

0.083
0.769
0.221

-0.437
-3.267
0.001

-0.569
-4.051
0.000

-0.337
-3.303
0.001

-0.336
-2.883
0.002

-0.712
-3.962
0.000

0.029
0.287
0.387

β2

Coeff.
t-statistic
p-value

0.523
4.158
0.000

0.167
1.570
0.058

0.704
5.420
0.000

0.915
6.453
0.000

0.568
5.623
0.000

0.545
4.608
0.000

0.957
5.362
0.000

0.359
3.614
0.000

β3

Coeff.
t-statistic
p-value

0.091
1.840
0.034

-0.007
-0.118
0.453

0.184
3.577
0.090

0.110
2.336
0.010

0.093
1.783
0.038

0.121
2.040
0.021

0.141
2.781
0.003

0.092
1.795
0.036

β4

Coeff.
t-statistic
p-value

-0.050
-1.017
0.155

-0.064
-1.229
0.110

-0.065
-1.402
0.081

-0.025
-0.553
0.280

-0.026
-0.522
0.301

-0.033
-0.669
0.252

-0.028
-0.568
0.285

0.001
0.022
0.490
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Table 23 (Continued)
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

β5

Coeff.
t-statistic
p-value

-0.067
-1.297
0.100

-0.216
-3.627
0.000

-0.065
-1.270
0.102

-0.200
-3.713
0.000

-0.152
-2.769
0.003

-0.164
-2.845
0.002

-0.124
-2.354
0.009

0.007
0.150
0.440

β6

Coeff.
t-statistic
p-value

0.017
0.366
0.357

0.040
0.823
0.205

0.137
2.933
0.002

0.085
1.927
0.028

-0.008
-0.161
0.436

0.153
3.049
0.001

0.080
1.600
0.055

0.018
0.343
0.366

β7

Coeff.
t-statistic
p-value

-0.057
-1.049
0.147

-0.035
-0.673
0.250

0.105
2.357
0.009

0.245
5.624
0.000

0.042
0.788
0.216

-0.066
-1.361
0.087

-0.030
-0.535
0.298

-0.041
-0.673
0.250

β8

Coeff.
t-statistic
p-value

0.093
1.674
0.047

-0.037
-0.696
0.244

0.227
5.042
0.000

0.059
1.245
0.107

0.017
0.331
0.370

0.062
1.153
0.125

0.015
0.272
0.393

-0.055
-0.887
0.188

β9

Coeff.
t-statistic
p-value

0.078
1.587
0.056

0.044
0.872
0.192

0.055
1.237
0.109

0.160
3.653
0.000

0.058
1.149
0.126

0.047
0.905
0.183

0.128
2.550
0.055

0.021
0.391
0.348

β 10

Coeff.
t-statistic
p-value

0.042
0.909
0.182

0.012
0.238
0.406

-0.190
-4.014
0.000

-0.024
-0.557
0.289

0.002
0.042
0.483

0.004
0.087
0.465

0.095
1.889
0.030

-0.008
-0.175
0.430

β 11

Coeff.
t-statistic
p-value

0.016
0.346
0.364

-0.008
-0.159
0.476

-0.082
-1.817
0.035

-0.117
-2.582
0.005

-0.116
-2.314
0.010

-0.149
-2.605
0.005

-0.078
-1.501
0.067

-0.116
-2.331
0.010
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Table 23 (Continued)

* β 12

Adjusted R2
F-statistic

Coeff.
t-statistic
p-value

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

-0.100
-1.962
0.025

-0.070
-1.293
0.098

-0.099
-2.081
0.019

0.007
0.156
0.438

0.039
0.767
0.222

-0.066
-1.320
0.094

-0.11
-0.229
0.409

0.091
1.916
0.028

0.189
8.468

0.112
5.039

0.282
13.583

0.312
15.545

0.124
5.550

0.139
6.190

0.145
6.456

0.185
8.271

Note: All variables are defined in previous sections. The reported p-values are one-tailed.
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By using the full model, I estimate the concentration effects by including an
interaction variable, INST*CONC. The result shows that in the presence of all control
variables, CONC, INST and the interaction variable are all significant at the 1% level
(with p-values of 0.002, 0.008 and 0.006 respectively). This result is somewhat different
from the one reported in the main analysis. The interesting thing is that the coefficient of
the interaction variable is significantly positive. For firms with concentrated institutional
stockholdings, the coefficient value for the total institutional effect is (-0.068 + 0.129) =
0.61 while for firms not having any concentrated shareholdings by institutions, the
coefficient value is -0.068. It is evident that the mitigating influence of institutions is
greater in firms without concentrated institutional stockholdings as revealed by the test
results, which is counterintuitive and contrary to the results of the main analysis. One
interpretation is that firms with concentrated shareholdings have lower magnitudes of
abnormal accruals, which may be due to some unknown firm-specific factors in the study
and not due to institutional monitoring. This explanation contradicts the basic premise
underlying the concentration hypothesis that concentrated shareholdings are an essential
component of corporate governance in that they increase the economic stake of investors
and provide greater incentives to monitor management in their policy decisions regarding
accounting or other matters. Another reason for such a conflicting result is different
structures of the regression models used in these two types of settings, i.e., in the main
analysis, the dependent variable, FLACAC, estimated at an individual firm level and the
average values of independent variables are used to examine the regression relationship;
however, in the pooled cross-sectional time-series setting, I stack firm-year data to study
the institutional effect on cross-sectional differences in abnormal current accruals.
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Further research in this direction is warranted to look more thoroughly into this area of
anomaly and the reasons thereof. Moreover, further refinement may be required for
estimating concentration construct that would more effectively and precisely reflect its
effect on accrual management. As a whole, I find some support for the second hypothesis
from this pooled cross-sectional setting although some portion of the results conflict with
the basic notion of corporate governance.
Panel B of Table 20 reports the test results from estimating the equation 12C with
respect to various concentration measures. I find that none of these measures,
CONPERC, MULTCON or AVGHOLD are statistically significant in the presence of
other control variables.46
Table 21 presents the test results of institutional effects on accrual management
for the two categories of firms, the S&P 500 and the non S&P 500 in the sample by
estimating the equation 13. By using the reduced model 1, I replicate the regression to
estimate the effect of the S&P dummy in the presence of the control variables only. Like
the results reported in the main analysis, I find that the S&P dummy is not significant. By
using the reduced model 2, I examine the differential effects of institutional monitoring
on accrual management in the two sets of firms. The coefficient of the S&P dummy is
negative and highly significant (t-statistic: -3.452; p-value: 0.000) indicating that the
general level of abnormal accrual is lower in the S&P 500 firms. INST is found to be
insignificant (p-value: 0.146). But the interactive variable, INST*S&P, is found to be
46

In all the pooled cross-sectional tests, I also estimate the regression models by including year dummy
variables for eight years to capture any year-specific effects and to reduce the possibility of serial
dependence among residuals that may arise from the effects of common year-specific factors. None of the
year dummy variables is found to be significant. The basic results remain unaltered but most of the
coefficients become more robust. Moreover, I find that when the year-specific effects are controlled in this
manner, the coefficient of CONPERC has become significant at 10% level (coefficient: -0.022; t-statistic: 1.268; p-value: 0.100).
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significant at the 10% level (p-value: 0.076). The coefficient value for the S&P 500 firms
regarding the institutional effect is (-0.031 + 0.117) = 0.086 while that for the non S&P
500 firms is -0.031. It is evident therefore that the institutional monitoring effect is
largely moderated in the S&P 500 firms compared to the non S&P 500 firms. The result
changes when I estimate the differential institutional effects for the two categories of
firms in presence of other control variables by using the full model. Again, the coefficient
of S&P is negative but not significant (with p-value of 0.144). INST is significant (pvalue: 0.020) but the interaction variable, INST*S&P, is found to be insignificant (pvalue: 0.158). So, there is a difference in the institutional monitoring effect on accrual
management for the two categories of firms in the sample. But the evidence is
inconsistent across the models. The differential institutional effect as reflected by the
interactive variable disappears in the presence of all control variables in the regression.
Hence to better comprehend the institutional effects in the two categories of firms, I
estimate the regression equation 11 separately for the S&P 500 and the non S&P 500
firms.47
Table 22 exhibits the test results by estimating the equation 11 separately for the
S&P 500 and the non S&P 500 firms. It appears that for the S&P 500 firms, the
coefficient of INST is positive and significant at the 5% level (p-value: 0.045) whereas
for the non S&P 500 firms, the coefficient of INST is negative and significant at the 5%

47

I also estimate the cross-sectional regressions as described in the equations 11 to 13 by using fixedeffects model to control for firm-specific effect in the regressions. In the models, I control for the firmspecific effects by introducing dummy variable to represent each firm. I find that in most cases the results
are not significant, which indicates that the relationship between institutional investor shareholdings and
magnitude of abnormal accruals is basically driven by intertemporally stable firm-specific factors.
Controlling such factors makes the institution’s effect less powerful or insignificant in the cross-sectional
setting. This finding amplifies the basic premise underlying the main analysis of this study that the analysis
of accruals should be made at the individual firm level to properly capture the institutional investor
influence on management’s decision to make accrual adjustments in order to manage earnings.
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level (p-value: 0.018) in the presence of all control variables. The result is consistent with
the main research finding that the effect of institutional monitoring on accrual
management is different for these two categories of firms. The institutional monitoring
effect on accrual management levels is found to be large and negative for the non S&P
500 firms while for the S&P 500 firms, the institutional effect is found to be significantly
positive. The institutional monitoring effect on accrual management in the non S&P 500
firms is found to be consistent with the prediction and the result of the main analysis. It
is, however, counter-intuitive that institutional percentage shareholdings are positively
correlated with the magnitude of abnormal accruals for the S&P 500 firms. The accrual
generation process and the effects of institutional monitoring on such process in the
highly visible and large capitalization firms like the S&P 500 firms therefore need to be
further examined, preferably at the individual firm level, which suggests a future research
avenue in this direction.
•

Annual cross-sectional regression tests
Table 23 reports the results of annual cross-sectional regressions of absolute

accruals on institutional percentage shareholdings and other control variables. The
coefficients of INST are generally found to be negative (in five out of eight years, INST
coefficients are negative), and in four out of eight years, they are statistically significant.
It is also observed that compared to the latter part of the sample period, in the earlier part
firms experience greater institutional monitoring. The annual regression tests reveal that
over the time-period from 1991 to 1998, there is a change in the cross-sectional
relationship between institutional stock ownership and magnitude of abnormal accruals.
Furthermore, I find that the overall power of the cross-sectional accrual model has
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declined over the sample time-period as revealed by the adjusted R2. For the first four
years, the average adjusted R2 is 22.37% while for the last four years it is 14.83%. It
seems that the accrual generation process of the firms in the sample has undergone
change during the time-period under study as the explanatory power of the determinant
variables accounting for the normal level of accruals have declined over time. As a
whole, based on the main analysis as well as the pooled cross-sectional test, it is evident
that institutions, in general, have provided active monitoring on the accrual management
of the sample firms during the time-period under study.
8.3. Institutional Monitoring Effects on Generation of Positive Abnormal Accruals
Prior literature argues that institutional investors are transient in nature and
formulate their investment strategies based on short term gains because, as Greaves
(1988) suggests, institutions cannot afford to be far-sighted because managers managing
investment funds are reviewed and rewarded on the basis of quarterly, or at most, annual
investment performance. Potter (1992) opines that institutional investors are overly
concerned about short-term earnings. Bushee (2000) finds evidence that transient
institutional ownership in a firm is positively and significantly associated with overweighting of near-term expected earnings and under-weighting of long-term earnings. In
other words, firm-values captured in near-term earnings are positively associated with
transient institutions’ ownership levels, and this phenomenon leads to the temporary
mispricing of stocks leading to significant abnormal returns in subsequent periods.
It follows, therefore, that such a short-term earnings preference of a section of
large blockholders can create pressure on firm managers to present decent profit numbers
to maintain or increase firm value in the market, or, at least to prevent temporary stock
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price decline that may result from institutional investors’ large-scale selling off of their
stockholdings in response to a less than expected earnings performance. Generating
positive abnormal accruals is one of the convenient ways of managing earnings upward
in these situations. Moreover, Dechow and Skinner (2000) suggest that due to the
increasing importance of stock market valuations in 1990s, managers became overly
concerned about their firm values in the market and their relations to the key accounting
numbers such as earnings. Therefore, it is more probable that under pressure to meet or
beat certain earnings benchmarks, managers resort to upward accrual management by
generating positive abnormal accruals.
Besides, there are certain incentives for managing income upward rather than
downward such as compensation, debt-covenant violations etc. In those cases, managers
are more likely to generate income increasing abnormal accruals to achieve their
economic objectives rather than income decreasing abnormal accruals. Therefore, there is
likelihood that positive abnormal accruals are more commonly used tools at the hands of
managers to achieve their economic objectives rather than negative abnormal accruals. In
view of this discussion, it is interesting to examine whether institutions, as a whole,
provide any mitigating influence on the process of generating positive accruals, or,
whether they pressure managers to resort to managing accruals upward.
In Table 24, I present test results on the association between positive abnormal
accruals and institutional ownership using the same pooled cross-sectional model as
described in the equation 11 with the exception that in this case, instead of including all
observations, I consider the firm years having positive current accruals. The dependent
variable of interest is, therefore, positive accounting accruals instead of absolute value of
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the total current accruals. It is noteworthy that the number of firm-years having positive
accruals is 1759, which is 57% of the total sample observations. The proportion of firmyears having positive accruals is greater than that of firm-years having negative accruals.
By using the reduced model, I estimate the relationship between positive
abnormal accruals and the institutional percentage shareholdings in a univariate test. The
coefficient of INST is found to be negative and highly significant (coefficient: -0.070; tstatistic: -2.941; p-value: 0.002). By using the full model, I examine the institutional
shareholding effect on positive abnormal accruals in the presence of all control variables
that account for the level of normal accruals. INST is still found to be significant at the
10% level (t-statistic: -1.562; p-value: 0.060). The results support the first hypothesis
suggesting that institutions provide mitigating influences on the level of positive
abnormal accruals in a firm.
In Panel A of Table 25, I present various test results with respect to the effects of
concentrated institutional shareholdings on the level of positive abnormal accruals. By
using the reduced model 1, I examine the effects of the CONC dummy. I find that CONC
is negative and highly significant at the 1% level (t-statistic: -2.590; p-value: 0.005).
Most of the control variables are significant in the predicted directions. By using the
reduced model 2, I examine the concentration effect in the presence of the general
institutional effect. I observe that after inclusion of INST, the CONC is still statistically
significant (p-value: 0.018). INST, on the other hand, is not significant (p-value: 0.328).
The results suggest that firms with concentrated institutional stockholdings experience
greater institutional monitoring on generation of positive abnormal accruals that reduces
the level of income-increasing abnormal accruals compared to firms not having
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concentrated institutional shareholdings. This concentration effect persists even in the
presence of the general institutional effect. Therefore, with respect to positive abnormal
accruals I find some clear evidence of an incremental monitoring effect of concentrated
institutional shareholdings on the accrual management level.
However, the result does not hold when I test the full model by including an
interaction variable, INST*CONC, in the previous model. The results obtained are
qualitatively the same as I find in the case of pooled regression tests for total absolute
current accruals. The CONC, INST, and interaction variables are all significant.
Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction variable is positive. The coefficient for firms
having concentrated institutional shareholdings is (-0.071+ 0.148) = 0.077 while that of
firms not having concentrated institutional shareholdings is -0.071.48 The test result
suggests that firms not having concentrated institutional shareholdings experience greater
institutional monitoring effect compared to firms having concentrated shareholdings. The
result is similar to that found in the previous test done in the cross-sectional setting with
total absolute current accruals and is conflicting to the findings of the main analysis.
Further research in this area is warranted investigating the causes of such conflicting
results.
Panel B reports the regression results concerning the effects of various
concentration measures on positive abnormal accruals in the presence of other control
variables. I find that CONPERC is negative and significant at the 10% level (t-statistic: 1.348; p-value: 0.089) but the other two measures, MULTCON and AVGHOLD, are not
significant. Therefore, like earlier pooled cross-sectional tests as well as the main
48

I also estimate the regression models by including year dummy variables to control for the effects of any
unknown year specific factors. None of the year dummy variables is found to be significant, and the basic
results remain the same.
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analysis, I find limited evidence of concentration effect on the level of positive abnormal
accruals.
Table 26 presents test results regarding the institutional monitoring effects on
positive abnormal accruals separately for the S&P 500 and the non S&P 500 firms in the
sample. Consistent with the findings of previous sections, I observe that institutions have
a differential monitoring influence in the case of these two sets of firms. The coefficient
of INST is positive and significant (t-statistic: 1.397; p-value: 0.082) for the S&P 500
firms while it is significantly negative (t-statistic: -1.592; p-value: 0.056) for the non S&P
500 firms. So, with respect to positive abnormal accruals, I find the same kind of
differential institutional monitoring effects as I observed in the main analysis as well as in
the pooled cross-sectional tests reported earlier. The institutional monitoring effect on the
management of income-increasing abnormal accrual is more pronounced in the non S&P
500 firms. However, it is counter-intuitive that the coefficient of INST is significantly
positive for the S&P 500 firms indicating that in such firms, institutions induce managers
to use positive/income-increasing accruals to manage earnings. Further research needs to
be done in the area of the accrual generation process by large firms like the S&P 500 and
institutional activism in the context of earning management of such firms.
I also estimate the institutional shareholding effect on positive abnormal accruals
by estimating equation 13 like the previous cross-sectional tests for absolute current
accruals as reported in Table 21. The results in this case are reported in Table 27. I find
qualitatively similar results. I do not find any differential institutional effects on positive
abnormal accruals between the two sets of firms. The interaction variable, INST*S&P,
remain insignificant both in the reduced and full models. The result is qualitatively
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Table 24: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression of Positive Accounting Accruals on
Institutional Percentage Shareholdings and Other Control Variables
N = 1759
Model: CACC+it/ TAit-1 = β0 + β1 [(∆REVit -∆RECit) /TAit-1] + β2 [(∆COGSit + ∆INVit) / TAit-1] + β3
(∆OCFit / TAit-1) + β4 PMGR2it + β5 SIZEit + β6 LEVit + β7 ∆LIQUIDITYit + β8 ∆NETWORTHit + β9
ROSit + β10 MBit-1+ β11CAPit + β12 INSTit + εit

Coefficient
β0
β1
β2
β3
β4
β5
β6
β7
β8
β9
β10
β11
β12
Adjusted R2
F-statistic

Value
0.005

Reduced
Model
t-stat.
13.732

p-value
0.000

Value
0.105
-0.608
0.923
0.026
-0.033
-0.186
0.144
0.121
0.042
0.101
-0.004
-0.042

Full Model
t-stat.
10.168
-10.085
15.617
1.138
-1.475
-7.756
6.740
5.624
1.940
4.684
-0.172
-1.943

p-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.128
0.070
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.026
0.000
0.432
0.026

-0.070

-2.941

0.002

-0.035

-1.562

0.060

0.004
8.650

0.246
48.862

Note: All variables are defined in previous sections. The p-values reported are one-tailed.
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Table 25: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis of Concentrated Institutional
Shareholding Effects on Management of Positive Accruals
N = 1759
Panel A: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regressions of Positive Accounting Accrual on
Concentrated Institutional Shareholdings and Other Control Variables
Full model: CACC+it /TAit-1 = β0 + β1 [(∆REVit -∆RECit) /TAit-1] + β2 [(∆COGSit + ∆INVit) / TAit-1] +
β3 (∆OCFit / TAit-1) + β4 PMGR2it + β5 SIZEit + β6 LEVit + β7 ∆LIQUIDITYit + β8 ∆NETWORTHit + β9
ROSit + β10 MBit-1+ β11CAPit + β12 CONCit + β13 INSTit + β14 (INSTit* CONCit) + εit

Coefficient
β0
β1
β2
β3
β4
β5
β6
β7
β8
β9
β10
β11
β12
β13
β14

Value
0.104
-0.611
0.923
0.027
-0.032
-0.197
0.151
0.118
0.043
0.095
-0.005
-0.041
-0.055

Adjusted R2 0.248
F-statistic
49.337

Reduced
Model 1
t-stat. p-value
10.411
0.000
-10.140 0.000
15.646
0.000
1.189
0.118
-1.462
0.072
-8.524
0.000
7.019
0.000
5.492
0.000
1.990
0.024
4.427
0.000
-0.224
0.412
-1.922
0.028
-2.590

0.005

Value
0.114
-0.611
0.924
0.027
-0.034
-0.194
0.150
0.118
0.043
0.096
-0.004
-0.041

Reduced
Model 2
t-stat.
10.394
-10.127
15.645
1.191
-1.521
-8.001
6.966
5.488
1.976
4.448
-0.194
-1.936

p-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.117
0.064
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.024
0.000
0.423
0.027

-0.050
-0.011

-2.111
-0.444

0.018
0.328

0.248
45.536

Value
0.116
-0.607
0.919
0.027
-0.033
-0.198
0.150
0.121
0.042
0.097
-0.002
-0.043

Full
Model
t-stat.
10.530
-10.073
15.575
1.166
-1.507
-8.144
6.952
5.622
1.932
4.481
-0.076
-2.015

p-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.122
0.066
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.027
0.000
0.470
0.022

-0.152
-0.071
0.148

-3.104
-1.987
2.381

0.001
0.024
0.009

0.250
42.801

Panel B: Reported Coefficients of Various Measures of Concentrated Institutional
Stockholdings from Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression regarding Positive
Abnormal Accruals

Coefficient
t-statistics
p-value

Concentration of institutional stockholding measures
CONPERC
MULTCON
AVGHOLD
-0.023
-0.009
-0.029
-1.077
-0.324
-1.348
0.141
0.373
0.089

Note: All variables are defined in previous sections. The p-values reported are one-tailed.
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Table 26: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regressions Testing the Institutional Shareholding
Effects on Positive Abnormal Accruals Separately for the S&P 500 and
the Non S&P 500 Firms
Full model: CACC+it / TAit-1 = β0 + β1 [(∆REVit -∆RECit) /TAit-1] + β2 [(∆COGSit + ∆INVit) / TAit-1] +
β3 (∆OCFit / TAit-1) + β4 PMGR2it + β5 SIZEit + β6 LEVit + β7 ∆LIQUIDITYit + β8 ∆NETWORTHit + β9
ROSit+ β10 MBit-1 + β11CAPit + β12 INSTit + εit
N = 611
Coefficient
β0
β1
β2
β3
β4
β5
β6
β7
β8
β9
β10
β11
β12
Adjusted R2
F-statistic

N = 1148

Value
0.038
-0.430
0.788
-0.054
0.018
-0.143
0.137
0.310
-0.013
0.158
0.094
0.041

S&P 500
t-stat.
2.253
-5.267
10.138
-1.454
0.475
-3.749
3.867
8.717
-0.358
4.190
2.533
1.206

p-value
0.013
0.000
0.000
0.073
0.318
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.360
0.000
0.006
0.114

Value
0.133
-0.660
0.956
0.037
-0.040
-0.192
0.161
0.154
0.064
0.083
-0.013
-0.049

0.051

1.397

0.082

-0.043

0.321
25.027

Non S&P 500
t-stat.
p-value
8.845
0.000
-8.691
0.000
12.841
0.000
1.309
0.096
-1.497
0.068
-6.798
0.000
5.957
0.000
5.559
0.000
2.263
0.012
3.122
0.001
-0.519
0.302
-1.831
0.034
-1.592

0.056

0.249
32.703

Note: All variables are defined in previous sections. The reported p-values are one-tailed.
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Table 27: Pooled Cross-Sectional Tests of the Institutional Shareholding Effects on
Positive Abnormal Accruals in the S&P 500 and the Non S&P 500 Firms
of the Full Sample
N = 1759
Full model: CACC+it /TAit-1 = β0 + β1 [(∆REVit -∆RECit) /TAit-1] + β2 [(∆COGSit + ∆INVit) / TAit-1] + β3
(∆OCFit / TAit-1) + β4 PMGR2it + β5 SIZEit + β6 LEVit + β7 ∆LIQUIDITYit + β8 ∆NETWORTHit + β9
ROSit + β10 MBit-1 + β11 CAPit + β12 S&Pit + β13 INSTit + β14 (INSTit* S&Pit) + εit
Reduced
Reduced
Full
Model 1
Model 2
Model
Coefficient Value
t-stat. p-value Value
t-stat.
p-value
Value
t-stat.
p-value
0.105
9.587
0.000 0.069
17.139
0.000
0.108
9.762
0.000
β0
-0.610 -10.107 0.000
-0.608
-10.084
0.000
β1
0.923
15.608
0.000
0.925
15.662
0.000
β2
0.026
1.115
0.133
0.025
1.105
0.135
β3
-0.024
-1.099
0.136
-0.033
-1.488
0.068
β4
-0.210
-7.350
0.000
-0.203
-6.984
0.000
β5
0.149
6.781
0.000
0.148
6.735
0.000
β6
0.123
5.703
0.003
0.122
5.671
0.000
β7
0.043
1.998
0.023
0.043
1.996
0.023
β8
0.098
4.515
0.000
0.100
4.618
0.000
β9
-0.007
-0.334
0.370
-0.004
-0.204
0.419
β10
-0.040
-1.867
0.031
-0.040
-1.846
0.033
β11
0.022
0.807
0.420* -0.253 -2.836
-0.059
-0.723
0.470*
β12
0.006*
-0.035 -1.272
0.200*
β13
-0.053
-2.097
0.036*
0.126
1.353
0.176*
0.099
1.199
0.230*
β14
Adjusted R2 0.245
F-statistic
48.663

0.021
13.358

0.247
42.099

Note: All variables are defined in previous sections.
*The reported p-values are two-tailed. All other p-values are one-tailed.
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similar to those found in the pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis regarding the
total absolute current accruals. The test results suggest that partitioning the full sample
into the S&P 500 and the non S&P 500 sub-samples and conducting the tests separately
for each set of firms is a superior method of identifying the differences in institutional
effects on accrual management between these two sets of firms.
As a whole, the results suggest that institutions, in general, provide active
monitoring on a firm’s strategy to generate positive (i.e., income-increasing) abnormal
current accruals to boost earnings to achieve various economic objectives. Moreover, this
institutional monitoring effect on income-increasing abnormal accruals is specifically
large and significant for the non S&P 500 firms. This finding is contrary to the transient
investor hypothesis as advocated by prior studies and is consistent with the active
institutional monitoring hypothesis in the accrual management context.
8.4. Regression Diagnostics
I conducted several regression diagnostic procedures on the main model and the
pooled cross-sectional model employed in the analysis. The variance inflation factors
(VIF) and condition indices do not provide any evidence that multicollinearity effect is a
problem.49 The Durbin-Watson tests of first order auto-correlation indicate that errors are
uncorrelated to each other. The influence statistics, DEFFITS and Cook’s D, do not
indicate the presence of any influential data-points that may significantly affect the
results of the study. For most observations, the value of Cook’s D is less than 1.50 In a
49

Chatterjee and Price (1977) indicate that the VIFs in excess of ten signify serious multicollinearity
problem. Belsley et al. (1980) suggest that a condition index greater than 15 indicates a possible problem
and in excess of thirty suggests a serious problem with multicollinearity among the explanatory variables in
the regression. In this respect, the regression models employed in this study are well specified.
50

Both DFFITS and Cook’s D are available in SAS. I compare the DFFITS value of each observation with
the value of [2* [(m+1) / n]1/2], m = No of coefficients and n = No of observations in the model, as
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very few cases, Cook’s D ranges between 2 and 3. After eliminating those specific
observations, the basic results remain unchanged. The normal probability plots indicate
that errors are normally distributed. In general, residual plots do not exhibit any
systematic pattern of error distribution. The residuals are plotted against the predicted
value of FLACAC and against INST and are found to be randomly distributed with no
pattern. Overall, these statistics indicate that the regression models applied in the study
are well specified and can be interpreted without concern that multicollinearity,
heteroscedasticity, or influential observations affect the results.

suggested by Belsley Kuh and Welsch (1980) to identify outlier observations and estimate their effects on
the results of the study. Cook’s D helps to determine how strongly a data-point affects the overall
regression results. This is essentially a scaled DFFITS statistic, and any score above 2 or so indicate
possible problem with a particular data-point (Cody and Smith 1997).
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9. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, I examine the effects of an influential corporate governance factor,
institutional stock ownership, on a firm’s accrual management activity over a time-period
of eight years from 1991 through 1998 for 386 NYSE listed unregulated industrial firms.
This study is important in view of the fact that very little research exists directly testing
the effects of a governance factor on a firm’s decision to manage earnings. Earnings
management research to date is mostly confined to the studies of specific economic
incentives that induce managers to make accrual adjustments in some predicted directions
to manage earnings. Moreover, there are very few studies that have examined how
institutions monitor specific managerial actions. Therefore, in order to complement
previous research on earnings management it becomes necessary to examine the effects
of factors that constrain managers’ ability and influence their choice to manage earnings.
In various tests conducted in this study, I find strong evidence that institutions
have provided active monitoring on the sample firms’ decisions to manage earnings. The
estimated managerial flexibility/discretion to manage accruals for the sample time-period
is negatively and significantly associated with the level of institutional percentage
stockholdings of sample firms. The test results suggest that institutional investors monitor
and constrain management’s discretion to engage in accrual manipulation to manage
earnings. The substantial institutional presence reduces the level of earnings management
by inhibiting managers to use questionable accounting techniques to manage accruals. In
this sense, institutional investors improve the quality of corporate governance. This
mitigating institutional influence is found to be greater in firms having concentrated
institutional shareholdings. I observe that the effect of concentrated shareholdings is
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significant in the case where it is considered on a stand-alone basis. But when the general
institutional effect is accounted for in the model, the concentrated shareholding is not
found to provide any additional effect over and above the general institutional monitoring
effects. Also, for certain measures of concentration, I find some evidence of mitigating
effects of concentrated institutional shareholding on the level of accrual management.
Moreover, I observe that the institutional influence on accrual management differs
between two categories of firms with different information environments, i.e., firms
having S&P 500 membership. Specifically, I observe a strong mitigating influence of
institutional investors on management flexibility in generating abnormal accruals for the
non S&P 500 firms but I do not find any significant institutional influence for the S&P
500 firms.
This “no institutional effect” result for the S&P 500 firms is consistent with the
fact that S&P 500 firms are generally large having high visibility and followings, and are
subject to monitoring by various regulatory and professional agencies. In such firms
institutional investors have, therefore, little room to provide additional influence on
managers in their accrual management efforts. I also observe that most of the traditional
determinants of accruals have no significant predictive abilities for the accrual generation
process of the S&P 500 firms as revealed from their insignificant coefficients in the main
cross-sectional accrual regression used in the study. Moreover, in the cross-sectional
pooled regressions using firm-year data the institutional effect is found to be positive
both in case of absolute abnormal accruals and in case of positive abnormal accruals. The
results contradict the basic notion of governance provided by institutional investors. I
suggest that the S&P 500 firms may have some unique abnormal accrual generating
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process, and that the traditional accrual model is insufficient to reflect that process.
Moreover, the role of institutions as the sophisticated investor group in such large, highly
visible firms needs to be further scrutinized. Therefore, future research is warranted in the
area of accrual generating process of such highly visible, large firms with high
institutional investor and analysts following, and the institutional activism in the context
of such accrual management.
In this study, I consider firms listed on the NYSE stock exchange as the sample
firms. Restricting the sample to the NYSE firms ensures a level of homogeneity across
sample firms. According to the NYSE listing requirements in the time-period of study,
the listed firms must have independent audit committees, which act as a governance
mechanism overseeing financial statement preparation and providing support to external
auditors leading to increases in audit effectiveness. Moreover, most firms in the sample
are audited by Big-5 auditors. The Big-5 auditors are assumed to provide high-quality
auditing in audit literature, and previous studies (e.g., Becker et al. 1998) find that high
quality external audits reduce the level of accrual manipulation by constraining
management’s accounting flexibility. Therefore, the firms in the sample are already
subject to some form of effective corporate governance. This study is an interesting
extension of this stream of research as it shows that when several governance factors are
in place, institutional investors still impact a firm’s decision to manage abnormal
accruals. The effect increases with the increase in the concentration of institutional
stockholdings in some concentration measures. The overall results of the study are also
consistent with that of a recent study done by Chung et al. (2002) who examine
institutional impact on a firm’s effort to maintain a smooth profile of earnings stream and
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report that institutional investors reduce managerial efforts to opportunistically engage in
generating discretionary accruals to manage and smooth earnings. The present study
differs from that of Chung et al. (2002) in that in this study, I examine the monitoring
influence of institutional investors in the context of the overall accrual management
process by employing a unique firm-specific abnormal accrual estimation approach
whereas Chung et al. (2002) restrict their investigation to a specific managerial action,
income smoothing, to manage earnings in a pooled cross-sectional setting.
The influence of two important governance factors, audit quality and audit
committee, in the context of accrual management was already examined by prior studies.
This study incrementally contributes to the existing literature of earnings management
and corporate governance by documenting the evidence of the effects of another
influential governance factor, institutional stock ownership on a firm’s accrual
management effort. I suggest that earnings management tests performed in many prior
studies may be more effective if they control for the cross-sectional variations in the level
and concentration of institutional stock ownership because managers’ abilities to manage
accruals are not uniform but vary across firms depending on the degree of governance
mechanisms.
The other notable contribution of the research is the unique model developed to
estimate the level of accrual management. Most previous research employed a crosssectional approach and used abnormal or discretionary accruals estimated according to
the firm-specific or cross-sectional version of the Jones (1991) or the modified Jones
(1995) models as the dependent variable of interest. In this study, I estimate management
flexibility in making abnormal accrual adjustments by ascertaining the firm-specific
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variability of abnormal accruals over the sample time-period based on the premise that
management strategy of managing earnings in a year is unlikely to be a single-year
decision but is a part of the broader strategy of reporting earnings number at a certain
level or within a certain range in compliance with the overall operating and financial plan
of an organization for a time-period. Therefore, the estimated managerial flexibility in
managing accruals could better reflect the multi-year aspect of accrual management. The
magnitude of abnormal accruals is positively and significantly correlated with
management flexibility as reported by previous research and observed by this study. This
management flexibility is used as the dependent variable of interest in the main analysis
of this study. Econometrically, this model also appears to be sound while estimating the
level of accrual management over a given time-period.
In this study, I examine aggregate institutional influence on a firm’s accrual
management activity. Institutional investors, however, differ from each other in their
investment objectives and horizons. So, the policies toward corporate governance and
their influence on a firm’s earnings management activity are not homogeneous across
different types of institutional investors. Moreover, Bushee (2000) documents that the
level of stock ownership by institutions with short investment horizons and by institutions
with stringent fiduciary standards is positively (negatively) associated with the amount of
firm-value captured in near-term (long-term) earnings. Hence, it is interesting to see how
different types of institutional investors with different investment objectives/policies
influence a firm’s earnings management. Therefore, a logical extension of this study is to
examine the influence of different categories of institutional investors having different
investment objectives and horizons on the level of a firm’s accrual management activity.
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The analysis of the empirical relationship between the level of accrual
management and percentage shareholdings by different classes of institutional investors
would also be a worthwhile exercise because the impact of concentrated stockownership
on accrual management may vary depending on investment policies and horizons of
different institutional investor types, e.g., transient versus dedicated institutional
investors, or, bank trusts versus pension funds. Therefore, examining the monitoring
effects of the concentrated shareholding of institutions at the aggregated level may have
balanced out the respective unique influence exerted by various classes of institutional
investors. The analysis can help explore the factors underlying investment decisions of
different classes of institutional stockowners and their strategy toward governing the
financial reporting process of firms in which they made substantial investments.
I design this study for a general setting. An extension is to examine the aggregate
institutional influence in specific situations where particular economic incentives to
manage earnings are expected to be present (e.g., income smoothing, reducing
political/regulatory costs, avoiding debt-covenant violations, meeting or beating earnings’
benchmarks, avoiding reporting losses) to see how this influential corporate governance
factor impacts a firm’s decision to manage accruals in view of such specific incentives.
I have observed that accrual generation process of the S&P 500 firms in the
sample are unique because most traditional determinants of accruals used in this study are
found to have little predictive ability to account for the normal accrual level of such
firms. Moreover, institutions are found to have no monitoring effect on abnormal accrual
generation of the S&P 500 firms as reported in the main analysis. Further, in the
specification check, I find evidence that in the pooled time-series cross-sectional setting

145

with firm-year data, the institutional shareholding is positively related to the level of
abnormal accruals of the sample S&P 500 firms. The result is somewhat contrary to the
general notion of institutional monitoring on corporate financial reporting process. The
S&P 500 firms are large capitalization firms having high visibility and large institutional
investor and financial analysts following. The nature of institutional activism in such
firms’ financial reporting and their accrual management are likely to be different from
firms not having the S&P 500 membership. It is, therefore, an interesting extension of
this research to investigate the accrual generation activity of the S&P 500 firms at the
individual firm level and the nature of institutional investors’ intervention in such
process.
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